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EDITORIAL COMMENT 
This report is one of a series produced by the Industrial Strategy Project. 
The ISP has its origins in the Economic Trends Research Group, a collective of 
economists and other social scientists convened by the Congress of South African Trade 
Unions in 1986. COSATU, under attack for its support for sanctions, initially asked these 
researchers to examine the impact of enforced isolation on the South African economy. It 
soon became clear that sanctions were a small aspect of the problems besetting the South 
African economy, and the work of the Economic Trends Research Group expanded into a 
full-blown analysis of South Africa's economic crisis. 
The poor performance of South Africa's manufacturing sector loomed large in the litany 
of problems bedeviling the South African economy. The 1980s had been, in economic 
terms, something of a lost decade. The manufacturing sector was particularly conspicuous 
by its inability to create jobs, and to produce commodities that satisfied the divergent 
requirements of the domestic and international markets. A range of factors contributed to 
this malaise — apartheid's impact on the skills profile of the workforce, repressive and 
outmoded industrial relations systems and work organisation, a highly concentrated 
industrial structure and a concomitantly weak and repressed SME and micro-enterprise 
sector, and a highly inward oriented trade regime, were the most obvious sources of the 
crisis in manufacturing. 
However, the solutions were less obvious than the problems, and in 1990, again at 
COSATU's initiation, the ISP was conceived. From the outset, the political environment 
ensured that the ISP would not be an ordinary research project. The unbanning of the ANC 
and the certainty of the immediate accession to power of COSATU's political ally, 
coupled with the union federation's increasingly direct role in policy formulation, ensured 
that the ISP focus closely on policy, contributing to the development of the industrial 
policy that would address the poor performance of South African manufacturing. 
To this end, the ISP engaged a range of researchers with the purpose of undertaking 
detailed examinations of the key sub-sectors of South African manufacturing. The fruits of 
the ISP are to be found in the reports, such as this one, most of which are to be published 
by the UCT Press. The authors of the reports were assigned, generally for a period of 14 
months, to the study of a particular sector. The researchers were required to study the local 
sector and the factors promoting and restraining its development. They were required to 
assess its prospects in the light of the likely global trajectory of the industry. Detailed 
examination of local firms were complemented by international visits that enabled the 
researchers to consult with international experts and visit factories to enable them to 
situate South African firms in a comparative perspective. 
In addition to the sectoral studies, the ISP also engaged researchers to examine key cross- 
cutting issues. Those selected for study were human resource developmeilt and industrial 
relations, technology development, market and ownership structures, trade performance 
and policies, and regional industrial strategies. 
Industrial policy is not a plan easily contained between the covers of a single document. It 
is a process, a process of engagement between the key industrial stakeholders. South 
Africa's peculiar transition has given concrete expression to this credo, with the tripartite 
National Economic Forum and the various sectoral task groups the key institutions and 
processes within which an evolving industrial policy is being developed. COSATU has 
played the leading role in this process. The ISP has, in turn, made a significant 
contribution to COSATU 's capacities. It has done this by constant dialogue between the 
ISP and the COSATIJ leadership, and by a traineeship programme which saw a number of 
union leaders seconded to the ISP for its duration. 
In addition the research process has engaged a range of key actors. Individual researchers 
have engaged with union and business leaders and experts within government. The ISP 
was punctuated by a series of intensive workshop attended by the researchers, COSATU 
and ANC leaders, and other local and international experts. The work-in-progress was 
thoroughly discussed and critiqued at these workshops and it is appropriate to see each 
report as owing a great deal to the ISP collective. 
A number of researchers are continuing their work from within the industry task forces, 
the unions, and the structures of the new government. The ISP itself is moving into a 
second phase, taking up questions still unanswered, re-examining conclusions of the first 
phase and continuing the unending process of developing industrial policy. It is in this 
spirit that these reports should be read: they are not final plans, but simply attempts to start 
a vital process, one that will of necessity be taken forward by all of the major industry 
participants. 
The Industrial Strategy Project was funded by generous grants from the Humanistisch 
Instituut Voor Ontwikkelingssamenwerking (HIVOS) of The Netherlands, the 
International Development Research Centre (IDRC), Ottawa, Canada, and the Olof Palme 
International Centre of Sweden. We benefitted not only from the financial resources of 
these institutions, but also from the wide-ranging experience of their staff members and 
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FOREWORD 
In the late eighties COSATU commissioned a group of economists to prepare a report 
analysing the impact of sanctions on the South African economy. We commissioned this 
work in response to criticism in the media and elsewhere that held us — through our 
support for sanctions — responsible for the sorry state of the South African economy, 
including the miserable conditions of our members and others whose interests and 
aspirations we represented. 
The research revealed that the crisis of the South African economy was rooted in the 
policies of the apartheid era and our commission to the economists was transformed into a 
full-scale critique of the economics of apartheid. A key consequence of the failures of 
apartheid's social and economic policies was its unproductive manufacturing sector. It was 
unable to produce basic goods of a suitable quality and at an affordable price; it was 
unable to produce goods that successfully penetrated international markets; it relied on 
low paid, poorly trained workers, and harsh, authoritarian shop floor supervision; above 
all, it proved incapable of generating desperately needed employment. While 
manufacturing's contribution to the global economy escalated, South Africa relied 
increasingly on its natural resource base and the cheap labour that mined and farmed it. 
Appreciation of these problems inspired COSATU to request its research collective to 
undertake research in support of our attempt to formulate a new industrial policy. This 
request flowered into the Industrial Strategy Project whose output is represented in these 
reports. 
The research process has been characterised by considerable dialogue between COSATU, 
its affiliates and the researchers. We have learnt much from this interaction; we are 
confident that we have taught the researchers much. However this work is the output of an 
independent research collective. As is to be expected in an arms length relationship of this 
kind, we do not agree with every line of each report, we do not accept every 
recommendation. But with regard to its major findings, we do agree that there is a real 
potential for building an efficient manufacturing base, rooted in well paid, productive 
workers. Above all we believe, and this is endorsed by the ISP, that an independent trade 
union movement actively and aggressively pursuing its interests is not merely compatible 
with rapid and sustainable industrial development — it is a precondition. p4 
John Gomomo 
President, Congress of South African Trade Unions 
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Chapter One: Introduction - focus of the study 
1.1 The challenge 
Over the next twelve years the South African textile industry is going to face its most 
serious challenge yet. The challenge is whether the industry is going to survive or not. One 
source of challenge comes from the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GAiT) concluded at the end of 1993. The Uruguay Round determined that 
tariffs in the South African textile and clothing industries will have to be lowered to 
approximately half their existing rates over the next twelve years. For the first four years 
the rates will remain the same, but thereafter they will be reduced more or less steadily 
over the next eight years to approximately half the existing rates (See Table 4.6 below). 
This means that the South African textile industry will be faced by unprecedented 
international competition that will keep on increasing from years five to twelve. In the 
light of this looming threat it is imperative for the textile industry to develop an industrial 
strategy. A primary aim of the strategy should be to ensure the long term viability of the 
textile industry as South Africa re-enters the international community. 
1.2 What is an industrial strategy? 
Although this is a question which can be answered at many levels, it will be answered 
purely at the level of an industrial sector. The approach towards industrial strategy 
developed by Michael Best is adopted in this paper. According to Best, 'the purpose of 
strategic industrial policy is to promote Schumpeterian competition and (collective) 
entrepreneurial firms' (Best, 1990:265—6). 
In Schumpeterian competition it is not price competition that counts, 'but the competition 
from the new commodity, the new technology, the new source of supply, the new type of 
organization . . . competition which commands a decisive cost or quality advantage and 
which strikes not at the margins of the profits and the outputs of the existing firms but at 
their foundations and their very lives' (Schumpeter, 1942, quoted in Best, 1990:118—9). 
Schumpeter calls this a process of Creative Destruction 'that incessantly revolutionizes the 
economic structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a 
new one' (Schumpeter, 1942:83, quoted in Best, 1990:119). 
Best draws three distinctions between a Schumpeterian entrepreneurial firm and a 
hierarchical firm. The first distinction is that the entrepreneurial firm has a strategic 
1 At the time of going to print the government had not yet announced its new tariff regime for the textile 
industry. 
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orientation: la strategically oriented firm chooses the terrain on which to compete; a 
hierarchical firm takes the terrain as given' (Best, 1990:11). 
'The second distinction between the entrepreneurial and the hierarchical firm is that the 
goals of the entrepreneurial firm is to gain strategic advantage by continuous improvement 
in process and product; the goal of the hierarchical firm is to gain minimum production 
costs by continuity in production operations, product runs, and product design' (Best, 
1990:11—12). 
The third distinction is in the organisation of production. Success, in Schumpeterian 
competition, 'depends upon maintaining the organizational flexibility required to be able 
to adjust a firm's competitive strategy depending upon the strengths and weakness of its 
competitors at any point in time' (Best, 1990:12). 
Best lists four aspects of industrial strategy policy that stand out. 
1. It depends upon strong antitrust pro-competition policy, whether formal or informal 
(Best, 1990:266). 
2. Firms do not operate only on a competitive basis, but on finding a 'balance between 
cooperation and competition' by means of 'preserving and buttressing inter-firm 
networks' (Best, 1990:266—7). 
3. In strategic industrial policy there is a primacy of strategy over planning: 
The task of strategic planning is not to plan industries of the future, but to examine the 
prerequisites for sustaining competitive success and work to ensure that firms, which 
provide the real dynamic thrust, can respond quickly as new markets emerge (Best, 
1990:268). 
He warns that 'developing sector strategies is not an intellectual project for detached 
economic planners'. Rather it requires 'independent but "hands-on" industry studies 
and the integration of thinkers and doers. This is the role of a forum composed of 
ministry officers and enterprise leaders' (Best, 1990:268). He should have added trade 
unionists to the list as well, but goes on to argue for a link between the industrial 
policy forums and other government instruments such as macro policy, the banking 
system, and education policy. This is because: 
An active industrial policy not only puts pressure on macro policy makers to think long 
term, but on the banking system to develop strategically oriented lending criteria and the 
educational system to upgrade the qualifications of the workforce (Best, 1990:268, 
footnote 15). 
4. Strategic industrial policy 'is a universal or sector-specific, as opposed to firm- 
specific, orientation'. This is because 'sector-specific industrial policies are less prone 
to special interest politics' (Best, 1990:269). 
Best highlights three elements of the successful industrial policy activities of the public 
authorities in Japan and the Third Italy. 
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'The first element in a successful industrial policy is a creative use and shaping of the 
market. Industrial policy fails when it overrides or ignores the market and is based upon 
the presumption that plans and markets are alternative means of economic coordination. 
The purpose is not to substitute the plan for the market but to shape and use markets. The 
market, it has been said, is a good servant, but a bad master. 
'Second, successful industrial policy has a production as opposed to a distributional focus. 
The primary goal of industrial policy in Japan is to promote the New Competition: the 
entrepreneurial firm, consultative buyer-vendor relations, and inter-firm associations and 
extra-firm agencies which facilitate continuous improvement in production. As an 
employment or distributional instrument industrial policy is inherently flawed . . . The 
sorry record of industrial policy in both American and British experiences has been a 
failure to target industrial policy to production advancement. 
'Third, Japanese industrial policy has been strategically focused. it is about the targeting 
of strategic sectors to maximize industrial growth. It means moving into new sectors a step 
ahead of the competition. . . Strategic sectors are those where an international competitive 
advantage can be secured by gaining organizational superiority. But the target is moving. 
It started with labour-intensive goods, moved to skilled-labour raw-materials intensive 
sectors, and eventually on to knowledge intensive sectors' (Best, 1990:20—21). 
It is salutary to bear Best's points in mind while attempting to develop an industrial 
strategy for the South African textile industry. 
1.3 The need for international competitiveness 
The challenge facing the South African textile industry can effectively be encapsulated in 
a single requirement: the attainment of international competitiveness. Porter (1990), like 
Best, suggests that there is only one way in which an industry can become and remain 
internationally competitive today, and that is through continuous improvement of 
productivity at the level of the firm. He argues that, in a particular country: 
A nation's firms must relentlessly improve productivity in existing industries by raising 
product quality, adding desirable features, improving product technology, or boosting 
production efficiency. . . . A nation's firms must also develop the capabilities required to 
compete in more and more sophisticated industry segments, where productivity is 
generally higher. . . . All this would make it clear why cheap labour and a ufavourable 
exchange rate are not meaningful definitions of competitiveness. The aim is to support 
high wages and command premium prices in international markets (Porter, 1990:6—7). 
Porter views the industry as the basic unit of analysis for understanding national 
advantage. He places an emphasis not only on the importance of firms gaining a 
competitive advantage, but also on the environment in which the firms operate: 
Firms gain competitive advantage where their home base allows and supports the most 
rapid accumulation of specialized assets and skills, sometimes due solely to greater 
commitment. Firms gain competitive advantage in industries when their home base affords 
better ongoing information and insight into product and process needs. Firms gain 
competitive advantage when the goals of owners, managers, and employees support 
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intense commitment and sustained investment. Ultimately, nations succeed in particular 
industries because their home environment is the most dynamic and the most challenging, 
and stimulates and prods firms to upgrade and widen their advantages over time (Porter, 
1990:71). 
In seeking to develop an industrial strategy for the textile industry in South Africa it 
therefore makes good sense to research the competitive advantages of the industry at the 
company level. This paper accordingly places great emphasis on company case studies as 
a method of identifying areas of competitive advantage of the textile industry in South 
Africa. At the same time it is immensely important to pay attention to developing the 
capabilities (such as training) as well as additional institutions at industry level which 
would be necessary to implement an industrial strategy. 
1.4 Scope of the study 
The South African textile industry is a large and diversified industry producing a wide 
range of products, from cotton and woollen fabrics to door and tailgate panels. Because of 
this diversity it is not easy to research and propose an industrial strategy for the industry as a whole. In addition, the industry forms part of a pipeline in which the raw material (fibre) 
passes through various distinct transformation processes that often constitute different 
industries. For instance, in the production of a chemical fibre, its transformation into a 
garment, and sale to a customer, the fibre passes through four industries: the chemical, 
textile, clothing and retail industries.2 
This study concentrates only on the spinning, weaving and finishing segment of the textile 
industry. This segment was chosen for the following reasons: 
• it is the largest segment in the textile industry in terms of employment and 
production. 
• it is the major provider of raw materials to the clothing industry (which has also 
been studied by the Industrial Strategy Project). 
• there is a need for informed debate to assist in resolving the dispute that has 
characterised the relationship between the clothing and textile industries for a 
long time. 
The industrial strategy developed for the spinning, weaving and finishing segment of the 
textile industry may therefore not be appropriate for the industry as a whole, especially the 
segments where their product market differs substantially from that of the spinning, 
weaving and finishing product market. 
2. Throughout this book the term 'chemical fibre' rather than 'man-made fibre' is used. This is to avoid use 
of the gender-insensitive term 'man-made'. The term 'human-made' seemed more appropriate, but the 
internationally recognised Textile Terms and Definitions of the Textile Institute (1991:114) states that 
'chemical fibre' is already being used by people wishing to avoid the term 'man-made fibre'. 
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Figure 1.1 
The South African textile-clothing pipeline 
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Figure 1.1 provides a clear presentation of the major segments in the South African textile 
industry as well as its relationship with other industries in the textile fiiere (pipeline). It 
clearly indicates the spinning, weaving and finishing segment, on which this study 
focuses. It is important to note that the spinning, weaving and finishing segment also 
produces household and industrial goods. 
1.5 Outline of the paper 
Chapter One comprises this Introduction. 
Chapter Two commences with an overview of changing trends in production, trade and 
technology in the international textile industry. It proceeds by outlining the international 
trade regime. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATF), the multi-fibre 
arrangement (MFA) and South Africa's relationship with the European Community (EC) 
are reviewed briefly. 
Chapter Three contains an overview of the South African textile industry. This includes a 
brief history of the industry and a macro-economic analysis of the industry over the past 
twenty years. The chapter ends with an examination of the contemporary structure and 
employment patterns of the industry. 
Chapter Four begins with a broad-brush examination of the South African textile 
industry's exports and imports over the past 20 years and a more detailed analysis over the 
past four years. The South African trade regime is then analysed. The complex system of 
tariffs and export incentive schemes including the discredited Structural Adjustment 
Program are examined critically. Modifications consistent with the GAIT requirements 
and the Uruguay Round are suggested. 
Chapter Five proposes an industrial strategy for the South African textile industry's 
spinning, weaving and finishing segment. The approach used is, firstly, a comparative cost 
analysis and, secondly, company case studies of seven successful and competitive 
companies. The proposed strategy is that this segment of the industry needs to shift to the 
production of differentiated higher value-added goods. Quality fabrics have to be 
differentiated on the basis of design or specialisation in order to compete effectively on 
local and international niche markets. 
Chapter Six provides additional corroboration of the appropriateness of the proposed 
strategy, on the basis of two international company case studies, one in Turkey and the 
other in the UK. This study attests to the appropriateness of the strategy identified for the 
local textile industry. Chapter Five however also includes an analysis of the reasons for 
the collapse of Turkish textile exports throughout the 1980's. 
Chapter Seven broadens the study by analysing the problems in South Africa's textile- 
clothing pipeline. This analysis concludes that there is considerable volatility in demand 
for textiles due to the length and the large holdings of stock in the pipeline. A solution to 
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the problem, the Quick Response technique, is presented in detail as well as its application 
in South Africa. 
Chapter Eight examines the role of the industry's dominant trade union, the South African 
Clothing and Textile Workers' Union (SAcTWU), in formulating and implementing an 
industrial strategy. The chapter moves on to consider training needs in the textile industry, 
the training policy of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), and 
finally, recommendations to SACTWU on issues dealt with in the chapter. 
Chapter Nine rounds off the study by briefly summarising its major recommendations. 
Finally, the study is concluded by discussing the adjustment problems that will arise if the 
suggested industrial strategy is pursued. Although the restructuring will include job losses 
it is concluded that more jobs will actually be created in the textile and clothing industries 
combined than will be lost in the textile industry alone. 
Chapter Two: Trends in the international textile 
industry 
In mapping out a medium to long term strategy for the South African textile industry it is 
necessary to be aware of the major trends in the international textile industry as well as in 
the international trade regime. This chapter accordingly starts with an examination of 
international developments in the textile industry. It then moves on to analyse the 
international trade regime faced by the South African textile industry. The significance of 
GATF and the MFA, as well as South Africa's relationship with the EC are considered. 
2.1 International developments in the textile industry 
2.1.1 Global production and trade trends 1960-1990 
On a global level the textile industry is growing more slowly than most other categories of 
industry, even in regions where textiles are experiencing comparatively rapid growth. 
Between 1967 and 1979 the annual growth rate of textile production in the world was 
3,6% while the rate for all manufacturing was 5,1%. This could be due to the fact that the 
share of textile production falls as a proportion of total manufacturing output as GDP per 
capita rises (Toyne et al, 1984:50—53). 
In the twenty years from 1960 to 1980 the growth of chemical fibre production far 
outstripped that of natural fibre production.' In the period world production of chemical 
fibre increased more than 300 percent while natural fibre increased only by about 36 
percent. The combined increase of all fibres was roughly 100 percent resulting in a global 
increase of per capita textile consumption of 35 percent over the period (Toyne et al, 
1984 :52 and Table 4.1). 
However, in the subsequent decade from 1980 to 1990 the trend did not continue. During 
the period the share of chemical fibre production as a proportion of total fibre production 
remained almost stable declining marginally from 47,7 percent to 47,4 percent. This was 
due, on the one hand, to the fall in cellulosic fibre output and, on the other hand, 
favourable weather conditions and attractive prices for natural fibres (Anson and Simpson, 
1991:8—9). 
The trends in global trade tended to follow the trend in world production. Chemical fibre 
fabric trade experienced the fastest world-wide growth during the 1970's. Out of a total 
average annual increase of $3,5 billion in textile trade from 1970 to 1979, chemical fibre 
1 Throughout this book the term 'chemical fibre' rather than 'man-made' fibre is used. See Textiles Terms 
and Definitions of the Textile Institute (1991:14). 
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fabric (SITC Group 653) accounted for $1 billion. Although cotton lost ground to 
synthetic fibres, woven cotton fabric (SITC Group 652) still added $580 million on 
average per year. In addition yarns of all fibres (SITC Group 651) added a further $780 
million on average each year to the total of textile trade. Between them these three textile 
groups accounted for more than two-thirds of textile trade growth in the 1970's (Toyne et 
al, 1984:57). 
On a regional level Asian countries made significant headway in the 1970's. Korea, 
starting from a small output of $715 million in 1970, increased its production tenfold by 
the end of the decade. In terms of exports, Japan and South Korea made significant 
inroads. For the whole decade of the 1970's Japan was the largest exporter of chemical 
fibre woven products, a result in keeping with Japan's strategy of moving into relatively 
high value-added, high-technology goods. 
In terms of spinning capacity Taiwan, Thailand and Indonesia registered very high growth 
rates in the 1960's and 1970's. Over the same period the number of spindles in Japan 
decreased thereby shifting production of lower value-added textiles to lower cost Asian 
countries (Toyne et at, 1984:58,61,90 and Table 5.14). 
In the 1980's a potentially dangerous development took place. It was the production of an 
over-capacity in the primary textile industry. In the nine years between 1980 and 1988, 
cotton yarn production in the world outside of Eastern Europe, Russia and China increased 
by 34 percent. While it rose by only 13 percent in the industrialised countries, it jumped 
by 50 percent in the developing countries. This rate of increase outgrew the rate of fibre 
consumption. (Strolz, 1991:33) The over-production was confirmed by yarn stock 
movements. In 1989 yam stocks in Europe grew by 25 percent in one year and in Asia by 
50 percent. While this could in part be due to the amplification effect in the textile pipeline 
(see Chapter Seven), it nevertheless points to an over-production in yarns 
(Munkholt, 1991:34—35). 
Herwig Strolz calculated that, for yarn output to have grown in line with consumer 
demand, 8 percent of the processing capacity in place at the end of 1979 or about 8,5 
million spindle equivalents would have had to be taken out of production from 1980 to 
1988. He attributed the basic reason for the imbalance between production and 
consumption to the fact that investors did not pay due attention to the rapidly rising 
productivity of the new machines they were installing. On average he calculated post-1980 
spindles to have a 50 percent higher productivity than pre-1980 spindles (Strolz, 
1991:33—34). 
The gains in textile production and trade by Asian developing countries was not without 
impact on highly industrialised countries. In most developed countries output increased up 
to 1973 and remained more or less constant for the remainder of the 1970's, but with some 
notable exceptions. At the one extreme Italy's textile industry recovered and showed 
substantial growth in the 1970's. At the other extreme the UK textile industry experienced 
moderate expansion up to 1973, but declined rapidly thereafter. By 1980 its production 
index had fallen to only 70% of its 1973 level (Toyne et al, 1984:88—90). 
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In spite of the general stagnation of the textile industry in industrialised countries in the 
1970's, yarns and fabrics continued to be made competitively in developed countries. 
Throughout the 1980's Germany continued to be the world's largest textile exporter with 
11 percent of world trade. Italy was second with 8 percent of world trade (Anson and 
Simpson, 1991:15). 
2.1.2 Structural changes in the international textile industry 
There have been some dramatic changes in the global textile industry during the twentieth 
century. Most of it happened in the second half of the century as countries in the Far East 
challenged the dominance of advanced industrialised countries in Europe and the United 
States of America. Even before World War Two Japan made heavy inroads into Britain's 
dominance in world trade in textiles: by 1939 Japan was exporting 22 percent of world 
exports in textiles. 
In the late 1950's and early 1960's a fresh generation of export-oriented newly 
industrialising countries emerged in the Far East, most notably Hong Kong, South Korea 
and Taiwan. But as their economies matured and wages rose relative to other countries in 
the region, a third generation of Far Eastern countries came to the fore. During the 1980's 
the textile and clothing industries of mainland China and some South and South-East 
Asian economies (particularly Thailand, but also Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines) 
grew very rapidly. These countries had considerably lower wages than Hong Kong, South 
Korea and Taiwan which, in turn, were well below labour costs in the advanced European 
countries and the USA.2 
The response of the textile industries in the more advanced industrialised countries was to 
move to higher value-added production requiring more sophisticated technology. The big 
textile groups in these countries, such as Marotto and GFT in Italy, Steilmann in Germany, 
Coats Viyella and Courtaulds Textiles in the UK, Milliken in the USA, Toray and Teijin 
in Japan, was to make use of advances in automation. Some sectors of the textile industry, 
notably spinning and weaving, were turned into capital-intensive industries thereby 
undermining the Asian countries' advantage of low labour costs. They thus concentrated 
on the value-added areas of production where cost is a lesser criterion.3 By so doing they 
restored their international competitiveness and managed to remain amongst the world's 
top textile exporters. In 1989 six of the world's top ten textile exporting countries were 
advanced industrial countries (GATI', 1990b:62). 
2.1.3 Changes in technology 
The development of textile technology has been divided into three stages. The first stage 
commenced in the 18th century and extended to the pre World War Two era. It was based 
on English spinning and weaving technologies for the manufacture of natural-fibre textiles 
2. GAIT, 1990a: 24; and Financial Times Survey, 3 October 1991. 
3. Dertouzos and others, 1989:17; Financial Times Survey, 3 October 1991. 
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and was labour-intensive. The second stage from the mid-1930's to the 1960's was 
dominated by technologies developed in the USA for the manufacture of synthetic and 
blended fibre textiles. These technologies were also relatively labour-intensive (Toyne, 
1984:43). The third stage has extended from the mid-1960's up to the present, is labour- 
saving, and dominated by European and Japanese technologies. The impetus underlying 
this stage has been competition within and between countries. 
Since a basis of this competition is product differentiation and costs (e.g. shorter runs of 
specialized fabrics), substantial and rapid improvements occurred in productivity, 
productive versatility and product quality (Toyne, 1984:44). 
During the third stage a fundamental change took place in the basic machinery 
development process. Textile machinery innovations became available on the open market 
rather than being the proprietary technology of a textile company. A major factor that had 
precipitated this shift was technological innovation stemming from many disciplines in 
science and engineering. This made it well nigh impossible for any but the most 
technically advanced textile firms to develop all the requisite skills. As a result, any firm 
could purchase on the open market virtually any one of the major types of equipment, such 
as spinning frames or looms, embodying the latest technology. This enables developing 
countries to have access to virtually the same high level technology as in advanced 
industrial countries (UNIDO, 1990:199). 
Major technological innovations have been introduced in the textile industry between 
1950 and 1990. These innovations consisted mainly of new automatic bale feeders, 
aerofeed systems, high-draft spinning, texturisation, shuttleless looms, rotary screen 
printing, and computer-integrated manufacture (UNIDO, 1990:201). Specific and 
important changes in spinning and weaving equipment with projections up to the year 
2000 are examined next. 
Table 2.1 
Technological changes in spinning mills 
Processing Variables 1975 1987 2000 
Roving 
Speed (rev/mill) 1 200 1 300 1 400 
Cost per unit (dollars) 117 241 124 138 310 345 
Work-load (spindles/operator) 310 360 500 
Spinning 
Speed (rev/mm) 13 000 14 000 18 000 
Cost per unit (dollars) 61 572 79 488 148 966 
Work-load (spindles/operator) 1 800 2 200 12 000 
Source: UNIDO, 1990, Table IV.36, p.202 
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Table 2.1 presents information regarding the conversion of short-staple fibres (cotton and 
synthetic staple fibres having cotton-like dimensions), processes common to the South 
African textile industry. The major changes that have taken place within the spinning 
department are high-draft spinning and the development of new spinning methods, 
particularly the type exemplified by open-end spinning, or the O-E frame. The impact of 
these changes has been to reduce the required number of pre-spinning steps, and to limit in 
most cases, the need for roving to oniy one step instead of several as before. In addition 
the newer frames run at much higher spindle speeds. 
The figures in Table 2.1 show a most likely trend towards more capital intensive spinning 
in the future. This is because the cost per unit of frames and the number of spindles per 
operator are due to increase rapidly up to the year 2000. 
Table 2.2 
Technological innovations in weaving mills 
Processing Variables Type of Loom 
Shuttle Shuttleless air-jet 
1975 1982 1989 2000 
Speed (picks/minute) 210 630 900 1 000 
Cloth width (cm) 173 — 330 361 
Cost per unit (dollars) 8 500 — 40 000 50 000 
Work-load:looms per weaver 120 — 19 30 
Source: UNIDO, 1990, Table IV.39, p.204 
Table 2.2 demonstrates that the new shuttleless looms are much faster than the traditional 
shuttle looms. By 1989 the air-jet loom could make more than four times the number of 
insertions (picks) per minute (900 as opposed to 210) than the shuttle loom could in 1975. 
In addition the shuttleless loom can weave a wider fabric and improve the fabric's quality 
through greater yarn and woven fabric flexibility. Although the air-jet looms cost much 
more than shuttle looms, they are six times more labour-intensive and their installation 
would thus be unlikely to lead to a reduction of employment (UNIDO, 1990:204). 
Shuttleless looms can be of several types: rapier, projectile, air- or water-jet looms. Due to 
advances in precision engineering in the 1980's water-jet looms have increased in 
prominence. Global sales of water-jet looms rose by 135 percent between 1988 and 1992 
and accounted for 30 percent of the world market in 1993. Almost 95 percent of all 
production was being sold in Asia with a Japanese manufacturer dominating the market. 
Water-jet looms are not going to replace all their rivals. While they are best for the rapid 
manufacture of synthetic fibre cloth, air-jet and other shuttleless looms remain the first 
choice for natural fibres (Financial Times, 6 August 1993). 
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2.2 The international trade regime 
In seeking to promote a strategy of international competitiveness for the textile industry in 
South Africa, it is important to understand the trade regime which the industry faces 
internationally. On the one hand there are the trade policies pursued by countries or 
regions round the world. On the other hand there are international trade regulating 
mechanisms which impact on textile products. 
The formation of the European Economic Community holds potentially major 
implications for the SA textile industry as the region constitutes South Africa's largest 
export market. In 1987 South Africa textile and clothing exports to the region totalled 295 
million dollars constituting 52 percent of South Africa's textile and clothing exports 
(UNCTAD, 1990:46—47, Table A.11). 
The two most important international trade regulating mechanisms in textiles are the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATF) and the Multi-Fibre Arrangement 
(MFA). They are considered next. 
2.2.1 GATT 
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATJ) came into existence as part of the 
post-war reconstruction after World War Two in the belief that an international institution 
could help further the cause of global free trade. It came into being in 1947 as part of the 
preparatory negotiations to set up an International Trade Organization (ITO) and was 
meant merely to be a temporary treaty until the ITO was implemented. The ITO was 
conceived as one leg of a tripod that was to manage different areas of international 
economic relations: the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was designed to provide short- 
term finance when countries faced temporary balance of payments deficits; the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) to offer long-term 
assistance; and the ITO to promote freer trade and to regulate trade policies. However the 
ITO was never ratified and by default GAIT became the basis on which successive rounds 
of negotiations on tariff reductions were conducted (Tussie, 1987:1). 
At its foundation there were 27 member countries, but GAIT membership currently 
extends to 109 countries which between them account for over 90 percent of world trade 
(Trade Monitor, 1993, 1:1). 
Three important principles underlie the GAIT charter. 
1. Most favoured nation treatment: The most favoured nation treatment means that if a 
tariff is lowered on imports from one GAIT member, the same cut will apply to the 
same imports from all other GAIT members. 
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2. Reciprocity of concessions: GAiT signatories must be willing to make tariff cuts as 
concessions in international tariff negotiations in return fro receiving equivalent 
concessions from other GAIT countries. One important aspect of this principle is that 
all members must be willing to make concessions in any round of tariff negotiations. 
3. Protection in the form of tariffs: GATF does allow tariffs, but seeks to lower the level 
of tariffs and prescribe rules relating to the use of tariffs to protect domestic producers 
in an emergency. Its rules outlaw quantitative restrictions on trade such as import 
quotas as they are considered to be more harmful than tariffs. GATT is thus a charter 
for freer trade, not for free trade. 
The articles of the treaty does however provide various loopholes which enable members 
to impose tariffs under special circumstances. One of the most important is embodied in 
Article 19, the so-called Escape Clause or Safeguard Clause. It states: 
If as a result of unforeseen developments and effects of obligations incurred by a member 
under GATF (including tariff concessions), a product is imported in such amounts as to 
cause or 'threaten' 'serious injury' to domestic producers, that country is free to suspend the obligation or modify the concession until the injury is remedied. 
At the same time, rules are laid down about the manner in which such tariffs may be 
imposed and the duration of time allowed. 
Since its inception in 1947, there have been seven rounds of international trade 
negotiations carried out under the auspices of GAIT. The eighth round, the Uruguay 
Round, began in 1986 and was finalised at the end of 1993 (Grimwade, 1989:31—34). The 
underlying objective in the Uruguay Round is to steer countries in the direction of full 
trade liberalisation, principally through trade neutrality between domestic and foreign 
markets. Currently, export promotion measures such as GElS and those tailored to specific 
sectors are incompatible with measures of the Uruguay Round. It is unclear whether 
GAIT will grant South Africa developing country status. If it does, South Africa would 
qualify for 'special and differential treatment', but it will not automatically qualify South 
Africa for trade preferences. They would have to be negotiated bilaterally with countries 
concerned (Trade Monitor, 1993,1:2,8). 
As a result of the gradual lowering of tariffs and removal of certain quantitative 
restrictions after the various GAIT tariff-cutting 'rounds' world trade grew rapidly after 
World War Two. The most dynamic sector of world trade was manufacturing. In the 36 
year period from 1950 to 1986 trade in manufactures grew sixteenfold which was well 
over twice as fast as the growth of manufacturing output (which increased sevenfold). 
Much of this growth in world manufacturing trade took place between western 
industrialised countries. This came about as a result of a specialisation in narrow product 
ranges within specific industries, i.e. an intra-industry specialisalion (as opposed to an 
earlier inter-industry specialisation) within each country. Hence there was a rapid growth 
in intra-industry trade between the industrialised countries (Grimwade, 1989:53—55). 
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However the share of textiles in the global trade of manufactured goods declined. During 
the thirty year period from 1955 to 1985 the proportion of textiles in the world trade of 
manufactures fell from 5,1 percent to 2,9 percent. This, according to Grimwade, was due 
to three factors. The main reason was the low income elasticity of demand for textile 
products; secondly, the western industrialised countries had been less willing to allow 
freer trade in these products; and, thirdly, the scope for increased international 
specialisation was accordingly limited (Grimwade, 1989:68). 
The reason why western industrialised countries did not want to allow freer trade in 
textiles was as a result of the penetration of textile imports they experienced from 
developing countries as Table 2.3 indicates. 
Table 2.3 
Exports of textile fibres, yarn and fabrics and clothing. 1970—1987 
Millions of dollars (f.o.b.) 
Origin Destination 
Developing countries: YEAR EEC EFTA USA JAPAN 
America 1970 262 25 135 169 
1980 1202 212 533 254 
1987 914 121 1556 115 
Africa 1970 246 60 13 64 
(excludesSA) 1980 1229 123 44 163 
1987 2318 144 304 117 
West Asia 1970 198 40 9 34 
1980 941 185 38 9 
1987 2814 210 332 8 
South and 1970 607 96 862 229 
South-East Asia 1980 5777 971 5357 1870 
1987 10349 1840 16433 4874 
Source: UNCTAD, 1990, A.11 
From 1970 to 1987 textile and clothing imports from developing countries penetrated 
heavily into the industrialised countries. Different developing regions penetrated different 
industrialised countries. Developing America made its major inroads into the USA while 
Africa and West Asia expanded their exports mainly to the EEC. The South and South 
East Asian countries however succeeded in expanding their textile and clothing exports 
extensively to all the major industrialised countries. 
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Exports of textiles and clothing from the less developed countries (LDCs) have, in the 
words of Tussie, 'been the great success story' (Tussie, 1987:7). She continues: 
Generally, the textile industry is the first rung in the ladder of industrialization. . . . After 
successful substitution of imports, the LDCs entered the world market to use their acquired 
textile capacity as a foreign exchange earner. In 1976 textiles and clothing comprised more 
than one-third of the manufactured exports of the LDCs and exports from LDCs 
comtituted one-fourth of world exports of textiles and clothing. In these circumstances, 
LDCs' competitive goods were thought to be disrupting the markets of the importing 
developed countries (Tussie, 1987:7). 
It is in this context that the emergence and continuation of the Multi Fibre Agreement can 
best be understood. 
2.2.2 The Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA) 
The United States of America and Europe have for a long time been placing restrictions on 
imports of textile and clothing products, from Japan before World War Two and 
subsequently from the newly industrialised countries. Due to the worsening of the 
situation in the 1950's a Long-Term Cotton Arrangement was drawn up in 1962 under 
GAIT auspices. It was signed by nineteen cotton-textile exporting and importing nations 
and involved an agreement on quotas for the main types of cotton textile products. The 
agreement was for four years, but it was renewed twice and lasted until 1974, when it was 
replaced by the Multi-Fibre Arrangement. This extended the agreement to cover most 
kinds of textile, including chemical fibres. 
In 1977 MFA1 was replaced by MFA2 which gave way in 1981 to MFA3. An MFA4 was 
negotiated in 1986. Each new extension involved some tightening in the ceiling imposed 
on textile exports. Moreover, bilateral restraints were separately negotiated and has 
increased over time. In 1974 there were only seven such agreements and by 1977 there 
were thirty-three. 
Although the MFAs are sanctioned by GAIT, they are a violation of its rules since they 
impose a system of quota control on North-South textile trade over and above the most 
favoured nation tariff rates. Since the quotas are agreed on a bilateral basis they also 
violate the GAIT principle of non-discrimination. The existence of the MFA thus means 
that the textile sector follows principles totally opposed to those for which the GAIT 
stands (Tussie, 1987:64; Grimwade, 1989:355). 
In the Uruguay Round of negotiations the agreement reached on the MFA includes an 
increase in quotas for developing countries in two stages and their removal after ten years. 
The MFA will by then be phased out completely bringing trade in textiles and clothing 
under GAIT rules. In a proposal dated December 1991 it was proposed that after three 
years quotas on 17 percent of the volume of imports be lifted; after seven years a further 
18 percent be lifted, and after ten years the remaining 65 percent of quotas be lifted 
(GAiT, 1991:0.4). The date of commencement was delayed to after the successful 
completion of the Uruguay Round of negotiations. 
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2.2.3 Implications of Uruguay round on MFA and SA textiles 
The abolition of the MFA will impact differently on different countries. The ones likely to 
gain from the trade liberalisation are those that can marry high technology with relatively 
low labour costs and fashion sophistication (such as Hong Kong, Malaysia and Thailand). 
So will countries with advantages of market proximity (Central America for the USA) 
(Watkins, 1992:52). But there will inevitably be losers and South Africa is likely to be 
amongst them unless it takes appropriate precautionary action over the next ten years. 
Such a strategy would include the following. 
Firstly, the existence of the MFA quotas provides a temporary advantage to South African 
textile finns as it gives them access to markets that are effectively closed to many 
successful exporters from developing countries which have used their quotas to the full 
(Trade Monitor, 1993,1:2). South African textile producers should therefore do their 
utmost to secure export markets. They should actively search market niches where they 
have or can create competitive advantages based on product differentiation and quality 
rather than price as it is unlikely that they will be able to compete with developing 
countries on price after quotas are lifted. Secondly, SA textile producers should try to 
secure these markets by getting close to their customers. Beside ensuring the quality and 
reliability of their products and deliveries, textile producers should also take trouble to 
find out exactly what their customers want in terms of product specifications and try to 
make sure that they meet all the customers' expectations. Moreover, given the nature of 
the quantitative controls, revenue, and probably also profits, will be higher with higher 
unit-value items. 
2.2.4 Relationship with the European community 
The European Community (EC) constitutes an enormous potential market for the South 
African textile industry. Although market entry requirements and prospects in Asia and 
North America are also important issues for the South African textile industry only its 
relationship with the EC is considered in this study. 
The EC is the worlds biggest importer of textile and clothing products and also the biggest 
exporter. The demand for textile and clothing industry products was very positive in the 
EC until the end of the 1980's. The consumption of textile and clothing industry products 
rose by a total of about 20 percent in the second half of the 1980's. Households spent 300 
billion ECUs on textile and clothing products in 1989, amounting to six percent of 
household expenditure. The upward trend in consumption came to a halt in the early 90's 
due to recessionary conditions in EC countries. 
A significant part of foreign trade in textiles is still with industrialised countries. The share 
of industrial countries in total textile imports into the EC in 1990 was about 42 percent 
The second largest group with 40 percent of the share, were those developing countries 
with which the EC has MFA agreements. 
18 INDUSTRIAL STRATEGY PROJECT 
The EC's preferential countries account for about 18 percent of total 'textile imports.4 
About half of the EC's exports goes to industrial countries, a quarter to MFA countries 
and 13 percent to preference countries (UNIDO, 1992:1,5,6). 
South African textile and clothing exports to the EC declined during the 1980's. In 1980 
South Africa exported 345 million dollars (fob) worth of textiles and clothing to the EC, 
but this dropped to 295 million dollars (fob) by 1987. Textile and clothing imports from 
the EC to South Africa also declined from 273 million dollars (fob) in 1980 to 194 million 
dollars (fob) in 1987 (UNCTAD, 1990: A44—A47, Table A.11). 
In a study on the potential trade policy options which the EC could adopt towards a post- 
apartheid South Africa Page and Stevens found that many of South Africa's most 
important exports to the EC would be unaffected by any post-apartheid preferential trade 
regime. This is because the face low MFN (most favoured nation) tariffs and no serious 
non-tariff barriers (Page and Stevens, 1992:37). 
They thereupon sharpen their analysis by drawing up a table to try and identify more 
precisely which existing South African exports could benefit from EC trade preferences. 
Its entries for textile products are presented in Table 2.4. Products for which South African 
exports to the EC were more than 20 million ECUs in 1990 were considered ones for 
which prima facie trade preference from the EC is most likely to be beneficial to South 
Africa. Those which could gain from trade preference are marked as A. Some; however, 
(marked as D) already enter the EC with little or no import duty or other restriction under 
the existing MFN regime. 
The other issue which is addressed in Table 2.4 is to identify the products being exported 
to the EC by other developing countries which are likely to face trade diversion to South 
Africa if it is granted improved access. The Table considers three levels of aggregation: all 
developing countries, the ACP countries which already have Lomd privileges, and the five 
neighbouring southern African countries, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland, and 
Zimbabwe. Exports which might be adversely affected by South Africa were defined as 
those which are at least 0,2 percent of the relevant group's exports to the EC and for which 
the value of South African exports to the EC is at least 1 percent of the group's exports. 
Table 2.4 also attempts to identify those products where South Africa would compete with 
EC production by comparing South African exports to the EC with intra-EC trade. The 
potentially competitive products are marked as B in the relevant columns. 
Table 2.4, which may have omissions of products, nonetheless provides some useful 
information. It shows that relatively unprocessed wool does not face a tariff barrier in the 
4. The EC provides trade preferences to developing countries under two schemes. The first is the 
Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) which the western industrialised countries in 1971 in response 
to pressure from UNCTAD in 1971. This followed years of agitation by developing countries for 
preferential treatment for their exports in the markets of the industrialised countries. Superimposed on 
this system of preferences, the EC introduced its own additional preferences on imports from some forty- 
six African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries (the ACP countries) which in 1975 signed the Lomé 
Convention (Grimwade, 1989:332). 
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EC, nor does it threaten to displace imports from the developing countries. Synthetic 
filament yarn on the other hand, could potentially benefit from preferential access to the 
EC. The likelihood of being granted preference is however low as it could threaten intra- 
EC trade. Cotton yarn and woven fabrics of cotton not only threaten to displace intra-EC 
trade, but also trade from developing countries, the ACP countries, and South Africa's 
neighbouring states. 
Table 2.4 
South Africa's principal textile exports to the EC market classified by competitor 
Exports % Share of Products in EC Imports from: 
HS Product Million SA Dev. ACP BLNSZ Intra MFN 
Code ECU Countries -EC Tariff 
5101 Wool 162D 0,9 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,0 0 
5105 Wool, carded 33D 0,2 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,1 3 
5402 Synthetic 
filament yarn 23A 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,1B 0,4B 9 
5205 Cotton yarn 12 0,1 0,1B 0,1B 0,4B 0,1B 4-6 
5208+ Woven fabrics 
5209 of cotton 6 0,0 0,1B 0,4B 0,3B 0,3B 10 
Notes: 
A = All products for which EC imports from South Africa are> 20 million ECUs and 
which face trade barriers in the EC; 
B = Products and suppliers for which South African competition could be important; 
D = EC imports from South Africa which are> 20 million ECUs and which do not 
face any significant barriers. 
Source: Page and Stevens, 1992:38-9, Table 9. 
The implications of these findings are that South African textiles already have access to 
the EC for products that are fairly unprocessed and low in value-added, but that it faces 
tariffs for more processed products with higher value-added. This is a typical trend of 
tariff structures in industrialised countries. Because of their need for raw materials they 
present no or low barriers to the importation of raw materials, but they increase the 
protection the more processed the goods are. If, in addition, the processes are fairly labour 
intensive, the protection is even higher because of the low cost of labour in developing 
countries producing the same products. Table 2.5 clearly indicates how tariffs increase 
with the degree of processing, 'that is as the labour-intensity of production increases' 
(Tussle, 1987:59). 
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Table 2.5 
Tariff barriers according to degree of processing of selected textile and clothing 
products in eleven major industrialised countries 
Products Average Tariff 
Rates (%) 
Cotton, not carded or combed 1,1 
Carded and combed cotton 5,2 
Cotton textiles 8,2 
Knitted cotton 12,4 
Men's and children's clothing 23,1 
Knitted clothing 26,9 
Source: Tussie, 1987:60, Table 2.8 
Furthermore, because other developing countries are also exporting such products to the 
EC, South Africa is less likely to obtain preferential access if it has to be negotiated with 
the EC in consultation with its preference countries on an item by item basis. 
Page and Stephens are quite pessimistic about the prospects of the South African textile 
industry: 
Textiles appear unlikely to be competitive even with the most preferential trading regime 
(Page and Stephens, 1992:52). 
I do not share their pessimism about the exporting prospects of the textile industry as there 
is ample evidence of pockets of international competitiveness within the industry (see 
Chapter Five). It would also be interesting to know what proportion of South African 
fabrics actually do go into clothing exports. 
Page and Stephens find that, for South Africa, 'assistance in restructuring the economies 
could be more effective than providing improved trade access', but they do not spell out 
what such assistance might be. EC assistance in the training of labour and management in 
the textile industry would help to enhance the performance of labour-intensive 
manufacturing industry. The textile industry is itself relatively labour-intensive compared 
to other sectors of the economy such as mining, metals and motors. But its output is also 
the key input in clothing which is a very labour-intensive sector with export potential. By 
improving the quality and price of textile fabrics, the international competitiveness of the 
clothing industry can thus be raised. 
The EC would thus be assisting meaningfully in the restructuring and attaining of 
international competitiveness of the textile and clothing industries if it were to help in the 
training of labour and management in the textile industry. Such assistance could take three 
forms: financial, personal and institutional. The financial assistance could provide money 
to help people to take time off from work to receive training and education; the personal 
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assistance could come in the form of sending knowledgeable people out to South Africa to 
assist in the training and education; and the institutional assistance could be in the form of 
educational and training institutions in the EC making their facilities available to selected 
candidates from South Africa. Alternatively, institutions could extend their activities 
relating to training and education to South Africa and make their services readily available 
to people working in the textile industry. 
To conclude, this section's finding is that the textile industry in a post-apartheid South 
Africa will be best served by the provision of training and educational assistance that will 
help to improve the performance of the textile industry than would the provision of trade 
preferences by the EC. This will assist the textile industry to attain a level of international 
competitiveness more than would providing South Africa with benefits that are not 
enjoyed by other countries at a similar level of industrial development to South Africa. 
Chapter Three: The textile industry in South 
Africa 
3.1 A brief history of the textile industry in South Africa 
to the 1970's. 
The South African textile industry developed in stages. Blanket manufacturing was the 
first sector to establish itself, which it did properly in the 1920's and 1930's. The apparel, 
furnishing and industrial fabrics sectors only took off after the Second World War, while 
the synthetic fibres sector developed in the 1960's. A common feature of all these sectors 
is that they developed behind protective tariff and quota walls. 
(a) The blanket manufacturing industry 
Blanket manufacturing was the first sub-sector of the textile industry to establish itself in 
South Africa (Hirsch, 1979:13). Although the first weaving factory was built in 1891 in 
King Williamstown to produce blankets for the 'native territories', it was not until 1925, 
when the customs duties on blankets, rugs, shawls and heavy sheeting were increased, that 
the blanket industry developed (du Toit, 1978:33; Steenkamp, 1983:7, paragraph 31). The 
duties were very high, ranging from 197,5% to 312%. By 1933 there were twelve factories 
producing woollen and cotton blankets in South Africa, and by 1944 there were sixteen 
factories employing 3 711 people and producing some 90% of the country's needs in the 
line of blankets, rugs and sheeting (Steenkamp, 1983:7, paragraph 31). 
(b) The apparel, household and industrial textile industries 
It was only after the Second World War that textiles became a major sector in the 
manufacturing industry of South Africa. It was during this period that the apparel, 
household and industrial textile sectors were firmly established. State support for the 
textile industry contributed considerably to this development. One form of support was 
financial and was provided through the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC), a 
public sector institution that played an active entrepreneurial and financial role in setting 
up textile plants. 
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The other form of support provided by the state was through protection. According to H A 
F Barker: 
If not the absolute origin, then certainly the recognized establishment and subsequent 
growth of a textile industry in South Africa were primarily due to the acceptance of certain 
conclusions set out in a report by the Board of Trade and Industries published in 1951 
(1963:285). 
The BTI report referred to by Barker, actually published at the end of 1950, had, as its 
main aim, to detennine the prospects of, and the conditions for, the development of the 
local textile industry to a stage where it could obtain a substantially larger share of the 
local market on the basis of economic competitiveness, and to determine the level of 
protection that would be necessary to achieve such a development (BTI, 1950:2, paragraph 
7). 
The BTI report considered the textile industry to require, with a few exceptions, relatively 
small production units as far as turnover, number of employees per mill, and capital 
investments were concerned. Consequently it regarded the South African market for 
textiles to be "large enough to support a fairly large number of factories of economic size 
for the production of cotton cloth, rayon cloth and knitted goods, and, in a lesser measure, 
wool cloth". It also recommended only moderate customs tariff protection. However, "that 
BTI report laid the foundation upon which the textile industry was to develop. Thereafter 
quantitative import control was to play an important role in reserving the domestic market 
for it" (Steenkamp Report, 1983:11, paras 48,49). 
In 1950, at the time of the Report was published, duties on cotton and cotton-related 
fabrics were mostly of a fiscal nature and were, with very few exceptions, below ten 
percent. To cope with foreign competition ad valorem duties of 15% on yams and of 
25—35% on fabrics were introduced in 1952 (Steenkamp Report, 1983:64—65, paras 370, 
372). A year prior to that ad valorem duties ranging from 20—30% had been introduced on 
worsted fabrics, because the BTI Report stated that there was scope for meeting 75— 100% 
of domestic requirements in this section (Steenkamp Report, 1983:68, paras 387, 388). 
From shortly before the Report was published up to 1960/61 "the expansion of the textile 
industry proceeded rapidly, especially in the spinning, weaving and finishing of cotton and 
wool products and in the knitting section" (Barker, 1963:292). The first knitting mills were 
established in the 1930's, and by 1950 there were 18 in existence. They increased rapidly 
thereafter to 74 in 1960, providing employment for 15 741 workers. Over the same period 
(1950 to 1960) the number of cotton mills increased from 8 to 52, with employment 
increasing from 3 000 to 14 849 (Steenkamp Report, 1983:7—10). 
In May 1961 control on textile imports was purposefully re-imposed. This provided 
another spurt to the growth of the domestic textile industry (Barker, 1963:296). In the 
three-year period from 1960/61 to 1963/64 the number of knitting mills increased from 74 
to 130, with employment doubling from 15 741 to 31 392. 
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Over the same period employment in the spinning, weaving and finishing of non-woollen 
yarns and fabrics went up by almost 50% from 14 849 to 21 503 (Steenkamp Report, 
1983:8—9). However, between 1963 and 1970 the knitting industry shrank by almost a 
third in terms of employment, while the spinning, weaving and finishing of woollen yarn 
and fabric grew slightly. It was, however, the spinning, weaving and finishing of non- 
woollen (mainly cotton) yarn and fabric that showed a vibrancy over this period. The 
number of establishments in this sub-sector increased from 60 to 73 and employment rose 
from 21 500 to 35 000 (Steenkamp Report, 1983:8—10). 
Barker, writing in 1963, was sharply critical of the Board of Trade and Industries, its 
Report, and the modus operandi of textile industrialists. One of his main criticisms was 
that the Board, though forewarned, disregarded the practical difficulties in classifying 
textile fabrics effectively for customs purposes. But once it started appreciating the 
problem, the Board used it as an argument for widening the scope of duties to include 
fabrics that were not being produced in South Africa. The 'bogey of substitution' was used 
on numerous occasions as a rationale for applying duties to a wider range of products than 
those produced in South Africa at the time. And there were frequent applications for 
amendments to tariff protection for textiles. Between 1950 and 1963 there were no less 
than sixty other BTI reports dealing with amendments (Barker, 1963:290). 
The apparent readiness of the Board to comply with the wishes of textile industry, led 
Barker to make the following critical and incisive comment about the industry: 
Once an implied pledge of protection had been given and received, there was 
understandably little disposition on the part of textile manufacturers to consider anything 
that might tend to limit or regulate the operation of their mills, even temporarily or only 
tacitly. So the hint of their concentrating on specialized output, with no certainty on how 
that might accord with future trends, was repugnant, even though at the time it might have 
helped in attaining growth and stability. In any event when an industry has been 
conceived, born and brought up in the expectation that its well-being will be ensured by 
tariffs, it is likely to have a built-in mistrust of its own ability to compete on any other 
basis (Barker, 1963:291—2). 
(c) The synthetic fibres industry 
The first factory for the texturising and dyeing of imported polyamide (nylon) yarn was 
started in 1959 by British Nylon Spinners, a subsidiary of Courtaulds and ICI. In 1964 the 
company, which subsequently changed its name to South African Nylon Spinners 
(SANS), commenced producing apparel nylon yams, and the following year it started 
producing industrial yarns, which were mainly for the manufacture of tyre cord, and also 
diversified into polyester filament yarns. In 1968 another leading international and 
pharmaceutical firm, Hoechst, launched into the manufacture of polyester staple fibre in 
South Africa (Steenkamp Report, 1983:12—13, paras 53,55,56). 
By 1974 there were, besides the above two producers of unprocessed yarn and fibre, a 
further fifteen companies in the intermediate industry that processed filament and fibre 
yarns into stretch and bulked yarns (processed yarns). At that time, a major technological 
change took place with the advent off an integrated drawtexturing process that combined 
processes previously carried out separately by fibre producers and yarn processors. This 
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led to a process of rationalisation in which SANS took over a number of manufacturers, so 
that by the end of 1976 there remained only three independent processors in this sub- 
sector (Steenkamp Report, 1983:13, paragraph 57). However, in 1978 the Frame Group 
unexpectedly started producing polyester staple fibre for its own use. The plant had a 
capacity of six million kilograms, which was doubled in 1981 and extended to the 
manufacture of polyester fibre yarns. This caught the existing producers by surprise and 
resulted in an overcapacity in the area of polymer and staple fibres. For a while SANS 
operated at less than 50 percent capacity (Steenkamp Report, 1983:13—14, paras 59,64; 
Hirsch, 1978:104). 
Once again protection played an important role in the development of this sub-sector of 
the textile industry. According to the Steenkamp Report: 
The synthetic fibres industry would not have been able to exist, let alone to expand as it 
has done, without the assistance of tariff protection and, in particular, of quantitative 
import control. The initial rates of duty protection varied from 15 to 20 percent ad valorem 
(Steenkamp Report, 1983:14, paragraph 62). 
The conclusion that follows from this brief overview of the history of the textile industry 
in South Africa is that it was built behind a wall of protection that included both tariffs and 
quantitative import controls. Although it grew rapidly up to the end of the 1960's this does 
not mean that it was necessarily an economically efficient or internationally competitive 
industry. Barker warned in 1963 that, "without the buttress of substantial and widening 
tariff protection, the outlook for the industry would doubtless be unpromising" (Barker, 
1963:302). 
3.2 A macro-economic overview of the textile industry 
from 1972-1990 
(a) Growth: output and employment 
There have been two distinct phases in the growth of the textile industry in South Africa 
over the past two decades (see Figure 3.1). The first period from 1972 to 1981 was one of 
sound growth of output: the average annual compound growth rate over this period was no 
less than 5,7%. Production reached a peak in 1981 of R9 721 million (in 1990 prices). 
Employment also grew during this period, but displayed a cyclical trend with two peaks, 
one in 1976, and the other in 1981. At the time of the second peak the textile industry 
employed a total labour force of 113 700 (IDC, 1992). 
The second distinct phase from 1981 to 1992 has been characterised by a decline in the 
textile industry. Output dropped drastically after 1981 and declined by 22% over the four 
year period 1981—1985. As a result employment fell rapidly over the same period: the 
textile industry workforce decreased by no less than 18 580, a 16% reduction. In 1986 the 
downward cycle bottomed out and production and employment increased until 1989. 
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Figure 3.1 
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From 1990 onwards production and capacity utilisation declined once again. Capacity 
utilisation fell to 79,1% in 1990. In May 1992 it was down to 74%, reaching the lowest 
capacity utilisation yet (CSS, 1992; van Coller, 1992:4). Once again employment 
plummeted, falling from 97 500 at the end of 1990 to 91 700 twelve months later, and to 
86 800 by October 1992 (CSS, 1993; NCF, 1993:40). The textile industry in South Africa 
has thus been facing a serious challenge for the past decade. 
(b) Capital stock, investment and technology 
Over the past two decades capital investment in the textile industry has lagged behind 
capittl investment in the manufacturing industry as a whole. This is clearly borne out by 
the fact that the proportion of the textile industry's capital stock within the manufacturing 
sector halved itself from 4,8% in 1972 to 2,4% by 1983. Thereafter (from 1983 to 1990) 
the proportion of capital stock in the textile industry remained constant at 2,4%. 
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The low level of investment in the textile industry over the past twenty years means that 
much of the technology has become dated, as Table 3.1 demonstrates. 
Table 3.1 
Age of textile machinery in South Africa 
Number of Machines in each Age Category 
Type of Machinery Years: 
0—5 6—10 11—15 16—20 >20 AvAge % >10 
Age Median 2,5 8 13 18 25 
Spindles 112502 70155 64752 106298 213799 15,76 67,81 
Conventional 87654 65931 57328 100346 210631 16,41 70,57 
Open End 24848 4224 7424 5952 3168 8,30 36,27 
Looms 500 348 724 692 667 14,53 71,07 
Ordinary 0 0 178 0 21 14,27 100,00 
Automatic 0 0 7 180 60 19,56 100,00 
Shuttleless 500 348 539 512 586 14,05 65,88 
Knitting Machines 63 186 173 99 161 14,23 63,49 
Circular 60 151 132 64 109 13,47 59,11 
Warp 1 35 41 22 40 15,91 74,10 
Flat 2 0 0 13 12 19,96 92,59 
Note: 
Table 3.1 is based on a survey conducted by Errol Keller of the Textile Federation at 
the beginning of 1992. Most of the large companies in the spinning, weaving and 
knitting industries were surveyed. 
Table 3.1 shows that, at the start of 1992, the average age of textile machinery used in 
spinning, weaving and knitting ranged from 14 to 20 years, with the exception of open-end 
spindles which had an average age of 8 years. It also shows that for all the equipment, 
again with the exception of open-end spindles, more than 50% was more than 10 years 
old. In most cases a far larger proportion of the machinery exceeded ten years in age. In 
the case of shuttle looms, 100% were more than ten years old, while 93% of the flat 
knitting machines, and two-thirds to three-quarters of the remaining machinery, exceeded 
ten years of age. 
The two major technological advances that have been made in spinning and weaving over 
the past four decades or so have been the development of open-end spindles, and 
shuttleless looms. Their speeds are considerably higher than the conventional ring- 
spinning spindles and shuttle looms, thereby increasing productivity significantly 
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(UNIDO, 1991:198—205). H.Strolz has estimated that the spindles installed since 1980 
have a productivity 60 percent higher than those in place at the end of 1979 (Strolz 
1991:34). 
Table 3.2 compares the extent of investment in new spindles and looms over the 10 year 
period ending 1988 in South Africa with other countries. 
Table 3.2 
Comparative ages of textile machinery, 1988 
% of Machinery More Than 10 Years Old 
Spindles Looms 
Short- Long- Open-End Shuttle Shuttle- 
Country Staple Staple Rotors less 
West Germany 79.5 64.7 0.0 98.7 38.5 
Italy 50.7 79.4 0.0 99.5 44.5 
Turkey 82.2 69.5 19.9 96.4 88.1 
Taiwan 63.5 18.2 16.2 88.9 63.5 
South Korea 68.0 81.7 8.4 67.0 88.7 
Hong Kong 69.2 n.a. 0.0 97.4 54.9 
Indonesia 74.8 33.8 14.6 87.2 92.8 
Thailand 75.3 22.6 0.0 96.8 96.5 
China 98.6 89.5 1.5 99.9 98.1 
Australia n.a. 83.8 34.5 98.8 40.0 
South Africa* 78.2 71.0 32.2 100.0 65.9 
* South African looms for 10 year period ending 1992. 
n.a. not available 
Source: UNIDO 1990 Tables IV.50, IV.54, IV.56, IV.62, IV.64. 
Table 3.2 demonstrates that South Africa has fallen behind international trends as regards 
investment in open-end spindles. Of the eleven countries listed it is only Australia that has 
a larger proportion than South Africa of open-end spindles more than ten years old. No 
less than five of the countries have completely (or almost completely) replaced all their 
open-end spindles over the period. With regards to shuttleless looms South Africa falls in 
the median position, but it lags a considerable way behind the extent to which West 
Germany, Australia and Italy have replaced their shuttleless looms. 
The significance of the age of textile machinery lies in the fact that the world's four top 
textile exporters in 1988, namely, West Germany, Italy, China and Hong Kong (in that 
sequence) have, with the exception of China's low replacement rate of shuttleless looms, 
invested extensively in new open-end spindles and shuttleless looms over the preceding 
ten year period. The South African textile industry's relatively low level of investment in 
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new technology therefore serves to undermine its ability to face up to international 
competition. 
(c) Value-added 
The stage has been reached in South African textile production where the proportion of 
value-added to the total value of a product is immensely important. A highly desirable 
feature would be to attain a higher value-added per unit of output over time, but this has 
not been the case in the textile industry for the period 1972 to 1990. The proportion of 
value-added in total output has remained virtually constant over the whole period ranging 
from 27% to 30% of production. This is also visually borne out by Figure 3.2 which 
demonstrates the close correlation between production and value-added over the period. It 
clearly demonstrates that value-added has not increased as a proportion of output over the 
period 1972 to 1990. 
Figure 3.2 
Production and value-added 
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Figure 33 
Production and value-added per employee 
Constant 1990 prices 1972—1990 
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The value-added per employee has however increased over the period 1972 to 1990, 
particularly from 1975 to 1981 when it grew at an annual compound growth rate of 8,8% 
(see Figure 3.3). The rise in value-added per employee during this period was closely 
matched by the rise in output per employee (labour productivity) which grew at 7,6% per 
year. Generally, the two relationships, namely value-added per employee and labour 
productivity, displayed the same cyclical trends over the period. 
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(d) Productivity and capacity utilisation 
Although the levels of labour and capital productivity fluctuated from year to year over the 
period 1972—1990, they both demonstrated a long-term increase over the period. Least 
square linear regression analysis reveals that both labour and capital productivity 
increased over the long term, but labour productivity had a far sharper rate of annual 
increase on average than did capital productivity. Labour productivity was rising at an 
annual rate of Ri 671 per year while output per unit capital (capital productivity) was 
almost stagnant increasing at a rate of only R0,02 per annum. 
Figure 3.4 
Capacity utiisation and labour productivity 1972—1990 
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Figure 3.5 
Capacity utilisation and capital productivity 1972—1990 
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Both labour and capital productivity had similar cyclical fluctuations to the level of 
capacity utilisation in the textile industry, as Figures 3.4 and 3.5 demonstrate. 
Surprisingly, very little of the variance in both measures of productivity can be explained 
by the variance of the level of capacity utilisation. Even in the case of capital productivity 
only 26,6% of the variance (R Squared) could be explained by the level of capital 
utilisation in a least squares linear regression equation. 
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(e) South Africa's labour productivity in comparative perspective 
How has South Africa performed in production, employment and labour productivity 
improvement in comparison to other countries during the 1970's and 1980's? Table 3.3 
compares South Africa's performance on a global level as well as the developed and 
developing market economies. Two regions are also singled out because of their 
importance to the South African economy, namely the European Economic Community 
(EEC) and the Asian market economies. 
In the period 1973—1981 South Africa's textile production performed as well as that of the 
developing market economies (their increase in production over this period was 47%), but 
there was an important distinction between how they achieved the growth. In the case of 
the developing market economies the growth was achieved mainly through an increase in 
employment, while in South Africa's case it was achieved mainly through an increase in 
labour productivity. As can be seen from Table 3.3, employment in the developing market 
economies went up by 41% and productivity increased by 5%, whereas in South Africa 
employment went up by only 6% and productivity increased by between 43% and 47%. 
However, during the 1980's South Africa's textile industry performed badly in 
comparison with the rest of the world. The first striking difference is that in the period 
1980/1 to 1988, production in South Africa declined while it expanded in the rest of the 
world. In the Asian market economies in particular, production almost doubled itself over 
this period (it increased by 97 percent), while in South Africa it decreased by 13 percent. 
Employment in textiles in South Africa also decreased in the 1980's (it fell by 15%), and 
while it fell by the same amount in the EEC there are two important distinctions between 
South Africa and the EEC. Firstly, production in the EEC increased by 12 percent during 
this period, while it decreased in South Africa. Secondly, the reduction in employment in 
the EEC took place as a result of an increase in labour productivity, while employment in 
South African textiles declined because production slumped. Whereas labour productivity 
in the EEC rose by 34%, it probably remained static in South Africa.1 
The Asian market economies, by contrast, increased both their employment and labour 
productivity during the 1980's. The fact that they could achieve both was due to their 
phenomenal growth in production over this period. 
1. According to the Industrial Development Corporation it increased by 5% over the period, but according 
to the National Productivity Institute it declined by 6%. 
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Table 33 
Production, employment and productivity growth in textiles 1973—1988 
South Africa in comparative perspective 
Indices: South Africa 1981 = 100; 
Rest of World 1980 = 100 
Region/Country Year Percent Change 
1973 1980/1 1988 73-80/1 80/1-88 
Production 
World 81 100 128 23 28 
Developed M.Econs 89 100 121 12 21 
EEC 92 100 112 9 12 
Developing M.Econs 68 100 149 47 49 
Asian M.Econs 65 100 197 54 97 
South Africa 68 100 87 47 -13 
Employment 1986/7/8 80/1-86/8 
World 90 100 99 11 -1 
Developed M.Econs 106 100 89 -6 -11 
EEC 111 100 85 -10 -15 
Developing M.Econs 71 100 110 41 10 
Asian M.Econs 70 100 118 43 18 
South Africa 94 100 85 6 -15 
Labour Productivity 
World 85 100 129 18 29 
Developed M.Econs 87 100 121 15 21 
EEC 84 100 125 19 25 
Developing M.Econs 95 100 134 5 34 
Asian M.Econs 95 100 134 5 34 
South Africa: IDC 70 100 105 43 5 
NPI 68 100 94 47 -6 
Notes: 
Production figures in the third column for all countries are for 1988, but Employment 
and Labour Productivity figures are for different years: World and Developing Market 
Economies 1986; Developed Market Economies = 1987; South Africa = 1988. 
Source: South Africa: Industrial Development Corporation, 1992a, and National 
Productivity Institute, 1991 (only for labour productivity); Rest of World: 
UNCTAD, 1990. 
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3.3 Structure and employment in the textile industry 
(a) Structure in the mid—1980's 
Table 3.4 
Standard Industrial Employ- Number Output Cap.stock 
Classification Subgroup ment of firms (000's) (000's) 
Spinning, weaving and 
finishing of non-woollen 
yarns and fabrics 36 845 94 Ri 235 575 R210 232 
Garment and hosiery 
knitting mills 13 499 98 R224 311 R34 323 
Soft furnishings 8 103 183 R167 988 R24 311 
Blankets 6311 8 R119781 P3859 
Other knitting mills 4 324 25 R187 790 R53 368 
Dyeing, bleaching, 
printing and finishing 4 179 30 R223 527 R17 762 
Spinning, weaving and 
finishing of woollen 
yarns and fabrics 4 108 11 R86 750 R12 821 
Carpets and rugs, mats 
and matting 4042 32 R202 805 R20 568 
Automotive textile 
goods 2613 86 R89539 R8178 
Pressed felt, padding 
and wadding; Tyre cord 
and fabric 1 984 21 R62 391 R5 820 
Notes: 
Output is the value of gross output in Rand terms. 
Capital stock is the end Rand value of the following fixed assets: plant, machinery and 
other equipment. It excludes the value of stocks on hand, land, buildings and vehicles. 
Source: South African Statistics, 1992: 12.30—12.33; and CSS Census of 
Manufacturing, 1985: 33—34 
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By the mid—1980's the South African textile industry was very comprehensive — some 
would say too comprehensive — in terms of the products which it manufactured. In the 
latest available (1985) Census of Manufacturing the ten largest subgroups in terms of 
employment were as shown in Table 3.4. It shows the dominance of the spinning, weaving 
and finishing of non-woollen yarns and fabrics subgroup in terms of employment creation. 
It is followed by the knitting mills and then by the subgroup that makes up soft household 
furnishings. 
There is a distinct regional concentration of the textile industry. Table 3.5 indicates that it 
is mainly concentrated in two areas, namely the Durban-Pinetown-Pietermaritzburg region 
and the Western Cape. There are four smaller areas of concentration, namely the Pretoria- 
Witwatersrand-Vereeniging region, Border, Natal Midlands and Port Elizabeth-Uitenhage. 
Between them these seven areas account for most of the textile employment in South 
Africa. 
Table 3.5 
Employment by region 1985 
Region Number Employment 
(Statistical Region) of firms 
Western Cape 180 21 053 
(01, 02 and 08) 
Kimberley 4 263 
(20) 
Western Transvaal 4 1 003 
(25) 
Eastern OFS 7 2 004 
(29) 
Border 11 8 270 
(38) 
PE & Uitenhage 27 6 450 
(47) 
Durban, Pinetown & Pietermaritzburg 149 29 936 
(48 and 50) 
Natal Midlands 23 6 961 
(51 and 60) 
S Tvl & Kangwane 6 1 347 
(64 and 96) 
PWV 215 10 726 
(71, 72, 73 and 75) 
Lebowa 4 653 
(94) 
Source: SA Labour Statistics, 1992: 2.177—2.227, based on the 1985 Census of 
Manufacturing. 
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The number of firms within the industry as a whole and in each of the sub-sectors implies 
a competitive market structure for the South African textile industry. However, the reality 
is that there are significant areas of oligopoly and production is very concentrated in the 
hands of the largest enterprises. In 1985, the category comprising the largest enterprises 
(i.e. with a gross output of more than RiO million per annum), produced 71 percent of 
gross output and employed 66 percent of the labour force in the textile industry. 
Some of the largest firms are subsidiaries of conglomerates such as Anglovaal Industries, 
Tongaat-Huletts, Barlow Rand and Anglo American. The Frame Group is controlled by 
Seardel Investment Corporation. via Seargreg Investments. Industex is however a 
privately owned company. In addition there are group holdings which own a large number 
of small textile companies. The larger group holdings and their number of subsidiaries (in 
brackets) include the following: Debonair Group (11), Glodina Holdings (4), Gubb and 
Inggs (21), Ninian & Lester (4), SA Bias Industries (45), Strebel Group (8), Trimtex 
Trading (5), and Unispin Holdings (9). 
Within certain textile product ranges there are some very oligopolistic structures. The 
Board of Trade and Industry found in 1988 that 90 percent of production of all spun yarn 
was in the hands of five companies while more than 90 percent of continuous filament 
yarn was in the hands of only one company (BTI, 1988:19, paragraph 52). 
Almost 100 percent of the country's requirement of polyester and polyamide fibres were 
in the hands of three manufacturers and although two new entrants started producing 
polyamide yarns and another one started producing polyester continuous filament yarns, it 
still remained an oligopolistic structure (BTI, 1988:15, paragraph 35—36). Although the 
structure is very oligopolistic, it appears to the outsider to be a competitive rather than 
collusive oligopoly. 
(b) Employment in the textile industry 
A more detailed breakdown of employment by population group and gender in the 1985 
census for the textile industry subsectors is provided in Table 3.6. 
Total employment in the textile industry in terms of population group in 1985 and 1991 
were as indicated in Table 3.7. It shows that more than half of the labour force in the 
industry is African and slightly more than a quarter is Coloured. Whites constitute only 
about one-tenth of employees and Asians even less (about 7 percent). 
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Table 3.6 
Employment by subgroup, population group and gender in 1985 
Subgroup Whites Coloureds Asians Africans 
M F M FM F M F 
Wool scouring 
& combing 128 21 42 13 89 8 958 379 
Cotton ginning & 
fibre working 99 35 19 2 3 1 609 103 
Dye, bleach, print 
& finish 272 144 683 383 289 118 1599 691 
Blankets 495 130 311 303 363 56 2499 2154 
Spin, weave & finish 
of woollen yarns 
and fabrics 255 88 769 1515 1 1 435 1044 
Spin, weave & finish 
of non-woollen yarns 
and fabrics 2406 606 3264 4360 2234 656 13385 9934 
Soft furnishings 441 304 670 2535 279 525 1136 2213 
Bags& sacks 68 43 79 153 108 202 569 519 
Tents, tarpaulins, 
sails&canvas 180 152 110 215 198 42 455 553 
Automotive 
textile goods 216 94 297 623 155 79 817 332 
Garment and hosiery 
knitting mills 608 420 914 3139 389 169 2404 5456 
Other knitting mills 453 165 1119 588 371 40 1229 359 
Carpets and rugs, 
mats, etc. 351 166 762 523 195 40 1553 452 
Rope, cable, 
cordage, etc. 179 57 462 453 107 2 468 3 
Linoleum and 
coated fabrics 189 66 234 8 118 13 556 2 
Pressed felt, tyre 
cord and fabric 141 42 186 82 132 92 1028 281 
Total 6481 2533 9921 14895 5031 2044 29700 24475 
Source: CSS, Censtis of Manufacturing, 1985: 135-136 
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In terms of gender more males were employed in the textile industry than females in 1985. 
The total number of males was 51 133 (54%) and total number of females 43 947 (46%), 
but there were significant differences between the population groups as shown in Table 
3.6. Among Whites the overwhelming majority were male (72%) while among Coloured 
people females significantly outnumbered males (by 60% to 40%). For Asians the ratio 
was reversed with males (60%) outnumbering females (40%), whereas among Africans 
the ratio of males (55%) to females (45%) was about the same as the average for the 
textile industry as a whole. 
Table 3.7 
Employment in the textile industry by population group 
1985 1991 
White 9 014 (9,5%) 10 600 (11,6%) 
Coloured 24 816 (26,1%) 24 900 (27,2%) 
Asian 7 075 (7,4%) 6 500 (7,1%) 
African 54 175 (57%). 49700 (54,2%) 
Total 95 080 (100,0) 91 700 (100,0%) 
Source: CSS, Census of Manufacturing, 1985: 135-136; 
SA Labour Statistics, 1992:2.177-2.227. 
An important aspect of the South African textile industry not touched on as yet, is trade. 
This is considered in the next chapter. 
Chapter Four: South African textile trade and 
trade regime 
This chapter commences by examining the South African textile trade and then proceeds 
to investigate the complex South African trade regime for textiles. It ends with a brie! 
exposition of the phasing down schedule of textile tariffs accepted by GAIT in the 
Uruguay Round of negotiations. This schedule is of great importance to the textile 
industry as it is a clear signal that textile tariffs are going to be reduced over the next 
twelve year period. 
4.1 South African textile trade 
Textile exports, as a proportion of domestic production, averaged about 6% in the 1970's, 
but increased steadily in the 1980's to 15% in 1989. According to the IDC Sectoral Data 
Series exports in the textile industry during the 1970's and 1980's constituted more or 
less the same proportion of domestic textile production as manufacturing exports did in 
the manufacturing industry. Textile imports, on the other hand, constituted a smaller 
proportion of domestic demand in the textile industry in the 1970's and 1980's than did 
manufacturing imports in the domestic demand for manufactured goods. Textile imports 
from 1972 to 1989 constituted, on average, 14% of domestic demand in textiles whereas 
manufacturing imports constituted 19% of domestic demand over the same period (IDC, 
1992a). 
Trends of imports and exports in the textile industry and in sub-groups of textile products 
are presented in Figures 4.1 and 4.2. Figure 4.1 shows that, except for three years in the 
mid-1980's, textile imports consistently exceeded textile exports over the nineteen year 
period from 1974 to 1992. 
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Figure 4.1 




Source: IDC 1992a 
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Breaking these figures down to subsectors of the textile industry according to the Standard 
Industrial Classification reveals that there are four major subsectors that have shown 
considerable growth in exports from 1988 to 1990. They are (1) the spinning, weaving and 
finishing, (2) the fabric knitting, (3) the household and automobile, and (4) the carpets and 
rugs subsectors (Figure 4.2). 
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Figure 4.2 
Export of textiles (Four SIC sectors), Constant 1990 prices 
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A pertinent question that arises is how the existing South African textile trade fits into the 
industrial strategy proposed later in this study. The strategy is based on the finding that the 
South African textile industry is potentially more internationally competitive in higher 
value-added products that are specialised or differentiated in one way or another. On the 
other hand it is not internationally competitive at the basic commodities end of the market. 
It is therefore proposed that the South African textile industry should focus on the 
production of higher value-added products. Do the trade figures reflect this trend or not? 
The Department of Customs and Excise Harmonised System figures for the thirteen 
product groups (called chapters) of textiles and textile articles (including apparel) provide 







Source: CEAS, 1992, File Exp69.WQ! 
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Figure 4.3 presents the exports and imports in 1991 for each of the thirteen chapters.1 
Figure 4.3 
Iniports and exports 1991. Harmonised system 
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The Thirteen Chapters of the Harmonised System are: 
50-Silk 
51 - Wool and other Animal Hair 
52 - Cotton and Cotton-related Products 
53 - Other Vegetable Textile Fibres 
54 - Chemical Filaments 
55 - Chemical Staple Fibres 
56 - Wadding, Felt; Ropes & Cables 
57 - Carpets and Other Floor Coverings 
58 - Special Woven Fabrics 
59 - Industrial Textiles 
60 - Knitted Fabrics 
61 - Knitted Clothing 
62 - Clothing not Knitted 
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The first striking feature of South African textile imports and exports is that it is 
overwhelmingly dominated by the export of wool-related products (Chapter 51) and the 
importation of products related to chemical staple fibres and chemical filaments (Chapters 
54 and 55).2 
Of the R989 million wool-related products exported in 1991 the overwhelming proportion 
was unprocessed wool. About one half of it (R444 million) was not carded or combed and 
consisted mainly of shorn wool, while the other half (R448 million) was carded or combed 
wool and was mainly wool tops. Only a very small proportion (0,7%) consisted of woven 
fabrics of wool and other fine animal hair. 
There is thus a strong prima facie case for the beneficiation of wool in the textile industry 
in that it could both add value to exports and created considerable investment and 
employment opportunity. As it is common cause that there should be wool beneficiation in 
the textile industry and there is a Technical Committee under the chairmanship of Paul 
Hatty on the long-term Panel, thi paper does not delve into the matter. The position 
adopted is to support the beneficiation of wool to the stages where South Africa is 
internationally competitive on a sustainable basis and to recommend expeditious action on 
that front. 
The titles of Chapters 54 and 55 (chemical filaments and chemical fibres) are rather 
misleading in that their imports consist mainly of fabric and yarn made from chemical 
fibres and filaments. The two major components of Chapter 54 imports in 1991 were RiOl 
million yarn and R340 million woven fabric. Chapter 55 comprised R264 million filament 
and fibres, R54 million yarn and R429 million woven fabric. Thus almost two-thirds of the 
imports under Chapters 54 and 55 consisted of woven fabrics. As regards the export of 
chemical filament and fibres the picture is reversed. Only R20 million or 11% of exports 
in both chapters consisted of woven fabrics, the remainder consisting of staple fibres and 
yarn. A considerable volume of filament yarn to the value of R102 million was exported in 
1991. Although a considerable degree of technological know-how is required to produce 
export quality filament yarn, what emerges from the trade pattern of goods in Chapters 54 
and 55 is that South Africa imports a considerable proportion of higher value-added 
woven fabric and exports mostly lower value-added filament yarn (IDC, 1992b). 
As regards cotton-related products (Chapter 52) the ratios are similar, but not as dramatic 
as in the case of woollen and chemical fibre and filament related products. In 1991 almost 
60% of the R264 million's worth of cotton-based imports were woven fabrics whereas 
almost 60% of the R104 million's worth of exports constituted cotton and cotton yarn. 
Hence, once again, in cotton textiles, South Africa exports mainly lower value-added 
products and imports mainly higher value-added fabric (IDC, 1992b). 
2 Throughout this book the term 'chemical fibre' rather than 'man-made fibre' is used. See Textiles Terms 
and Definitions of the Textile Institute (1991:14). 
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An important group of higher value-added textile products in which exports have been 
growing much faster than imports are garments. Although they fall outside the scope of 
this study, it is important to note that the value of exports in knitted and other garments 
has increased considerably between 1988 and 1991 with the result that knitted garment 
exports had almost caught up with imports while other garment exports exceeded imports 
in 1991 (see Figure 4.4). This is a significant development for the domestic textile industry 
as the growth of garment exports can create a demand for local fabric that could well 
require shorter lead times and higher quality fabric. 
Figure 4,4 
Apparel imports and exports 1988—1991, constant 1990 prices 
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4.2 The textile trade regime in South Africa 
4.2.1 Protection 
(a) Introduction: complexity and fluidity of textile tariffs 
It is no easy matter to present an overview of the tariff structure in the textile industry. 
This is primarily because of the complexity of the South African tariff system which Belli 
et a! (1993:3) has described as 'one of the most complex in the world'. There are a variety 
of duties each with a multitude of rates which may be used separately or combined in 
complex ways with each other. Some rates are ad valorem, some are specific, while others 
are based on formulae. In some cases the specific duties are not related to the import price, 
but are just stated as specific rand amount per unit of weight, volume, or other product 
characteristic. In others, there is an ad valorem rate and an alternative specific rate. Still in 
other cases there are specific duties coupled with maximum or minimum ad valorem rates 
and, finally, for some items the specific rate applies in addition to the ad valorem rate 
(Belli et a!, 1993:3—4). 
The tariff structure of the textile industry is no exception to the rule. If anything, it has one 
of the most complex tariff structures because of the extensive representations the industry 
has made to the Board of Trade and Tariffs over the years. Added to this are the relatively 
frequent changes in the tariff rates as well as the vast number of textile products covered 
by tariff duties. For instance, in the revised schedules of November 1992 more than 2 300 
products are listed, most of which are covered by a combination of ad valorem and 
formula duties (Government Gazette, No.14405, 13 November 1992). 
The Industrial Development Corporation has calculated nominal and effective duties for 
the economy as a whole down to fairly small product groups in the manufacturing sector 
(IDC, 1990). It has also done subsequent calculations which Pedro Belli and others used 
extensively in their World Bank publication reviewing trade policy in South Africa (Belli 
et al, 1993). In fact, most of the tables in Belli et al on nominal and effective rates of 
protection in South Africa are based on IDC calculations. Between them these two 
publications make it possible to present an overview of the textile trade regime in South 
Africa. 
(b) Levels of protection of textile products 
i. Nominal tariff rates 
The textile, apparel, and leather products subsector is one of the most protected, if not the 
most protected subsector in the manufacturing industry. Table 4.1, which pertains to the 
years 1989—1991, demonstrates the high level of nominal protection which the subsector 
receives compared to manufacturing industry as a whole. 
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The Table reveals that, within the subsector, nominal protection is higher for wearing 
apparel and footwear than for textile products. The weighted mean of the nominal rate of 
protection of textile, apparel and leather products is more than twice the manufacturing 
weighted average (66 percent as opposed to 28 percent). But the weighted mean for 
apparel goods is almost four times higher than the manufacturing average and for footwear 
more than three times the manufacturing average. This is the case even though textiles has 
the maximum rate of 1 389 percent (Belli et al, 1993:13-15, Tables 3—5). The maximum 
rate applies to only one product: woven polyester fabrics, containing less than 85 percent 
by mass of such fibres, mixed mainly or solely with cotton, of a mass between 300 and 
350 grams per square metre (Belli et al, 1993:12). 
Table 4.1 
South Africa: Nominal rates of protection on manufacturing, textile, apparel, leather 
and footwear (1) 
Sector! Wghted Unwghtd Mm. Max. Coeffct 
Subsector Mean (2) Mean Rate Rate of 
% % % % Variatn 
(3) 
Manufacturing 28 30 0 1389 158,4 
Textile, Apparel 66 62 0 1389 129,6 
& Leather Products 
Textiles 69 60 0 1389 140,6 
Apparel 104 81 5 265 51,3 
Leather 15 23 0 90 88,5 
Footwear 90 65 0 659 130,5 
Notes: 
(1) The Table is based on 1989, 1990 and 1991 tariff schedules. They were 
changed twice in 1992 and ended up higher than before (Belli et al, 1993:7). 
(2) It is customary to weight the tariff rates by some suitable set of weights, such as 
the country's 'own' trade weights (imports, for example), or world trade 
weights. In South Africa, with the exception of consumer goods and goods of 
agricultural origin, the difference between weighted and import-weighted 
averages are not markedly different (Belli et al, 1993:12). 
(3) The coefficient of variation is the standard deviation of a distribution divided by 
the arithmetic mean. 
Source: Belli et al, 1993:13—15, Tables 3—5. 
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ii. Tariffs based on import duty collections 
Moving onto tariff collections, South Africa follows the pattern in most countries. The 
nominal tariff rates are three times higher than the tariffs collected. The incidence of 
protections is however much the same. Manufacturing is the most protected sector while, 
within manufacturing, the textile, apparel and leather products subsector is the most 
protected. Table 4.2 provides the details. It also shows that wearing apparel and footwear 
have protection rates that are well above the average for textile, apparel and leather 
products. 
Table 4.2 
Protection based on duty collections manufacturing, textile, apparel, leather and 
footwear 
Sector! Wghted Unwghtd Mm. Max. Coeffct 
Subsector Mean Mean Rate Rate of 
% % % % Variatn 
Manufacturing 9,4 17,0 0,0 450,0 99,1 
Textile, Apparel 19,7 25,6 0,0 450,0 78,7 
& Leather Products 
Wearing Apparel 35,8 37,7 0,2 15 1,0 37,3 
Footwear 36,2 36,4 0,0 56,1 31,1 
Source: Belli et al, 1993:16—17, Tables 6 & 7. 
iii. Effective rates of protection 
Nominal rates of protection however provide a distorted picture of the actual or effective 
protection products receive. This is because tariffs are also imposed on imported inputs 
used in the manufacture of the final products. Hence in order to comment sensibly on state 
intervention one has to focus on the entire protective structure, not just on protection 
which is afforded to the final stage of the production process. In the case where tariffs are 
the only form of intervention, whereas an output tariff acts like a subsidy to the producer 
of a given commodity, an input tariff acts as a tax on value-added. The net protection to 
value-added in an activity therefore depends on the relative magnitude of output and input 
tariffs (Greenaway, 1988:78). 
THE TEXTILE SECTOR 49 
The effective rate of protection of an activity is defined as the change in the value-added 
due to the tariff structure as a proportion of the value-added at world prices (Holden, 
1992:187). 
According to calculations by the IDC using 1989 data inputs in the manufacturing sector 
had a nominal protection of about 13 percent on average while output had 18 percent 
protection, providing effective protection of 30 percent Table 4.3 shows that the textile, 
apparel and leather subsector enjoyed an effective protection three times higher than the 
manufacturing average. The 94 percent effective protection of the subsector is in fact the 
highest of all the manufacturing subsectors (Belli et al, 1993:22, Table 9). 
Table 4.3 
Effective protection on manufacturing and textiles, apparel and leather subsector 
Protection on Effective 
Sector/Subsector Inputs Output Protection 
Manufacturing 12,6 17,8 30,2 
Textiles, Apparel, & Leather 27,8 43,6 93,6 
Source: Belli et al, 1993:22 
There is also immense variation in the effective rates of protection within the textile, 
apparel and leather subsector as Table 4.4 indicates. According to the IDC calculations it 
ranges from -26 percent in wool and cotton processing to 239 percent for non-knitted 
garments. 
Belli et al suggests that the effective rates of protection reveal a clear tendency towards the 
promotion of increasing local value-added, in accordance with stated policy objectives of 
beneficiation. While there generally is low or even negative effective protection for 
unbeneficiated products, the pattern of effective protection for higher value-added 
products is however haphazard with some inconsistencies (See Annexure 8 of IDC, 1990). 
Table 4.4 also demonstrates the variability in rates, for instance, between the effective 
protection rates for garment knitting mills and other knitting mills (99 percent as opposed 
to 235 percent). 
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Table 4.4 




Product Group % % 
Wool and Cotton Processing 9 -26 
Spinning and Weaving 40 94 
Made-up Textile Goods 22 45 
Garment and Hosiery Knitting 87 99 
Other Knitting Mills 58 235 
Carpets and Rugs 30 161 
Cordage, Rope and Twines 25 15 
Other Textiles 20 18 
Clothing other than Footwear 75 239 
Footwear 35 87 
Note: 
Method of Calculating Effective Rate of Protection. 
Effective protection is calculated from value-added before and after protection. 
Since the effect of protection is included in all economic statistics, value-added after 
protection is readily available. Value-added before protection is calculated by the 
IDC from its input-output table. It is done by reducing the price of every material 
input in the input-output table by its nominal tariff rate. The reduced material input 
prices are then added together to attain their value before tariffs. Similarly the value 
of production before protection is calculated by reducing the price of every product 
by the nominal protection on that product. Value-added before protection is then 
derived by subtracting input costs before protection from the value of production 
before protection. Note that this method assumes that all inputs and products are 
marked up by their full rate of nominal protection. 
Source: IDC, 1990, Annexure 8. 
4.2.2 Export incentive schemes 
Under the Customs and Excise Act exporters are eligible for drawback (item 521.00) or 
exemption (item 470.03) of customs duties paid or payable on imported materials used in 
making or packaging goods for export. Firms however make little use of duty drawbacks 
and exemptions. In 1991 there were only 319 applications under 470.03 and 38 under 
521.00 of which the Board rejected only 2 under 470.03 (BeIli et al, 1993:23—24). 
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(a) The General Export Incentive Scheme (GElS) 
GElS is the major export incentive schemes for manufacturing industry as a whole. In the 
textile industry there was a second very important export and import incentive scheme, 
namely the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP), which has been replaced by a Duty 
Credit Certificate (DCC) scheme. GElS dates back to April 1990 and was designed to 
offset the price disadvantage the South African exporters face in international markets. It 
provides a tax-free financial subsidy to exporters based on the value of exports, the degree 
of processing and the local content of the exported product. The export subsidy increases 
with the level of beneficiation (processing), the level of local content, and with the value 
of the Rand against a basket of currencies. 
The amount of assistance provided under GElS is calculated using the formula 
Z = U*(M+orE)*P 
Where Z is the amount of the subsidy, U is the FOB value of the export, M is a 
manufacturing level factor, E is an exchange rate factor used to adjust M for inflation and 
exchange rate fluctuations, and P is the local content factor of the export product. 
Export products are classified into four categories, according to the degree of processing. 
This categorisation is used to determine the M-value which each particular export product 
receives for the purpose of calculating assistance. The categories and corresponding M- 
values are: 
i. Primary products: 0% 
ii. Beneficiated primary products: 7,5% 
iii. Material-intensive products: 12,5% 
iv. Manufactured products: 25,0% 
However, due to the exchange rate factor E the adjusted manufacturing levels factors (M 
minus E) as from September 1991 are: 
i. Primary products 0% 
ii. Beneficiated primary products: 2,5% 
iii. Material-intensive products: 6,0% 
iv. Manufactured products: 18,5% 
The local content factor P is equal to zero if the proportion of imported inputs is above 65 
percent of the value of the exported product, and equal to one if the proportion of imported 
inputs is below 25 percent. Between these two extremes P varies in proportion to the ratio 
of imported inputs to exported product (Belli et al, 1993:24—25). 
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The question arises what the net effect of the protection and export incentives policies is 
on the propensity to export. The anti-export bias coefficient is a measure commonly used 
to compare the effects of domestic policy on incentives to export. If policies raise value- 
added for domestic production more than for export, the anti-export bias coefficient is 
greater than one. If, on the contrary, policies render exports more attractive than domestic 
production, the anti-export bias coefficient is less than one. If policies are neutral, then the 
coefficient is exactly one (Belli et al, 1993:27). 
The importance of GElS in reducing or even removing the anti-export bias in 
manufacturing is evident from the following findings. The additional revenue obtained 
through GElS in the manufacturing sector as a whole was estimated to increase the value- 
added in exports by about 83,9 percent in 1991. On the other hand value-added in 
domestic sales without GElS would have been 88,6 percent higher than in exports. With 
GElS the difference shrinks to a fairly negligible 4,7 percent. It is therefore doubtful that 
South Africa could sustain the present level of manufactured exports without GElS (Belli 
et al, 1993:27—28). But it is equally doubtful whether the state can afford to sustain GElS. 
In 1991 R 900 million was paid out under GElS; of this, R100 million went to the clothing 
and textile industries. In 1992 it is estimated that GETS paid out R1,5 billion (Trade 
Monitor, 1993, 1:8). 
The importance of GElS as a financial incentive was confirmed in a different study aimed 
at establishing whether certain South African regions offered a competitive environment 
for the establishment of industrial plants designed to supply manufactured goods to the 
European market. In a sensitivity analysis to policy and other changes in the environment 
it was found that the financial feasibility is very sensitive to the availability of the export 
incentive (GETS) and changes in the financial Rand discount. The removal of GElS was 
the factor that made expected return on investment fall most and reduced the South 
African regions' competitiveness vis-a vis other countries round the world (Plant Location 
International, 1993:22; Bridgman, 1993:7—9). 
(b) The Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) 
Although the SAP has been phased out, it is instructive to examine because of the 
unintended consequences it had on the textile industry. It is therefore important for policy- 
makers to understand why the SAP went awry. 
The history of the textile industry, as mentioned above, has been characterised by 
protectionism. In fact, the textile industry developed a reputation of lodging more 
complaints about imports and tariffs with the Board of Trade and Industry (BTJ) (as it was 
then called) than any other industry in South Africa (Interview, BTI, 24 March 1992). The 
result of such active representation, as shown above, made it the most protected industry 
in South Africa. 
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Protection was however the basis of the state's industrialisation policy of import 
substitution which it pursued throughout the 1950's and 1960's. This was also the state's 
policy with regards to the textile industry. As from 1972, with the Report of the Reynders 
Commission, the state started developing a policy of export promotion as well. The policy 
measures to promote exports were not however adequate to turn South Africa's 
manufacturing industry into an export-oriented industry. Industries such as the textile 
industry also continued to pursue their protectionist strategy with strength and vigour. 
The high protection of the textile industry generally worked to the detriment of the 
clothing industry because it led to an increase in the cost of fabric and other textile inputs 
into the clothing industry. Consequently the history of the relationship between the textile 
and clothing industries has been characterised up to 1992 by conflict and opposition of 
each other's tariff objectives. The second half of the 1980's was no exception and the 
tussle between the textile and clothing industries to have tariffs raised or lowered 
continued unabated. 
The state had however increasingly become aware of the primacy of manufactured exports 
as a policy objective by the mid-1980's. In 1988 the BTI published a major policy 
document, A Policy and Strategy for the Development and Structural Adjustment of 
Industry in the Republic of South Africa. It was a path breaking document in many ways 
and argued the case for much greater support on a selective basis to promote the structural 
adjustment of certain chosen industries. It introduced notions such as dynamic 
comparative advantage and performance criteria for granting incentives (Black, 
1991:4—5). 
The textile industry was one of the industries selected by the BTI for a structural 
adjustment programme which was finalised in October 1988. The BTI realised that it had 
to give exporters access to inputs at world prices and assistance to improve their own 
productivity (BTI, 1988:59, paras 172&3). In order to make fabrics available at world 
prices, it proposed that textile and clothing manufacturers be able to import, under full 
rebate of the duty, 10 percent of their domestic purchases for the year for processing 
locally (Ibid:62, para. 179). Beneficiaries of the rebate would be expected to perform in 
terms of certain specified criteria. The Board also recommended that participants in the 
SAP who performed according to the criteria should qualify for working capital loans at 
preferential rates from commercial banks (Ibid: 163, para.182). 
Furthermore, to encourage exporters the BTI recommended that they be allowed to import 
a certain percentage of the value of their exports under rebate of the full duty. The values 
of the permits issued ranged from 70 percent of the previous year's exports for clothing, 
down to 40% for exporters of yarns of human-made fibres. The rates were set in such a 
way that there was a greater incentive for exporters of higher value-added goods (Ibid. :63, 
para. 183). 
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Although the BTI opposed tariff protection in principle it was of the opinion that it could 
not be withdrawn without a disastrous effect on local industries. It accordingly 
recommended moderate tariff protection with the inclusion of formula duties to prevent 
disruptive competition in the textile and clothing markets (Ibid:59—60, para.175). In 
keeping with this spirit the lengthy list of recommended amendments to Schedule No 1 to 
the Customs and Excise Act stipulated low ad valorem rates of duty. They ranged from 
free through 10, 15, 20, up to 30 percent (Ibid:72—244). 
To improve local productivity assistance was recommended for productivity improvement 
programmes. Such programmes were to include productivity as well as quality 
improvement schemes, technology development schemes and production management 
improvement schemes. Preference was to be given to human resource development 
programmes (Ibid:67, para. 192). 
The SAP was implemented on April 1989, but unfortunately only very limited aspects of 
the proposed Programme were implemented. The export incentive scheme was 
implemented, but in a way that undermined export incentives as well as the textile 
industry. This was because clothing and textile fabric manufacturers who exported at least 
2,5 percent of their turnover, in tenns of value, qualified under the SAP for the duty-free 
import permits. The value of the permits was the sum of the values of two separate bases. 
The one basis was the export of products manufactured from raw materials produced 
locally or imported on which the full duty was paid. In this case the value of the permits 
for clothing manufacturers was 70 percent of the previous year's exports of clothing and 
for textile manufacturers 50 percent of the previous year's exports of fabrics. The other 
basis was the purchase of raw materials manufactured locally and the value thereof was 10 
percent of purchases of such raw materials (yarns and fabrics) (Board of Trade and 
Industry, 1991). 
Arising from the Structural Adjustment Programme a local textile company calculated that 
a clothing company could obtain duty-free imports that were 2,7 times the value of its 
exports once it managed to export 2,5 percent of its output. The figure was arrived at as 
follows: 
Suppose a clothing company produces R100 million worth of clothes annually of 
which it exports R2,5 million, and that local raw materials constitute 50% of 
production. 
Then it can import duty-free: 
70% of previous year's exports R1,75 million 
10% of locally purchased raw material = 0,1 x R50 million 
= R5 million 
Total value of duty-free imports = R6,75 million 
Hence by exporting R2,5 million the company can obtain duty-free import pennits to 
the value of R6,75 million or 2,7 times as much as it exports. 
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Even if the assumptions in the above example are slightly distorted, it serves to highlight 
the nature of the impact of the SAP export incentive. While the exporting firms enjoyed 
the advantage of cross-subsidising exports from the rents they obtained via duty-free 
imports, the impact on other firms was negative. This was because firms in the apparel 
textile and clothing pipeline were encouraged to export at the expense of output of their 
former suppliers (since duty-free imports would replace purchases from local suppliers). 
What is more, the penalty which other firms had to pay in terms of foregone sales due to 
duty-free imports could be of a much greater magnitude than the value of the exports (in 
the example above 2,7 times more). 
Furthermore, the export incentive was not on a smooth sliding scale which meant that an 
exporting firm received no incentive until it exported at least 2,5 percent of output 
whereupon it suddenly receives a considerable reward. Thereafter the incentive did not 
increase until exports reached at least 15 percent of turnover, but the increase then was 
proportionately far less as the permit was based on 12,5 percent of local purchases. There 
was thus a strong incentive for textile and clothing firms simply to reach the 2,5 percent 
export level and leave it at that. 
Hence there were two central problems with the SAP export incentive scheme. Firstly, it 
encouraged exports in the textile clothing pipeline at the expense of production in the 
same pipeline and, secondly, it only provided an effective incentive for firms to export a 
mere 2,5% of their output. 
4.2.3 Suggestions for modifications to the trade regime 
In suggesting modifications to the existing trade regime policy by the state it is important 
to clarify first what the aims of the trade regime policy should be. Then every effort should 
be made to formulate the policy in such a way as to achieve the desired results. 
The aims of the textile trade regime should be the following: 
• to facilitate the restructuring of the textile industry in order to raise productivity and 
so make it internationally competitive. International competitiveness includes both the 
ability to export commodities at domestic prices in world markets and to compete 
with imports entering the country at their domestic prices while facing moderate 
tariffs that are in line with the GAIT requirements. 
• to minimise and, if at all possible, to avoid a reduction in the size of the labour force 
in the textile industry during the restructuring phase. 
• to achieve economic growth in the textile industry and in the textile pipeline as a 
whole so that there is a positive rate of job creation. 
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In order to become internationally competitive in both the international and domestic 
markets the anti-export bias needs to be removed to the point where trade policies are at 
least neutral or, as the experience of East Asian exporters suggests, biased in favour of 
exports. In order to achieve export neutrality two separate requirements need to be met. 
First, all exporters must have free access to imported inputs. Second, incentives to export 
must be brought closer in line with incentives to produce for the domestic market (Belli et 
al, 1993:41). 
South Africa has very high levels of unemployment and it is therefore imperative that, 
during the transition phase of restructuring the textile industry, job losses are restricted to 
a minimum. For this reason the immediate need of trade policy reform is not liberalisation, 
but rather to maintain protection in a way which provides for a net export bias. In addition 
protection needs to be transparent and rationalised radically to ease the administration and 
improve the efficiency of tariff policy implementation by South African customs officials. 
Rationalisation of the textile tariff regime should commence by moving away from the 
laser beam approach of levying duties to particular items at the eight-digit level of detail, 
but rather down to the six or even four-digit level (Belli et al, 1993:41). 
Rationalisation could also entail lowering the extremely high tariff levels to moderate 
tariff levels. As Belli et al say, 'It is doubtful that tariffs as high as 44 times the average 
are needed in order to protect a textile manufacturer in South Africa.' For a start, the 
extremely high tariff levels should be lowered to a maximum that will not cause disruptive 
imports into the country. But what should that level be? Table 4.5 casts some light on the 
matter. 
Table 4.5 shows that a lowering of the maximum duty to 150 percent would have a 
relatively minor effect on the weighted and unweighted average duty for textile, apparel 
and leather products reducing them from the existing levels by 12 and 7 percent 
respectively. A reduction of the maximum rate to 50 percent would almost halve the 
existing weighted mean to 34 percent while the new unweighted mean of 37 percent 
would be 60 percent of the existing level. Also if duties actually collected are a more 
accurate reflection Table 4.2 above shows that wearing apparel and footwear will not be 
affected at all by a lowering of the maximum duty to 150 percent. (In Table 4.2 wearing 
apparel's maximum rate of duty collected is 151 percent and footwear's maximum is 56,1 
percent.) 
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Table 4.5 
Resulting tariff structure if highest tariff is reduced: textiles, apparel and leather 
sector 
Maximum Level Weighted Unweighted Mm. Max. Coeffct of 
of Duty Mean % Mean % Rate % Rate % Variation 
Existing: 1389% 66 62 0 1389 129,6 
150% 54 55 0 150 71,8 
50% 34 37 0 50 37,9 
20% 17 19 0 20 21,8 
Source: Belli et al, 1993:14,43—45, Tables 4,16—18. 
It would thus appear that a reduction of the maximum level of duty to 150 percent would 
have a small impact on the textile industry. This is a very conservative estimate. 
According to Mr Hem Wiese, convener of the Statistics Subcommittee of the Task Group 
developing a long-term plan for the textile-pipeline, a maximum rate as low as 50 percent 
will have a minimal impact on the textile industry (Discussion, Cape Town, 29 March 
1993). What is not known however, is exactly how many companies and what level of 
employment would actually be affected by reductions of the maximum tariff rate to 50 
percent. 
More light has been shed on this issue by Miriam Altman. She has identified 64 trade 
sensitive items of mostly woven fabric. She proposes that apparel fabric duties should be 
moved to a uniform ad valorem rate of 50% except for the 64 trade sensitive items she has 
identified. She suggests that they should be subject to a specific duty as well and that the 
higher of the ad valorem or specific duty should apply (Altman, 1992:1, Appendices 1 and 
3). 
Further research that shows which companies would have their employment levels 
affected by lowering tariff levels from 150 percent down to 20 percent in increments of, 
say 10 percent, would be most useful and of great assistance in devising a new tariff 
policy. Until that is known it would be unwise to try to formulate here a detailed reduction 
in tariff policy proposal. However, what does seem clear is that rationalisation of the tariff 
structure in the textile industry could immediately commence by reducing the maximum 
duty for most textile products to 50 percent except for identified sensitive items which 
could also have a specific duty not exceeding 150 percent. Further reductions of the 
maximum level of duty should only take place after research has clarified the questions 
raised above. Then it will be important to set a specified time frame such as ten years and 
clear milestones that have to be achieved by intermediate dates. Once set, they may not be 
changed due to representations from sectional interests in the textile-clothing pipeline. 
Instead, there should be a permanent tripartite body with stakeholders from the whole 
textile-clothing pipeline that would have to give its approval to any changes the tariff 
policy. 
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4.3 Textile tariffs after the GATT Uruguay round 
The Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations of GATT was completed at the end 
of 1993. South Africa's tariff offer on textile and clothing products was accepted. As a 
result South Africa has committed itself to a phased reduction of tariffs according to a 
definite schedule over the next twelve years. The phasing down schedule is presented in 
Table 4.6. 
A great advantage of the GATF phasing down tariff schedule is that it specifies a definite 
time-table for tariff reductions over the next twelve years. This should stop the frequent 
upward and downward adjustments in duties that the industry has been subject to over the 
past decade. Another feature is that the phasing down schedule is very gradual: over the 
first four years it in fact remains static at existing levels and only from the fifth year 
onwards does it commence decreasing gradually. The existing maximum specific duties 
may also be retained for the first four years. The textile industry would therefore not be 
faced with a rapid and sudden influx of duty-free imports. Instead, it would be given a 
period of grace of more than a decade over which to adapt to gradually lowering tariff 
rates. 
However in the light of discussion in the previous section it appears as if South Africa's 
Uruguay Round Market Access offer in the textile and clothing industries is leaving some 
problems unresolved. The specific duties would still have to be implemented at the eight- 
digit level to allow for the different weights of the material. The extraordinarily high rates 
of specific duties for particular products will also remain in place as no ceiling has been 
placed on them. It would thus appear that the Uruguay Round of textile tariff reductions 
has left some very important loopholes in South Africa. While this may help to retain 
existing levels of production and employment in certain mills, it removes the strong 
incentive that lower tariff rates would have had in bringing about productivity 
improvements. 
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Table 4.6 



































































































































Note: Present minimum and maximum specific duties may be retained and the 
maximum specific duties will be subjected to the same reduction schedule. 
Source: Department of Trade and Industry Press Release, 21 December 1993 
Chapter Five: A strategy for the South African 
textile industry 
This chapter commences by comparing the costs of some of the factors of production in 
spinning and weaving between South Africa and other countries. After criticising the 
inadequacies of such an approach it moves on to examine the strategies adopted by 
competitive South African firms and the factors that accounted for their success. On the 
basis of the findings an industrial strategy for the spinning, weaving and finishing sector 
of the South African textile industry is presented. 
5.1 Comparative costs of production 
5.1.1 Total costs of production 
To arrive at a comparative figure between different countries for the total cost of 
production broken down into different components is no easy matter. Table 5.1 however 
provides such a breakdown comparing total fabric costs between six countries in 1991. 
Unfortunately South Africa is not one of the countries. 
Even so Table 5.1 does provide some valuable indicators. Firstly, it shows that capital and 
raw materials constitute the two major cost components. While raw materials constitute 
approximately one-third of the cost, the cost of capital shows greater variance ranging 
from 26% in the case of Germany to 49% for India. Secondly, it demonstrates that the 
proportion of labour cost is closely related to the level of wages in a country. Hence in the 
low wage countries (Brazil and India) the proportion of labour cost is only one-quarter to 
one-fifth the proportion of labour costs in the high wage countries (Germany, Japan and 
the USA). (Compare with Table 5.2) The exception is Korea where, in spite of higher 
wage levels the labour cost component is low, but Korea's raw material cost is probably 
high because it constitutes a considerably larger proportion of total cost than for the other 
five countries. 
Arising from this, it is interesting to compare South Africa's labour cost with that of other 
major textile producers in the world. 
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Table 5.1 
Total Fabric Costs 1991 
Cost Element Brazil Germany India Japan Korea USA 
US$ per yard of fabric 
Waste 0.037 0.035 0.028 0.042 0.042 0.035 
3% 3% 3% 3% 4% 3% 
Labour 0.055 0.283 0.042 0.261 0.058 0.237 
5% 22% 4% 20% 6% 22% 
Power 0.055 0.110 0.063 0.115 0.061 0.055 
5% 8% 6% 9% 6% 5% 
Auxiliary material 0.085 0.085 0.078 0.071 0.086 0.067 
7% 7% 8% 5% 9% 6% 
Capital 0.533 0.342 0.494 0.409 0.302 0.334 
(depreciation & interest) 46% 26% 49% 31% 31% 30% 
Raw material 0.390 0.447 0.305 0.423 0.430 0.375 
(see note below) 34% 34% 30% 32% 44% 34% 
Total fabric costs 1.155 1.302 1.010 1.321 0.979 1.103 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
(Index: Germany = 100) (89) (100) (78) (102) (75) (85) 
Definition of Total Fabric Cost Elements: 
Waste 
In spinning, revenue from the sales of waste (waste from slivers, filters, flats and grid droppings, etc.) is 
considered when calculating the waste costs. 
Labour 
The wage costs are calculated on the basis of the wages paid to operatives and to skilled and unskilled 
labour for maintenance work. All social charges and shift-work premiums are included. For reserve 
personnel a percentage figure is added. 
Power 
The energy costs include the costs relating to the actual power consumption of the machines, the 
illumination, the air conditioning, steam and heating. It is assumed that the mill is lit for the entire 
production time. 
Auxiliary MaterlaJ 
The costs fpr spare parts, lubricants, cleaning materials, and maintenance work on the buildings represent 
the costs for auxiliary material. In weaving this cost element also includes yarn preparation costs. 
Depreciation 
This element includes depreciation of machines, accessories and buildings. The machinery costs are 
inclusive of free delivery to the mill, erection and, where applicable, of customs duty and taxes. 
Interest 
Costs for capital interests. 
Raw Material 
The raw material costs relate to the consumed raw cotton only. The other costs in spinning are included in 
the respective captions for waste, labour, etc. 
Total Fabric Costs 
The sum of the above group of costs gives the total fabric costs. 
Source: ITMA, 1991a 
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5.1.2 Labour costs 
Table 5.2 presents comparative labour costs between South Africa and other countries in 
spinning and weaving in 1980, 1989, 1990 and 1991. It presents the total hourly operator 
cost (including social charges) and shows that, in spite of a considerable increase in wage 
levels in 1990, South African labour costs are still relatively low. Nonetheless, there are 
newly industrialised countries in the Far East paying only about one-fifth to one-third of 
South Africa's wage in 1991. 
Table 5.2 
Labour cost comparisons: spinning and weaving 
Total Cost per Hour in US$ 
Spring Spring Summer SummlAut Ratio to US 
1980 1989 1990 1991 Cost in 1991 
Country % 
USA 6.4 9.7 10.0 10.3 100 
Belgium 11.8 13.4 17.9 17.4 168 
West Germany 10.7 13.2 16.5 17.0 164 
Italy 9.1 13.0 16.1 17.3 168 
United Kingdom 5.8 8.2 10.2 10.2 98 
Turkey 1.0 1.3 1.8 3.1 30 
South Africa n.a. 0.7 1.6 1.6 16 
Brazil 1.6 1.8 2.0 1.5 15 
China n.a. 0.4 0.4 0.3 3 
Hong Kong 1.9 2.4 3.1 3.4 33 
India 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.6 5 
Indonesia 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.3 3 
Japan 4.4 14.0 14.0 16.4 159 
South Korea 0.8 2.9 3.2 3.6 35 
Malaysia n.a. 0.8 0.9 1.0 9 
Pakistan 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 4 
Singapore 0.9 n.a. 2.8 3.2 31 
Taiwan 1.3 3.6 4.6 5.0 48 
Thailand 0.3 0.7 0.9 0.9 8 
Source: Werner International, 1992. 
In 1990 South Africa had the distinction of recording the highest increase in labour cost in 
the textile industry in the world. In US dollar terms the increase was about 47 percent 
representing a rise of 43 percent in Rands. Wolfgang Crone of Werner International has 
commented that, 'Even with the rapid rise in labour cost South Africa falls into the group of countries which have a definite advantage in the textile industry with a labour cost of 
less than two US dollars per month.' (Textile Industries Dye gest SA, May 1991:4) 
THE TEXTILE SECTOR 63 
Table 5.3 
Labour cost comparisons for South Africa 1982—1991 
Spinning and weaving 
Sum/Aut Spring Autumn % Duff 
1991 1987 1982 1991/82 
Direct wages — local currency 4,57 2,01 1,52 
Other cost paid to operator: 
local currency 0,44 0,21 0,22 
Other costs paid by company: 
local currency 0,37 0,30 0,22 
Total cost per hour — local 
currency 5,38 2,52 1,79 200,6 
Rate of exchange US$/Rand 3,29 3,07 1,07 
Total cost in US$ 1,64 0,82 1,67 -1,8 
Ratio to US cost: % 16 9 22 
Source: Textile Industries Digest, Southern Africa, 1991 
It is worth pointing out that presentation of the South African labour cost in US dollars 
makes it subject to changes of two variables, namely the wage rate expressed in local 
currency (Rands) and the exchange rate between the US dollar and the Rand. This is 
clearly indicated in Table 5.3 which demonstrates that, during the period 1982 to 1991, the 
hourly Rand cost of labour increased by 200,6 percent while it decreased by 1,8 percent in 
terms of US dollars, thereby slightly increasing South Africa's international labour cost 
competitiveness. The exchange rate can also function to disadvantage countries 
internationally as was the case with the high wage countries of the European Community. 
Between 1989 and 1990 their wage increases ranged from 4 to 8 percent, but translated 
into US dollars the increases magnified, ranging from 24 to 32 percent (Barthold, 
1991:47). These examples thus demonstrate the immense importance of the rate of 
exchange as a factor determining the international cost competitiveness of a country's 
industry. 
5.1.3 Raw materials: cotton and polyester 
Cotton and polyester are the two major fibres used in the South African textile industry 
that are grown and produced in South Africa. Figure 5.1 compares South African cotton 
prices with the Liverpool A-Index prices (usually regarded as the world price) from 1982 
to 1992, and the Pakistan official minimum support prices from 1986 to 1991.1 
1. The A-Index is generally regarded as the world price of cotton. It is the statistical average of expected 
weekly prices of 12 countries cited in Cotton Outlook. The data was kindly provided by the Cotton 
Board. 
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Although South African prices have been lower than world prices in seven of the eleven 
years recorded, it was a matter of grave concern to the textile industry that the South 
African cotton price in 1992 was well above the world price. This is because the South 
African cotton spinners have to buy their annual quota of South African cotton before they 
are granted permission to import cotton. Normally this constitutes about 70 to 80 percent 
of the cotton requirements of spinners, but in 1992 it only made up about 30 percent of 
their requirement due to a drought. 
Figure 5.1 
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Notes: The A-Index is generally regarded as the world price of cotton. It is the 
statistical average of expected weekly prices of 12 countries cited in Cotton 
Outlook. 
Source: A-Index and SA prices in Rand and Pakistan prices in rupees — supplied by 
the Cotton Board; Exchange rates — rupees to US dollars, US dollars to SA 
rand — International Financial Statistics, 1992. 
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The South African price of cotton and purchase requirement is presently an additional cost 
burden to the textile producers, especially when it is compared to the price of cotton in the 
East. In the case of Pakistan, for instance, Figure 5.1 shows that the price of cotton in 
South Africa between 1986 and 1991 has been 2 to 3 times higher than the official 
minimum support price in Pakistan. However, market prices in Pakistan have consistently 
been above support prices throughout the 1980's and the Minimum Export Price of cotton 
from Pakistan ranged from 60% to 75% above the support price from 1988 to 1991 
(ICAC, 1992:2—3). Although this reduces the extent to which cotton in Pakistan is cheaper 
than South African cotton, it still meant that both the domestic and export price of cotton 
in Pakistan is lower than the price of South African cotton. 
Figure 5.2 
Polyester staple fibre prices for cotton spinning. DTEX 1.7/38MM, RSA: DTEX 
1.5/38MM 
USS cents/lb 
Sep88 May89 Sep89 May90 Jp 90 May91 Sep91 Aug92 
TatwanEj 74 53 78,5 48 48.5 48.5 46 48 
Japan 73 69.5 65 61,5 75 77 73 89 
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NB: RSA price: 
Sep88: R/kg 4.56 
May 89: R/kg 5.28 
Sep89: R/kg 5.48 
May90: R/kg 4.60 
Sep 90: R/kg 5.20 
May91: R/kg4.60 
Sep91: R/kg 4.60 
Aug 92: R/kg 4.48 
(Exch. Rate 2.46)=0.84 US$/lb 
(Exch. Rate 2.69)=0.89 US$/lb 
(Exch. Rate 2.80)=0.89 US$/lb 
(Exch. Rate 2.63)=0.795 US$/lb 
(Exch. Rate 2.59)=0.91 US$/lb 
(Exch. Rate 2.83)=0.71 US$/lb 
(Exch. Rate 2.86)=0.73 US$/lb 
(Exch. Rate 2.78)=0.73 US$/lb 
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With regards to polyester staple fibre the South African price was about 35 percent above 
world price in 1992 while polyester filament cost about 15 percent more in South Africa. 
Figure 5.2 compares the cost of polyester fibre at one of South Africa's major producers 
with that of six other countries over the period 1988 to 1992. It shows that the South 
African price has tended to be amongst the top end of the price range. Furthermore, in 
August 1992 the South African price was about 50% above the Taiwanese price. 
Thus, as far as the costs of labour and raw materials are concerned South Africa tends to 
be at a cost disadvantage compared to some of the newly industrialised countries in the 
Far East. 
5.1.4 Overcoming the limitations of static comparative cost analysis 
While the comparison of cost components between South Africa and other countries does 
serve to indicate where SA has comparative cost advantages and disadvantages, there are 
severe limitations to such an approach. It is, in the end, a static approach. Even where it 
provides the information in a time series it does not allow for the dynamics of innovation 
in the creation of products and search for market niches. Nor does it take into 
consideration the production process where dynamic human skills of organisation as well 
as technological progress come into play and interact with each other. 
A way of overcoming the limitation of a comparative static analysis of production costs is 
to study what companies themselves do. Even though such an approach runs the danger of 
not providing a representative picture of the totality, it does have the advantages of 
showing what is feasible and what opportunities exist. 
5.2 Comparative company case studies 
What follows next is a case study approach of seven competitive South African companies 
which commences with a relatively detailed look at three of the competitive South African 
companies. Then the strategies adopted by all seven successful companies are examined to 
establish what factors have contributed to their competitiveness. Because of requests for 
confidentiality from some companies, the names of the companies are not revealed. 
5.2.1 Three South African companies 
Texco One 
Brief description of company 
Texco One is a fully vertically integrated textile company which has three mills, two large 
and one small. It manufactures household goods, apparel fabric, and industrial textiles. 
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Strategy of company: marketing 
A crucial feature of the company's strategy lies in its marketing strategy. It operates in 
four distinct markets, namely household, apparel, home sewing, and industrial textiles, and 
treats each market as a separate division within the company. Each division is seen as a 
profit centre which is expected at least to break even or do better. In this way the company 
buffers itself against drops in sales in any one division. 
The diverse nature of our marketing division has proven to be a tremendous strength to the 
company because there is nearly always one division of the company which is doing very 
well (Marketing Director, Interview). 
Another feature of Texco One's marketing strategy is the undertaking to despatch within 
48 hours any order they receive for 'out of range' fabric, that is, any fabric the company 
has designed and is marketing (Chief Executive, Interview). This is done by keeping 'out 
of range' fabric in stock without increasing the level of stocks by means of careful 
statistical analysis of how and when the colours sell (Marketing Director, interview). 
Stock levels at Tex One are, however, high (see below for more detail). 
This service Texco One views as part of its niche marketing strategy. They understand 
niche markets not only as providing a unique product, but also as a unique service. 
Another marketing strategy that the company views as a niche market has been the 
introduction of computer aided design. With the aid of computerised scanning and design 
modification the company has been able to reduce the lead time to replicate a new design 
from sixteen weeks down to one week. 
Again we feel that we have stolen a march on competitors who are all working on the 
same project but we are just that little bit ahead of them, in a niche market if you like. For 
a period we can do it faster than anybody else (Marketing Director, Interview). 
Exports and imports 
The trade strategy of Texco One is almost completely determined by the export incentive 
scheme of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) outlined above. 
In view of this incentive scheme Texco One has set itself the task of exporting only 2,5 
percent of its output because the benefits to the company peak at that level. This is 
because the company merely breaks even on exports including the benefits of export 
incentives (Marketing Director, Interview). However, as soon as its export level reaches 
the target of 2,5 percent of output it qualifies for duty-free import permits to the value of 
approximately 4,5 percent of output.2 Increasing its exports any further does not increase 
the duty-free import permits (unless exports exceed 15 percent of output). Therefore it is 
2. This figure is arrived at as follows: 
50% of previous year's exports = 1,25% of output 
Raw materials approximately 33% of cost of production (ITMA, 199 la:16) 
10% of raw materials = 0,1x33% = 3,3% of output 
Total duty-free import permits = 4,55% of output. 
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optimal for Texco One only to reach the target export level of 2,5 percent in order to 
qualify for the duty-free permits. 
The company does not use all its duty-free permits and sells what it does not need. For 
instance, it obtained a permit for polyester filament which it could not use and sold it to 
Edgars even though it realised it was pulling the rug from underneath other producers in 
the textile pipeline. 
Generally the company policy with regards to imports is to import what it requires to 
satisfy its market. It imports from the cheapest satisfactory source which, nine times out of 
ten, is the Far East countries, Japan, Korea or Taiwan, but it has also been importing 
cotton fibre from Zimbabwe. 
Technology and production methods 
The age of the equipment in the two large vertically integrated mills varies immensely — 
from very new equipment being installed to more than twenty years old. The composition 
of the age varies between different stages of production as Table 5.4 below indicates. 
Table 5.4 
Stage of Production Age 
Less than More than 
20 years 20 years 
Blending and Carding 50% 50% 
Spinning 20% 80% 
Weaving (1) 67% 33% 
Dyeing and Finishing 45% 55% 
Colouration Preparation (1) 80% 20% 
Dyeing 40% 60% 
Printing 40% 60% 
Finishing 25% 75% 
Note 
(1) measured in tenns of output or capacity, not the actual machinery 
In spinning, for instance, the company has a large proportion (80%) of very old ring 
spindles, while in the colouration preparation most of the capacity (80%) comes from very 
new technology. The latter forms part of investment in new computerised technology by 
the company in four production processes. Firstly, computer aided design equipment, 
secondly computer sample printing equipment, thirdly computer-linked laser engraving of 
rotary screens used in printing, and finally a computerised dyehouse which was in the 
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process of being installed. In the dyehouse the computer will blend the correct colours in 
the correct quantities. 
The investment policy of the company is based on a number of criteria in descending 
order of priority. The first priority is to invest in machinery essential to the efficient 
running of the mills while the second is to upgrade technology in areas which would most 
directly effect the quality of the service provided to customers. 
In the acquisition of new technology the company virtually never has restrictions placed 
on it by the supplier. Only in the case of branding arrangements with a major British 
textile company are there some restrictions. Usually the restrictions are placed upon the 
supplier in that the company requires it not to supply the same service to one or other of its 
competitors (Manufacturing Director, Interview). 
Production performance 
Certain indicators of production performance of the company in its two integrated mills 
for the past five years are presented in Table 5.5. It indicates that there has been a 
substantial improvement in the quality of both production and customer service by the 
company, but other aspects of production performance have more or less remained static. 
Lead times have been cut by 40 to 50 percent over the five year period from 1988 to 1992 
and the percentage of rejects and reworks have also dropped by half. Deliveries on time 
have shot up from 50 percent to 88 percent, and the percentage of deliveries more than 
two weeks late has dropped from 18 to 2 percent. Set-up times at major stages of 
production have however remained constant over the five year period even though batch 
sizes have been decreasing in size. Although the stocks of raw materials declined by more 
than half in terms of weeks of input, stock turns have declined slightly over the period and 
the stock of finished goods increased by 70 percent in terms of weeks of output. Finally, 
although the throughput time declined it was still 12 times higher than actual value-added 
time by 1992. There is thus still scope for considerable production cost savings at the 
mills. 
Economic performance of company 
Texco One has remained profitable throughout the economic recession although its profit 
margin has been declining over the past three years. It declined from 25,4% in 1990, to 
19,3% in 1991, to 14,4% in 1992. The overall financial position of the company has 
however remained sound. 
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Table 5.5 
Indicator Year 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Stock turns/year 2.3 2.0 1.9 1.7 2.0 
Stock: 
Raw materials 22 20 18 15 10 
(weeks of input) 
Work in progress 3 3 4 4 4 
(weeks of production) 
Finished goods 5.0 6.0 7.0 9.0 8.5 
(weeks of output) 
Throughput time 15 14 13 13 12 
(weeks) 
Value-added time (weeks) 1 1 1 1 1 
Lead times: (weeks) 
Out of range 2.0 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 
Exciusives 18 16 14 12 10 
Colour Preparation 20 18 16 14 12 
Rejects: (% of output) 
Seconds 12% 9% 9% 7% 5% 
Fents and rags 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 3.5% 3.0% 
Reworks (% of output) 20% 20% 18% 15% 10% 
Deliveries: 
% on time 50% 60% 65% 75% 88% 
Late: 
% less than 2 weeks 32% 24% 20% 18% 10% 
%morethan2weeks 18% 16% 15% 7% 2% 
Set-up times: 
Spinning (shifts) 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5. 
Beaming (shifts) 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Weaving (shifts) 1 1 1 1 1 
Dyeing (hours) 1 1 1 1 1 
Printing (minutes) 48 48 48 48 48 
Batch sizes: 
Spinning a continuous process 
Beaming(l000m) 20 20 20 15 10 
Weaving (1000 m) 8 8 8 4 4 
Dyeing continuous dye lot = 3000 m 
Printing (1000 m) 3.0 3.0 2.0 1.5 1.0 
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Texco Two 
Brief description of company 
Texco Two manufactures apparel, parachute fabric, heavy weight and light weight 
industrial fabrics, and PVC coated fabrics. It sells, amongst others, to clothing and 
sporting manufacturers, and industrial fabricators. Its products tend to be made with 
specialised equipment which most other mills in South Africa do not have. It is not a fully 
vertically integrated mill as it buys in yarn and takes production through the warping, 
sizing, weaving, dyeing and finishing stages. Its turnover is about R100 million 
(Managing Director, Interview). 
Strategy of company 
The strategy of the company is based on its product specialisation. We have specialised equipment in our warping and sizing. We have specialised equipment 
in our weaving and we have specialised equipment in our dyeing and finishing. Now for 
anybody else to open up from scratch on the same basis, firstly, they'd have to get the 
skills which sure you can buy, but the capital investment is going to be so large that it is in 
actual fact going to frighten you. So as I say we are global competitors, not really local 
competitors (Managing Director, Interview). 
Not only does the company have specialised equipment, it also spends a considerable 
amount of effort and money on product development. The primary area of development is 
in apparel fashions, but also in new industrial fabrics. The managing director is of the 
opinion that its development programme is one of the most extensive in the country and 
that it stays ahead of the pack through its development work. 
Exports and imports 
The company uses its specialised production and development as the basis for exporting to 
all corners of the globe. It exports parachute fabric to Israel, United Kingdom, Germany, 
Austria, Canada, United States of America, Zimbabwe, Mauritius, Australia and New 
Zealand. It had recently commenced exporting the fabric in large quantities. Exports 
constitute no less than 40 percent of parachute fabric output, although it is only 3 percent 
of the value of total output. On the industrial side it exports 20 percent of industrial output. 
The basis of the company's exports is product specialisation, not price, and the managing 
director is firmly of the opinion that his mill would never be able to compete with the 
newly industrialised countries of the Far East on the basis of price. 
No matter whether we stood on our head or produced at 100% efficiency with the cheapest 
yarn in the world, we could still never compete with their prices. We have no hope in 
Hades in competing against the East (Managing Director, Interview). 
A strong motivation for exporting is to keep the level of plant utilisation high because it is 
only with high levels of plant utilisation that return on capital investment is rewarding. 
Furthermore the company only makes a small profit on exports. Were it not for GElS, 
which is at the rate of 6,5% for the company, it would be exporting at a loss. 
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The company imports surprisingly little yarn considering the large volume of duty-free 
import permits it is awarded for its exports. It only imports 15 percent of yarns and buys 
the rest locally. 
The managing director has a strong patriotic conviction which leads him to buy raw 
materials locally and not to sell import permits on principle. He does however swop 
import permits with his company's main supplier. 
Technology 
The successful export performance of the company is predicated on having state of the art 
technology in the mill. Not that the mill does not have some dated technology as well, it 
has 52 shuttle looms that are 19 years old, but it also has state of the art air-jet looms. 
The company has regularly invested in new technology. Over the last six years, for 
instance, it invested R39 million on technology, most of it being machine replacement 
with a certain amount of new types of machinery being purchased as well. The proportion 
of machinery in the mill that was six years or younger in August 1992 is presented in 
Table 5.6. 
Table 5.6 
Age of machinery 







The key benefit that new technology provides is speed. In weaving the latest looms do 750 
insertions per minute, replacing looms that did 200 insertions per minute. According to the 
managing director 'productivity in this game is machine speed and any person who thinks 
he can compete with an older machine is going to die'. 
There appears to be no constraints placed on the use of technology by the company. 
Previously it was part of the international group, Carrington-Viyella, and appears still to 
have a working relationship with them in the development of technology. 
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Production performance 
The efficiency level of the mill in terms of machine utilisation is high. For looms it is 
generally in excess of 90%. The week prior to my visit the efficiency level was considered 
not to be good: it was 87,8%. A plant visit also showed that not all machinery was in use. 
This was probably due to cut backs because of stock build up. However, the plant is kept 
running 24 hours per day and 7 days per week. 
It also appears to be running efficiently in terms of the following indicators for 1992: 
Stock turnover — 4,6 times per year 
Reject rate — 6% 
Deliveries on time — 95% 
Economic performance of company 
Although financial details of the company are confidential and cannot be released, the 
company is highly profitable with positive real rates of return on capital expenditure and 
investment. 
Texco Three 
Brief description of company 
Texco Three is a fully integrated spinning, weaving, dyeing and finishing mill. It considers 
itself to be a small company, but is actually quite sizable with a labour force of 500. It 
produces heavier weaves in the apparel industry suitable for men's trousers and women's 
skirts and dresses. Ninety percent of its products are made from chemical fibres: 65 
percent polyester and 35 percent viscose. The remaining 10 percent is woollen related. 
Economic performance 
The company has been performing well in spite of the fact that the South African economy 
has been in recession and that the textile industry has been declining. It has grown in sales 
each year from a turnover of R24 million seven years ago to one of R61 million in 1992. It 
has also made very good profits with a profitability rate of 10% on turnover. 
A large proportion of company profits is ploughed back into the company through 
extensive investment in new technology. This is discussed below. 
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Strategy of company 
The success of the company lies in the reliability and quality of its products and services, 
its relaxed non-bureaucratic style of management, its skilled middle management staff and 
its good relationship with customers. 
According to the director in charge of sales and manufacturing Texco Three delivers 93 
percent of all its orders on time. This is well above the industry average which is allegedly 
of the order of 50—60 percent. 
Quality is another aspect of production that the company concentrates on. It purchases 
quality fibres for which it is prepared to pay a premium price. This is because good quality 
starts at the bottom: if the fibre is not good a great deal can go wrong with production 
downstream. The company also has a laboratory set up in full conformance with 
Woolworths standards. 
The relaxed non-bureaucratic style of management contributes to efficient company 
management by virtue of the fact that there are very few meetings at the company because 
the management team 'make decisions on their feet'. The management style also 
facilitates communication and problem-solving within the company by virtue of the 
'hands-on' policy of management. In each department there is a manager in charge of and 
responsible for operations who is willing to 'role up his sleeves' and 'get stuck in' if there 
is a technical problem that needs attention. This style of management is facilitated by the 
relatively small size of the company. 
Coupled with this is the fact that the company has adopted an approach of self-reliance on 
the grounds that, if it has to rely on outsiders, it can be let down. To this end each major 
department has its own workshop and technicians. In addition the mill has its own general 
maintenance department. Consequently its machinery is kept in very good repair and well 
looked after. 
Texco Three has skilled and competent middle management. 'Our strength is in our 
people', according to the sales and manufacturing director. Because highly skilled staff is 
hard to come by in South Africa, the company has acquired a cosmopolitan staff 
consisting of Italians, Germans, British and Portuguese. They are 'well looked after' and 
stay on at the company. 
Finally, Texco Three has succeeded in developing close and good market relationships 
with its customers. In a Reputation Audit conducted by a consultancy firm customers were 
asked to rate the performance of six South African textile companies using wool fibre and 
overseas suppliers with respect to specific service and product criteria. Three of the 
criteria that were found to be critical by the audit were 'understanding customer 
problems', 'attitudes to customers' and 'responses to enquiries'. In all of these criteria 
Texco Three was rated the top company (MPCS, 1991). These results demonstrate that the 
company has succeeded in building a close relationship with its customers based on a 
market and service orientation. 
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Marketing, exports and imports 
Texco Three has, up to the present, focussed exclusively on the domestic market It 
exports less than one percent of its output. Because of its reputation it does not need to 
advertise. Yet it has a very wide and suitable spread of customers around the country. Its 
customers constitute both chain stores and retailers, the latter being mostly clothing firms 
on the Rand. Woolworths is one of its customers and it has taken a policy decision not to 
sell more than 15 percent of its output to any one chain store in order not to make itself 
beholden to any one company. It is not known at this stage what plant capacity utilisation 
has been and whether the company has been able to sustain demand through the recession, 
but it does sustain an output of about 400 000 linear metres per month. 
The company does import raw materials in the form of viscose and polyester fibres 
although it does purchase some polyester fibre on the local market. Its policy is to try and 
find reliable suppliers of good quality fibres and then to stay with them. It imports 
polyester fibre largely from Germany and Japan and viscose from Japan only. 
Technology 
As mentioned above, the company reinvests a considerable amount of its profits in new 
technology every year. Over the past four years the company has invested an average of 
R5 million per annum in new technology. Although the plant does have some old 
technology, there is a high proportion of technology not more than 7 years old as Table 5.7 
indicates. 
Table 5.7 
Age Of Machinery 
Machinery Average Age 
Spindles 7 years 
Twisting 4 years 
Looms 6—7 years 
Stenters 6 years 
80% of dyeing equipment 4—5 years 
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The director of manufacturing is satisfied that the company keeps abreast of new 
developments in textile technology. One senior manager travels abroad at least once a year 
to update himself while two directors visited the ITMA Exhibition in Germany late in 
1991. Agents for textile equipment also visit the company. Erectors usually come to install 
the plant and train management on the use thereof. People are also sent overseas for 
training. There have been no trading restrictions or royalties placed on machinery that was 
purchased by the company. 
Production methods 
While the company does strive to improve the quality of its products and its service, it is 
not trying to implement Just in Time techniques by moving towards a reduction of work in 
progress. This was vividly demonstrated by a store room approximately 50 metres by 50 
metres and 10 metres high with shelves almost up to the ceiling. It was brimful with 
different types and colours of yarn to the value of about R5 million. 
Nonetheless the company perceived the stock as the 'secret' of its success because it 
enables the company to start processing an order rapidly without first having to make the 
appropriate yarn first. In this way the customer lead time can be shortened. In the 
Reputation Audit done by MPCS Texco Three had the highest rating amongst South 
African companies for speed of deliveries. Remarkably, its rating was still below that of 
overseas companies suggesting that there is still considerable room for improvement in 
quick responses. 
5.2.2 Strategies of Seven South African Companies 
A common feature of all seven companies researched is that they all base their strategies 
on the production of differentiated products with higher value-added. None of them seek 
to base their strategies on 'commodities', which is the textile industrialists' term for 
products that are basic, undifferentiated, relatively straightforward to produce, and low in 
value-added. This is because they either perceive the 'commodity' market as over- 
supplied or because they do not think they can compete with the Far East NICs on price. 
(The primary basis for competition in 'commodities' is price.) However, the way in which 
the companies add higher value or differentiate their products varies considerably between 
them. 
The principle strategies adopted by the seven successfully competing firms are briefly 
summarised in Table 5.8. The strategies are subsequently discussed in more detail. Where 
reference is made in the following discussion to one of the three companies (Texco One to 
Texco Three) already presented above, no additional information is normally provided, but 
when one of the four remaining companies (Texco Four to Texco Seven) is discussed, 
additional information is usually included. 
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Table 5.8 
Principle Strategies adopted by Successful Companies 
Two of the companies (Texco One and Texco Four) primarily add higher value on the 
basis of design for either apparel or household goods or both. In addition they aim their 
different designs for particular markets. One of them (Texco Four) describes its business 
as being that of 'fabric decoration'. In apparel it provides weave, colour, design and 
sampling services. It has placed itself in the fashion market by which it means 'garments 
which are really mainstream retail at any one time'. In household furnishings it designs an 
extensive package aimed at particular markets as the following three quotes from the 
marketing and creative directors indicate: 
One of the resources which is in short supply is in fact creative designs resource for 
furnishings. So we are in fact selling a design service as well (Market Director, Interview). 
We have a unique advantage. Because we are a vertical operation we offer from a design 
creation package right through to advertising package to a high level of quality going 
through the mill, all under one roof. So we can go into a specific market and say, what are 
your needs (Creative Director, Interview). 
Ten years ago one was able to design with a spray and pray approach: just design and try 
to go and sell overseas. Those days are gone. Now it is a highly competitive design 
origination. If you want to get into a market you've got to design specifically for that 
market. What you've got to do is to get into that market, go down to that market, go and 
see and speak to the people, and develop relationships (Creative Director, Interview). 
One company (Texco Two) mainly adds higher value by means of product specialisation 
where either the technology or the process of production or both are highly specialised. In 
that way the company creates speciality niches for itself with the ability to export to 
numerous countries right round the world. 
— all 7 
Strategies 
• differentiated higher value-added products 
primarily by means of: 
design and marketing 
consistent quality 
product specialisation 
make-up into garments 
all 7 operate in niche markets 
• inyestment in new technology 
• drive to improve quality and service 
• strive to improve production process 
— 2 out of 7 
— 3 out of 7 
— loutof7 
—1 outof7 
— all 7 
— all 7 
— all 7 
Exports 
major exporters in particular niches 
export enough to qualify for SAP permits 
not in export market 
— 4 out of 7 
—2outof7 
—1 outof7 
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Three companies (Texco Three, Six and Seven) base their strategy primarily on consistent 
quality and reliability. Texco Three, which claims to deliver 93 percent of its orders on 
time, has discovered that 
People are prepared to pay premium prices to get goods of quality and have them delivered 
on time. We pride ourselves on our quality. We have a laboratory set up in full 
conformance with Woolworths (Interview, Manufacturing Director). 
Texco Seven (which also supplies Woolworths) blends no less than 96 bales of cotton 
simultaneously in order to ensure that it produces consistent quality. To some extent it is 
due to the fact that the company has to buy its quota of South African cotton which is not 
always of the quality the company desires. It therefore mixes the South African cotton 
with many other bales of better quality cotton to obtain the required quality. 
The third company whose primary strategy is based on quality, Texco Six, is a producer of 
synthetic filament and yarn. It introduced a system of Total Quality Management (TOM) 
based on W E Deming's philosophy. During the 1980's it adopted an export-oriented 
strategy and achieved considerable success. By 1993 it was exporting 30% of its turnover 
based on the attainment of world class standards. 
The following example illustrates the effort put into attaining world class standards by the 
company. Traditionally Texco Six's warping fault rate on certain yarns was 0,5—0,6 per 
million metres. A customer in Italy then sampled the yarn, but refused to place regular a 
regular order unless the fault rate could be reduced to ± 0,3 per million metres. The 
company's technical people felt that no improvement was possible with old technology 
and equipment. After six months of hard work investigating the spinning and drawtwist 
problems and making improvements, the plant team managed to reduce the warping fault 
rate to 0,2—0,3 per million metres. By doing so, the company captured a significant 
volume of export business at a time when local demand was low (Total Quality 
Management Seminar Facilitator Notes, 1992:53). 
One company (Texco 5) has adopted a strategy very uncommon to South Africa (but not 
elsewhere in the world) to raise the value-added to its production. It does so by making the 
fabric up into garments through subcontracting and then marketing the garments. It has 
gone a step further by branding one of its garments which it sells into the upper end of the 
market internationally. The company considers itself to compete in the world market and 
has adopted a number of ancillary strategies to try to ensure its international 
competitiveness (see Table 5.9). 
Table 5.9 presents more details of the seven companies' strategies on a company by 
company basis. It shows that three of the companies export a fairly substantial proportion 
of their output by value (between 18 and 35 percent) while a fourth exports a considerable 
proportion (40 percent) of its parachute fabric. Two of the companies deliberately appear 
to export only sufficient amounts to qualify for duty-free import permits under the 
Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) while one company concentrates exclusively on the 
South African market. It has a record of reliability, consistency, and closeness to the 
customer which has ensured its continued success. Table 5.9 also shows that all the 
exporting companies rely, to a greater or lesser extent, on export incentives provided by 
the state for maintaining their existing level of exports. 
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Table 5.9 























































































































Seven quality 3-4% yes, SAP 
permits 
Notes: (1) DCC Duty Credit Certificate 
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All seven companies have invested extensively in new technology over the past ten years. 
In most plants new state of the art technology make up a considerable proportion of the 
existing technology. In one mill (Texco 5) 100 percent of the looms are new, but in most 
mills there is a mixture of old and new technology. 
In addition to the three companies for whom it is the primary strategy, all four other 
companies also place an emphasis on improving the quality of their output with different 
companies placing emphasis on different aspects. In three of the companies it is the 
primary strategy. In one company a system of Total Quality Management based on W E 
Deming's philosophy which requires a major reorientation on the side of management is 
being implemented. In two other companies statistical process control is in place. 
Similarly there is a general drive to improve production processes, but there are usually 
not specific systems being adopted except in the company where Deming's TQM is being 
implemented. One company had installed Manufacturing Resource Planning (MRP2) no 
less than eight years ago. Usually a mixture of systems, adapted to suit the needs and 
circumstances of the company, is being pursued. But this does not always work well. 
Almost all the companies still keep high stock levels, for instance. In the case of raw 
materials this is sometimes due to uncertainty about the country's political and social 
stability and large stocks are being held for 'just in case'. Two of the companies have 
however turned their large stocks of finished goods into marketing assets by implementing 
quick delivery times for out of range fabrics. 
Actual production performance indicators and how they have changed over time has been 
presented above for Texco One, Two and Three. In the case of Texco Four Table 5.10 
shows the production performance improvements that the company was able to achieve 
over a four to five year period. 
Table 5.10 
Texco Four production performance indicators 
Activity Date 
1987—88 1992 
Set Up Times: 
Printing (to change a design) 1 hour 15—30 mm 
Colour Changes(dyeing machine) 30 mm 10 mm 
Household furnishings 12 months 3 months 
Batch Sizes: 
Continuous Dye 100—500 
metres 
Rejects 8,5% 4% 
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5.3 An industrial strategy: Higher value-added 
production 
The preceding analysis based on comparative costs of inputs and company case studies 
clearly points in a particular direction for a future South African textile industry. It shows 
that, in this segment of the industry, South Africa is not internationally competitive in the 
basic commodity end of the market where undifferentiated products are made. Nor is there 
a likelihood that it will become competitive in the foreseeable future due to the emergence 
of newly industrialised countries in the Far East with much lower labour costs than South 
Africa. In addition their raw materials are often subsidised which further lowers their 
costs. In the case of China there is also a manipulation of the exchange rate which drives 
their prices down. 
On the other hand successful South African companies have shown their ability to 
compete effectively, either in the South African market or internationally, in differentiated 
higher value-added products. In both the areas of design and specialised production the 
companies have been able to penetrate the markets of advanced industrial countries. In 
specialised production exports are truly global. This has been achieved on the basis of 
niche markets. 
It is thus clear that the future of the spinning, weaving and finishing segment of the South 
African textile industry (and quite possibly for others) rests on the development of the 
higher value-added, differentiated product end of the spectrum and not the basic 
commodity end. This would most probably ultimately mean a decline in the production of 
basic textile commodities in South Africa, but every effort must be made to try to ensure 
that it is preceded by an expansion in growth and employment of higher value-added 
textile products. 
Chapter Six: Comparative strategies: Turkey 
and the United Kingdom 
6.1 Introduction: Why Turkey and the United Kingdom? 
In a study of fifteen countries representing over two-thirds of world trade in textile goods 
Munkholt found that 
The star export performer of the decade [1980's] among the 15 countries under 
consideration was quite clearly Turkey (Munkholt, 1991:33). 
What is more, exports went up faster the higher the value-added to the product: most in 
apparel, then fabrics, then yarns. This changed the Turkish export profile into a higher 
value-added composition: the yarn share dropped from 73 percent of total fibre good 
exports in 1980 to only 41 percent in 1989 (Munkholt, 1991:33). But the important 
question that arises from the Turkish textile export performance in the 1980's is whether it 
is sustainable into the 1990's and beyond. The answer to this question holds important 
implications for both the South African textile industry and government policy towards the 
textile industry. 
By way of contrast the United Kingdom textile industry has declined severely in the 
1970's and 1980's with no less than 300 000 jobs being lost. What have been the reasons 
for the decline and what strategies did the industry adopt to maintain a healthy core? Once 
again the answer to these questions are informative and highly relevant to the South 
African textile industry. 
The chapter commences by examining the sustainability of Turkey's textile export 
performance in the 1980's. In order to do so it is necessary first to ask what accounts for 
sustainable exports. 
6.2 Turkey's textile industry and export performance in 
the 1980's 
6.2.1 Creating sustainable exports 
The rapid growth of exports of developing countries in the 1980's has not necessarily been 
synonymous with good overall economic performance. The reasons for these divergent 
experiences have been researched by Kell and Marchese (1991) at the industry level and 
come up with very clear findings in the textile industry. They argue that two key variables 
are sufficient at the industry level to demonstrate whether export expansion results from or 
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contributes to improved industrial perfonnances. First is the rate of capital accumulation 
as a measure of the development of the net stock of invested capital and the degree to 
which improved process techniques are diffused throughout the industries; second are 
productivity changes as a measure of the growth-stimulating effect of investment and 
exports (Kell and Marchese, 1991:16). 
The empirical findings of Kell and Marchese for the textile industry reveal that export 
expansion coincided with increased domestic consumption only if net stocks of imported 
capital goods and productivity also developed positively. Their evidence leads them to 
suggest that export expansion in developing countries during the 1980's was of two types: 
(a) export expansion sustained by capital formation and productivity gains; and (b) export 
expansion not based on capital accumulation, improved technologies and corresponding 
productivity gains, but apparently induced by policy constraints. They suggest that export 
expansion in developing countries may change in two directions. Firstly, there is 
sustainable development where increased exports are both the cause and effect of 
technological advance. Export growth, based on technological progress, facilitates efforts 
to acquire capital and technology, thus further strengthening technological 
competitiveness. Secondly, there is unsustainable development, where export growth is 
not accompanied by efforts to maintain or improve technological competitiveness. In a 
dynamic setting this development leads inevitably to a further weakening of relative 
competitive positions. The associated depletion of capital stocks is likely to mean that 
export growth is not sustainable. Just to maintain existing exports further policy measures 
are required in order to compensate for the erosion of the capital stock. These measures 
increasingly lose their effectiveness as the existing capital falls further and further behind 
the technological frontier. This moreover limits the abilities of the countries to produce 
higher value-added goods (Kell and Marchese, 1991:26). 
The authors' study of the 1980's however did not include Turkey, the 'star export 
performer of the decade'. In examining the reasons for Turkey's export expansion in 
textiles and clothing in the 1980's, attention is paid to whether it is sustainable or 
unsustainable as well as the validity and applicability of Kell and Marchese's conditions. 
6.2.2 The Turkish textile industry's performance 
The textile and clothing sector accounts for a third of manufacturing employment and is 
the largest industrial and export manufacturing sector in Turkey. Its exports during the 
1980's accounted for 35—40 percent of all manufactured exports (Arslan and Celasun, 
1992: 17, Table 7). The EC was Turkey's largest export market in 1990, accounting for 72 
percent of all textile and clothing exports. The largest export market in the EC was 
Germany which accounted for 54 percent of all EC exports in 1990, followed by the UK 
with 12 percent and Italy with 11 percent. 
The Turkish textile sector is generally fragmented in terms of company size and is not 
dominated by a single large producer. The state is also a textile producer, but accounts for 
only about ten percent of total production (Bodgener and Duruiz, 1991 :51). 
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Turkey's cotton production is large by world standards. The existing Turkish cotton 
growing areas are capable of an output of more than 500 000 to 600 000 tons per year, 
equivalent to 3,5 percent of all the cotton produced in the world, which makes Turkey the 
seventh largest cotton producer (Bodgener and Duruiz, 1991:50, 61). 
The Turkish textile and clothing industries are closely inter-related and commonly viewed 
as one sector in Turkey. They are not characterised by a division between them as is the 
case in South Africa. Many of the vertically integrated mills produce both textile fabric 
and clothing. In Istanbul two of the three integrated mills I visited made ready-to-wear 
clothing as well. Cotton clothing has a very high content of local cotton fabric as imports 
constitute a small proportion of Turkish cotton fabric production (3,4 percent in 1989). 
There is also a well developed subcontracting network in which relatively large firms 
operate with 40—60 small workshops, each containing ten to fifty sewing machines 
(Bodgener and Duruiz, 1991:53, 57,58, Tables 2 and 5). 
As mentioned above, it was really exports of the clothing industry that grew very rapidly 
during the 1980's. Figure 6.1 presents the trends in exports, output and employment for 
the clothing industry (SIC Group 322) from 1980 to 1988. Except for the decrease of 
output and exports in 1985 (and employment in 1986) they all grew rapidly over the 
period with exports growing fastest. 
Figure 6.1 
Output, exports, and employment trends in Turkish clothing, 1980—1988 
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Figure 6.2 
Output, exports, and employment trends in the Turkish textile industry, 1980—1988 
—— Employment —e— Output —DIE— Exports 
Output, exports and employment in the textile industry (SIC Group 321) also grew over 
the period from 1980 to 1988 as Figure 6.2 demonstrates. However, a closer inspection of 
Turkish textile exports during the 1980's and early 1990's reveals three distinct periods. 
The first, from 1980 to 1984, a period of very rapid expansion with an average compound 
growth rate of 31 percent per year; the second, from 1984 to 1988, a period of erratic and 
slower growth with an average rate of increase somewhere between 2,4 and 8,5 percent 
per year; and the third, from 1988 to 1991, a period of decline with an average annual 
decrease of 8 percent (Ansal, 1991:6,9, Table 2 and Figure 1; Yasar, 1992:1).1 
1. These calculations are based on export figures from Ansal (from 1980 to 1988) and Yasar (from 1984 to 
1991). There is a discrepancy between their statistics for the period in which they overlap (1984—1988). 
Ansal's data and graph yield an average annual growth rate of 8,5 percent while Yasar's figures give a 
growth rate of 2,4 percent. This is possibly because Ansal's data is presented in millions of US dollars 
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The trends in output and employment over the period 1980 to 1987 (the only period for 
which I have year on year data) are quite different. Output increased steadily over the 
period at an average compound annual increase of 10 percent, while employment 
increased by 3,1 percent per year from 1980 to 1984, but declined by one percent per year 
from 1984 to 1987. 
Collecting these findings together in tabular form and calculating labour productivity 
yields the result shown in Table 6.1. 
Table 6.1 
Turkey: Average annual rate of change of exports, output, employment and labour 
productivity in the textile industry 
1980-84 1984-87/8 1988-1991 
% % % 
Exports 31 2,4-8,5 -8 
Output 10 10 n.a. 
Employment 3 -1 n.a. 
Labour Productivity 6,7 10,7 n.a. 
From Table 6.1 it emerges that the sustained increase of 10 percent per annum in textile 
output was achieved by increasing labour productivity and not the level of employment. In 
fact, employment fell by 1 percent per year during the mid-1980's. The high growth rate 
of 31 percent per year in exports in the early 1980's could however not be sustained and 
dropped to a decline of 8 percent per annum from 1988—1991. In order to try to understand 
why textile exports could not be sustained it is necessary to examine investment and 
technology in the textile industry as well as macro-economic developments including state 
policy over this period. 
6.2.3 Investment and technology in the Turkish textile industry 
Private investment in the textile and clothing sector grew considerably as a proportion of 
total private manufacturing investment in the 1980's. As Table 6.2 shows, it almost 
doubled from 13 percent to 25,3 percent of the share of private manufacturing investment. 
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Table 6.2 
Turkey: Private textile and clothing investment in 1980's 
1980 1983 1986 1989 
Real Investment level 317 600 876 721 
(Billion TL, 1988 prices) 
Share in Private Manufacturing 13,0 24,9 28,4 25,3 
Investment 
Source: Arslan and Celasun, 1992:46 
Private investment in textile and clothing also grew in absolute terms from 1980 to 1986, 
but declined by 1989 (Table 6.2). Arslan and Celasun conclude that the allocation shifts in 
the post-1980 period seem to have favoured exporting industries more than import 
competing industries. They also provide a classification of manufacturing industries on the 
basis of their high or low growth of capital stock from 1983 to 1988. The industries are 
then further classified on the basis of their high or low growth of output and exports, and 
high or low rates of effective protection. Finally, the industries are also marked with 
respect to their high or low capacity utilisation rates in 1983 (Arsian and Celsun, 
1992:25—6). 
In their tabulation the textile and clothing sector is classified each time in the high (or 
above average) category. This makes textile and clothing only one of two sectors in 
Turkey where high capital growth had taken place with above-average growth of exports 
and output (Arsian and Celasun, 1992:26, 47, Table 12). According to the criteria 
developed by Kell and Marchese this should place Turkish textile exports in the category 
of sustainable exports because their expansion was based on capital accumulation rather 
than a set of policy constraints. But as has been shown above, the rise in textile exports 
was not sustained after 1989. To establish why this was the case, the extent of 
modernisation of textile technology in Turkey is examined first. 
A good way of obtaining an indication of how close the Turkish textile industry edged 
towards the technology frontier in the 1980's is to obtain a measure of the age profile of 
the technology installed in the industry. By comparing it to the age profile of technology 
in countries considered to be at the cutting edge in new technology, some measure is 
provided of the extent to which Turkey is on the frontier. 
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Although there have been a number of technological and process innovations in the textile 
industry between 1950 and 1990, (UNIDO, 1990:201) the two that virtually all textile 
research focus on are the introduction of open-end spinning and shuttleless weaving.2 In 
brief, open-end spinning reduces the required number of pre-spinning steps and the newer 
frames run at much higher speeds. Shuttleless looms, on the other hand, provide not only 
higher speeds, but also improve fabric quality (UNIDO, 1990:203—4). 
Table 6.3 provides an indication of the investment estimates for short-staple (cotton-type), 
long-staple (wool-type), and open-end rotor spindles for a number of countries. In addition 
to Turkey, South Africa and the United Kingdom, countries which are examined in detail 
in this paper, other countries which have been amongst the best performers in textiles in 
the 1980's have been included. The Table also provides a measure of the rate of 
equipment modernization between 1979 and 1988. It provides a measure, based on the 
estimates of total installed spindles in each country, of the percentage of spindles in 1988 
that were installed in the preceding ten years, i.e. from 1979 to 1988. The measure is thus 
an estimate of the percentage of all spindles in 1988 that were installed over the period 
1979—1988. 
Table 6.3 
Estimated spinning installations and spindles modernisation 
1988 Installed Proportion of 
Capacities Capacity Installed 
thousands of spindles since 1979 (%) 
Short- Long- O-E Short- Long- O-E 
Country staple staple rotors staple staple rotor 
Turkey 3 850 620 105 17,8 30,5 80,1 
West Germany 1 826 627 136 20,5 35,3 103,8 
Italy 2 340 3 785 113 49,3 20,6 143,4 
South Korea 3 558 1 108 46 32,0 18,3 91,6 
Taiwan 4 216 154 150 36,5 81,8 83,8 
Thailand 2 206 28 31 24,7 77,4 100,6 
Indonesia 2596 25 28 25,2 66,2 85,4 
China 26 114 1 836 202 1,4 10,5 98,5 
United Kingdom 771 581 49 5,7 6,9 43,7 
South Africa 734 79 21 21,8 29,0 67,8 
Source: UNIDO, 1990:211-15, Tables IV.50, IV.54, IV.56. 
2. This is probably because they allow for ease of measurement as there have been numerous other 
technological advances. See UNIDO, 1992:201—5. 
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It is important to note that Table 6.3 is based on estimates of the number of spindles in 
each country. As a result some of the statistics are incongruous; for instance the finding 
that more than 100 % of the installed O—E rotors of West Germany, Italy and Thailand 
were less than ten years old. This unfortunately throws into doubt the validity of the data. 
However the information comes from institutions with very good reputations. The UNIDO 
document cites Statistikon Corporation while the Zurich-based International Textile 
Manufacturers' Association (ITMA) provides similar data (ITMA, 1991b:9—17). Table 6.3 
will therefore be taken to provide a reasonable indication of the level of spindle 
instalments and proportion of machinery ten years old and younger, but is not assumed to 
be completely accurate. 
Some indication of the reliability of the statistics in Table 6.3 is provided by Ansal. 
According to her, 66 percent of the spindles installed in the Turkish cotton yarn sub-sector 
were 10—20 years old. Spindles older than 25 years made up 25 percent of the total and 
less than 10 percent were under 5 years old (Ansal, 1991:20). The age profile of spindles 
provided by Ansal thus suggests that installed spindles in Turkey are older than Table 
6.3's estimates. 
Comparing the high performance countries in Table 6.3 with Turkey, and ignoring China 
for the short- and long-staple spindles because China appears to have concentrated all its 
effort in expanding its open-end rotor spindle capacity, it appears that the high 
performance countries invested more extensively than Turkey in new spinning machinery 
during the 1980's. Whereas, on average, the proportions of machinery ten years and 
younger among the high performance countries were 31, 50 and 94 percent respectively 
for short-staple, long-staple, and open-ended spindles, they constituted 18, 31 and 80 
percent respectively for Turkey in 1988. 
It is interesting to note in passing that, except for short-staple spindles, South Africa's 
spinning machinery in 1988 was older than Turkey's while the United Kingdom had done 
very little investment in new spinning machinery during the ten years preceding 1988. 
With regards to weaving looms it is more obvious (see Table 6.4) that Turkey has not 
invested extensively in either shuttle or shuttleless looms in the ten year period from 1979 
to 1988. The figures for Turkey in Table 6.4 are probably of the right order as they more 
or less match information provided by Ansal. According to her 36,2 percent of total looms 
installed in Turkey was more than 20 years old while another 36,7 percent was 11 to 15 
years old. Only about 3 percent of the looms that belonged to a cooperative in Turkey was 
less than 10 years old (Ansal, 1991:20). The proportion of looms equal to or less than ten 
years old in 1988 in Turkey therefore lagged considerably behind that of numerous 
countries in Europe, East Asia and Australia as Table 6.4 indicates. 
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Table 6.4 
Estimated weaving installations and machinery modernisation 1988 
Total Shuttle Percentage of looms installed 
and Shuttle- between 1979 and 1988 
Country less looms Shuttle Shuttleless 
Turkey 5 190 3,60 11,92 
Austria 3 204 1,31 68,32 
West Germany 29 714 1,32 6 1,50 
Italy 68 701 0,53 55,47 
Belgium 12 340 0,35 48,33 
Australia 1 559 1,22 59,97 
Hong Kong 17394 2,63 45,09 
Taiwan 94 145 11,06 36,49 
Korea 209 574 33,02 11,32 
Source: UNIDO, 1990:218-20, Tables IV.62 & IV.64. 
The countries selected from Europe, East Asia and Australia in Table 6.4 are the ones with 
the highest proportion of 'new' shuttles, i.e. shuttles less than and up to ten years old. 
What they demonstrate is that Turkey's acquisition of new looms during the 1980's was 
low compared to theirs. As Turkey is predominantly a cotton textile producer, the extent 
of replacement of shuttleless looms is more important because of their greater speed. In 
that regard Turkey has lagged well behind the leading European and Asian countries and 
can therefore not be regarded to be at the technological cutting edge in weaving 
machinery. 
The relatively high level of investment in textiles and clothing in Turkey during the 1980's 
(Table 6.2) appears to contradict the finding that the spinning and weaving looms are of 
dated vintage (Tables 6.3 and 6.4). The solution to this apparent contradiction is that even 
though investment in textiles and clothing have been relatively high compared to 
investment in other sectors of the manufacturing industry, it has not been high enough to 
replace all the dated vintage capital stock in the industry. In 1992 it was estimated that a 
sum of six billion US dollars needed to be invested over a five year period in 
modernisation of plant equipment to make Turkey's textiles competitive with that of its 
main rivals ('Textiles: Investment is needed to match rivals,' p.5 in Turkish Finance, 
Investment and Industry Survey, Financial Times, 18 November 1992). 
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6.2.4 Macro-economic issues including state policy 
Turkey followed an import-substitution policy from the mid-1950's to late 1970's, but 
switched to an export-oriented liberalisation in the 1980's following a debt crisis. Four 
episodes may be differentiated from the mid-1970's to early 1990's: (i) foreign financed 
boom in mid-1970's; (ii) debt crisis in 1978—1980; (iii) export-oriented adjustment and 
liberalisation in 1980—1987; and (iv) macroeconomic instability from 1988 onwards. 
Turkey's economic recovery was very rapid in the early 1980's which was followed by a 
well-sustained export-led expansion in the mid-1980's. Its trade-oriented adjustment 
process yielded a substantial amount of restructuring that was clearly visible in the textile 
industry (Arslan and Celasun, 1992:1,3). 
The process of post-1980 Turkish economic liberalisation proceeded in a gradual manner. 
Trade reforms commenced with the removal of quantitative restrictions in 1981, 
elimination of licensing in 1984, and then realigned and reduced tariff rates in 1988. There 
was also internal financial liberalisation with the underlying objectives of providing 
greater flexibility to foreign trade financing, especially exports, and to prevent capital 
flight (Arslan and Celasun, 1992:5—6). 
In addition there was a continuous devaluation of the exchange rate from 1980 to 1988, 
often in excess of the inflation differential between Turkey and its major trading partners. 
This, coupled with wage repression over the period, resulted in sharply reduced real cost 
of labour in terms of its trade partners' currencies. Econometric studies provide strong 
evidence that the real exchange rate policy played a prominent role in Turkey's post-1980 
export expansion. Furthermore the real wage reduction moved in tandem with the real 
exchange rate depreciation to ensure the competitiveness of Turkish exports up to 1988 
(Ansal, 1991:12-13; Arslan and Celasun, 1992: 12—13). 
Other measures were also introduced by the state to stimulate exports in the 1980's. The 
major ones were the payment of export tax rebates (to compensate for indirect taxes), 
access to subsidised export credits, and duty-free imports of necessary inputs to 
manufacture for exporting (Ansal, 1991:13). 
The state also adopted policies to encourage investment. The policy instruments have been 
well summarised by Ansal and included the provision of: 
investment incentive certificates varying according to the location, sector and the total 
value of the investment project; 100 percent custom tax exemption for all the imported 
machinery and equipment; three months duty-free importation of raw materials and 
intermediate goods for new investments; and corporate tax exemptions depending on the 
characteristics of investment including capacity expansions. 
A Foreign Investment Department was established within the State Planning Organisation to minimise the bureaucracy involved. In an effort to encourage foreign direct investments, 
agreements were signed between governments providing guarantees against 
nationalisation, establishing principles for capital transfers and resolution of possible 
disputes (Ansal, 1991:13). 
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The export incentives were however changed in early 1985. Export tax rebates were 
lowered, and plans for their gradual phasing out were implemented; preferential export 
credits were abolished, and in February 1985 Turkey signed the GATT Subsidy and 
Compensation Tax Code which prohibits direct government export subsidies on goods 
exported to co-signatories of the agreement. In 1987 export tax rebates were further 
reduced to around two percent and, finally, in 1989 the government totally phased out the 
export tax rebates (Ansal, 1991:14). 
A rough estimate has been made of the budgetary cost of the investment and export 
incentives in the mid-and-late- 1980's. The World Bank estimated that the budgetary cost 
of the investment incentive regime in the mid-1980's was only slightly lower than 1,9 
percent of GNP per year. The share of manufactured exports in GNP was on the average 
10—12 percent, while the export subsidy rate varied around 20—25 percent. Thus the 
overall budgetary cost of investment and export incentives was in the region of 4 to 5 
percent of GNP. During this period the tax/GNP ratio was less than 20 percent illustrating 
the high cost of Turkey's micro-level incentive mechanism, a level that could hardly be 
sustainable over the long run (Arslan and Celasun, 1992:21). 
The constellation of policy measures discussed thus far help explain, at least in part, the 
rapid growth of Turkish textile exports up to 1984 and their slowdown from 1985 to 
1987/8 as the export incentives declined after signing the GATT Code. However, from 
1988 onwards a number of further developments took place that help to explain the 
subsequent decline of textile exports (see Table 1 above). 
After the 1987 elections the influence of trade unions increased. In the 1989 wage round 
they attempted to compensate workers for their losses in the 1980's. In the 1991 wage 
round they went more on the offensive to secure a maximum real wage increase. As a 
result, from 1988 to 1991 the index of real wages increased from 100 to 229 in the private 
sector, and from 100 to 288 in the public sector (Arslan and Celasun, 1992:9). What this 
meant for the textile industry's hourly labour cost in terms of US dollars was to increase 
from $1,27 in 1989 to $3,1 in 1991 (Textile Month, Feb 1991:9; Werner International, 
1992). In Turkey's top 500 industrial firms the share of wages (in net value-added) rose 
significantly while profits, particularly in the public sector, dropped sharply. From 1988 to 
1991 the share of wages in private firms increased from 31,8 to 55,8 percent while the 
share of profits dropped from 29,3 to 12,5 percent. But in public firms the share of wages 
rose from 35,4 to 130,4 percent thereby causing unsustainably large losses with a very 
unfavourable impact on public finance (Arslan and Celasun, 1992:9, 37, Table 2). 
Anther development over this period was a loss of control over the exchange rate as a 
result of the liberalisation of the financial market. Consequently there was a cumulative 
appreciation of the real exchange rate of the Turkish Lira by nearly 20 percent in 
1989—1990 (Arslan and Celasun, 1992:6—7). 
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A combination of three factors therefore contributed to the decline of Turkish exports after 
1988. They were (i) a reduction in export subsidies as a result of trying to conform to 
GAiT regulations, (ii) an appreciation of the real exchange rate, and (iii) a rapid rise in 
the level of real wages in the textile industry. These three factors all worked together to 
reduce the international competitiveness of the textile industry. 
The star performance of Turkish textile exports in the 1980's was not sustainable into the 
early 1990's. The reasons for its unsustainability appears to be that it was firstly a set of 
state policies that contributed significantly to the international competitiveness of the 
industry. Secondly, although investment in the textile industry was high and above 
average compared to other sectors in the manufacturing industry, it was not high enough 
to place Turkey at the technological cutting edge in textile machinery. As a result, when 
the contingent set of factors were reversed after 1988 they seriously undermined the 
international competitiveness of the Turkish textile industry and its exports started 
declining. 
Other aspects of the Turkish textile and clothing sector are also of relevance to South 
Africa and are briefly mentioned. Firstly, the recession in Turkey focussed manufacturing 
investment in the sector on its most competitive market, higher value-added fashion 
goods, in order to make the most out of quota restrictions in Turkey's main OECD 
markets, and to stay ahead of Asian and Far Eastern competition. Secondly, in 1989 the 
Turkish government introduced sweeping liberalisation of textile import tariffs, both on 
finished goods and raw materials. Yarn spinning, for instance, lost its competitive 
advantage and imported cotton yarn shot up from 16 million dollars in 1989 to 96 million 
dollars in 1990 (at constant prices) while imported woollen yarn increased from 3 million 
to 28 million dollars. There was a strong feeling among manufacturers that the 
government's objective of joining the EC by 1995 was overambitious and it had gone 
about the reduction too hastily (Bodgener and Duruiz, 1991:50,51,53, 57). 
The liberalisation forced individual textile firms to engage in restructuring as they 
searched out new competitive and profitable market niches. Some of these were 
observable in the firms I visited. The restructuring one of them engaged in is instructive 
for South Africa and considered next. 
6.2.5 Turkish company case study: Bozkurt Mensucat3 
The company was incorporated in the early 1950's and was initially owned by two 
prominent families, one of which was the Koc family. The company made quick progress 
from spinning to weaving to finishing and in the 1960's it had become a fully integrated 
textile mill. 
3. Most of the information of the Bozkurt case study is based on an interview conducted with Dr A. 
Aiptekin, general manager, and Mr L.AtaUnal, business strategy manager, and a mill visit on 1 October, 
1992, in Istanbul. Where other sources have been used they are referenced. 
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Of considerable interest to South Africa where such a step is unheard of, the textile 
company started making clothing in the late 1970's. It made house coats for women on a 
sub-contracting basis for exports, and in 1981 it added a clothing department to the plant. 
By 1985 it employed around 540 workers to produce more diversified garments both for 
local and export markets (Ansal, 1991:30). 
In the 1980's the Koc Group decided that textiles should be one of its core businesses and 
bought out other shareholders. In the mid-1980's the company was totally controlled by 
the Koc Group which had become an enormous conglomerate in the automotive industry, 
household appliances, electronic goods, food processing, and trade and distribution. 
Textiles constituted only a small part of the Koc Group's operations. 
The firm realised the necessity to invest in order to improve its export performance and 
launched an investment programme in 1984. It installed 39 000 new spindles which also 
included open-end rotors while it expanded its weaving capacity with 40 projectile 
(shuttleless) Sulzer looms and 296 shuttle looms. The dyeing/printing/finishing capacity 
was increased to 31 million metres. 
After the investment programme Bozkurt's exports almost tripled from 21 to 61 million 
US dollars while the number of employees was reduced by 37 percent between 
1985—1988. Spinning production remained constant over the period while weaving output 
dropped by 18 percent. The technological change thus has a labour-saving effect (Ansal, 
1991:29). 
The Koc Group decided that the company had to become a global operator able to 
compete internationally. It began to search for a suitable international partner and in 1988 
it sold 50 percent of Bozkurt shares to a French textile holding company, DMC. The first 
full year of the 50—50 joint venture was 1989; but by then the economic environment had 
changed adversely for the company with high inflation — in the order of 60—70 percent, a 
rapid rise in real wages, the appreciation of the Turkish Lira against the currencies of 
trading partners, and the complete phasing out of export rebates by 1989. In the same year 
the government introduced sweeping liberalisation of textile import tariffs on finished 
goods and raw materials. 
The company's profit margins were squeezed. It made a profit of TL 3 billion 
(US$700 000) in 1990, but went into a loss in 1991 and 1992 (Bodgener and Duruiz, 
1991:54,57,65; Questionnaire, March 1993). DMC lost interest in Bozkurt, but the Koc 
Group decided to support the company's restructuring program. It accordingly invested in 
Bozkurt and by 1992 it held 90 percent of the company's shares again. 
The restructuring programme of Bozkurt was based on a long-term strategy and its 
perception that it was no longer competitive in the labour intensive lower value-added part 
of its operation. It found that South and East Asia could produce cheaper and better yarn 
and fabric and decided to shrink its spinning and weaving operations. At the same time it 
found that it had a competitive advantage in higher value-added products and has 
expanded its dyeing, printing, finishing and garment-making operations. Other strategic 
advantages That Bozkurt found it has over the Far East was that it was closer to the large 
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European markets and that it has better communication networks with Europe. It is also in 
touch with European style tastes and can generate fashion and styles that are marketable in 
Europe. 
The company cut its spinning and weaving operations back by 80 percent to slightly less 
than 10 000 spindles and 100 looms. The spindles and looms it has kept in operation were 
all less than ten years old. The remainder of them were mothballed where, during a mill 
visit, they stood silently and eerily in the dark, like tombstones in a vault. In place thereof 
the company imports yam and grey cloth from Indonesia, South Korea, China and 
Pakistan. 
In the wet section of production, namely dyeing, printing and finishing, the company has 
engaged in an extensive investment programme to renew the technology. The principle 
advantage of the new technology is the ability to produce better quality while also 
marginally adding to speed of production. 
On the garment side the company installed a Computer Aided Design and Computer 
Aided Manufacturing system in 1989 with three laying tables for cutting. At that time it 
was producing men and women's leisure-wear, such as trousers, shirts, skirts, sports 
jackets, anoraks, and so on. By 1992 the company is doing very little stitching, only for 
sample-making. It subcontracts the stitching to 50—60 workshops where non-unionised 
workers are paid lower wages. Then the company does the final inspection, packaging and 
dispatching of garments. It has the capacity to assemble 2,5 million garments annually. 
As a result of the restructuring employment at Bozkurt declined from 2300 in 1990 to 
1000 in 1992. At the same time turnover in dollar terms declined by only 15 percent. The 
restructuring had thus led to greater labour productivity, but to a fall in the level of 
employment. 
The company has a manager in charge of company strategy whose task it is to oversee the 
company's restructuring plan. The plan involves a strategy as to product groups, process 
specialisation, investments, markets, and size of the company. To do so, the company 
prepares a business plan for five years comprising these elements. It is then presented to 
the company's board and holding companies. The report includes an account of where the 
company is and where it wants to be in five years' time. As a result the company has a 
clear idea where it wants to be in five years time. 
In five years' time Bozkurt will probably not have any spinning plant, although it may 
have a very small weaving unit. It will be specialising in dyeing, printing and finishing. It 
will also have a garment division which will not have a stitching unit, only cutting and 
finishing of the garment. It will subcontract. The company has already proceeded quite a 
long way towards that, but has to complete the renewing of its technology. 
In terms of its markets, in late 1992 it was 60% domestic and 40% export, but the 
company expects it to be at least vice versa in five years time, that is 60% export and 40% 
domestic, or even 70% export and 30% domestic. 
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In garments Bozkurt was just selling standard items at the end of 1992. The customer 
brought them the design, and they made a quotation. It is now busy preparing its own 
collections and joining the fashion shows. In five years time it intends selling only its own 
collections. 
On the printing side the customer also brings her design and asks for preparation of this 
design, but in five years time the company intends to have a huge design collection and 
selling it exclusively. At the end of 1992 it was both accepting customers' designs and 
promoting its own designs. 
The company is thus moving from producing standard items to fashion. As a result lot 
sizes will decrease, but value-added will increase. The decrease in batch sizes will be 
compensated by the increase in price of the final commodity. In finishing it is not capacity 
that will be increased, but in value-added and in quality that the company expects 
increases. 
In summary , the response of Bozkurt Mensucat is to develop sustainable textile fabric and 
clothing production and exports. It intends doing so by moving out of basic commodities 
where it is internationally uncompetitive and to move into areas where it has competitive 
advantages, namely higher value-added differentiated products such as fashion garments. 
It intends doing so on the basis of new technology. 
Other companies in Turkey have responded differently to the changes brought on by 
greater liberalisation in Turkey. For instance, Akin Tekstil, another vertically integrated 
textile company in Istanbul, places its emphasis on quality and is continuing with its 
spinning and weaving operations to ensure that its fabric meets its own quality 
specifications (Interview, M.Cagis, Assistant MD, 1 October 1992). Bozkurt does 
however provide a potentially relevant example of a creative and constructive way to deal 
with new challenges. 
Another important point to emerge from a study of the Turkish textile industry is the 
importance of the clothing industry to the textile industry. In fact, clothing was a driving 
force in the textile industry's expansion, as Aiptekin explains: 
Most of the growth of textiles was driven by the garment-making industry which tripled its 
output during the 1980's with a large proportion going into exports. It became the engine 
of the textile industry because, by expanding the clothing industry, there was a large 
demand for textiles and also it became insistent on good quality because it was largely 
export-driven. So it not only pulled the textile industry, but it also disciplined it as far as 
quality was concerned. 
6.2.6 ITKIB 
It was however not only at the macro-economic level of state policy or the micro- 
economic level of the firm that the Turkish textile industry developed and implemented its 
export strategy. It also did so on the meso- or industry-level. In 1986 it established ITKIB, 
a Turkish abbreviation for the Istanbul Textile and Apparel Exporters Association, as a 
non-profit organisation under the auspices of the Undersecretariat of Treasury and Foreign 
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Trade of Turkey. ITKIB is composed of four different Exporters Associations: Clothing 
and Readywear Garments, Textile and Raw Materials, Carpet and Leather, and accounts 
for 80% of Turkey's textile and clothing exports. 
The prime reason for the establishment of ITKIB was to negotiate its quota limits with the 
EC, but it also set itself a number of other objectives. They are: 
• 'to assist boosting further the technological renewal and development of the textile 
and apparel industry'; 
• 'to assist to increase the comptetiveness of the Turkish exporters in international 
markets with products having high value-added'; 
• 'to assist the exporters in finding new markets'; 
• 'to support education programs aiming to meet the qualified labour requirements of 
the industry.' (ITKJB, 1994) 
In order to achieve these objectives ITKIB engages in a number of activities. Amongst 
others it performs the following tasks: 
• organises promotion and state of the art exhibitions; 
• sponsors participation in international fairs and exhibitions; 
• performs all the legal and documentary work concerning export operations; 
• conducts market surveys for exporters about popular markets; 
• keeps statistical data about the industry; 
• carries out research projects; 
• organises seminars and courses for the in-job training of its members. 
ITKJB is thus an industry-level association that assists the textile, clothing and leather 
industries in developing and expanding their capacity to export. They do so by offering 
assistance across a wide range of services that embraces most of the requirements of 
exporters. The most likely impact of such an association must have been to benefit and 
strengthen Turkey's export drive. 
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6.3 United Kingdom: Case study of Courtaulds Textiles 
(a) Context 
The 1970's and 1980's were turbulent times for the British textiles and clothing filiere. 
The economic forces operating on them included demand changes with the rise of casual 
wear, and the global spread of textile and clothing production aided by multi-national 
corporations. Together with the buying strategies of the retail chains they led to a dramatic 
rise in the volume of imports of fabric and garments. Traditional export markets for fabric 
were also lost. As a result the filiere 'simultaneously contracted and passed through a 
structural and technological revolution': 300 000 jobs were lost between 1974 and 1991 
(Hardill and Wynarczyk, 1991:66). 
The political environment in which the textile industry operated in the UK in the 1980's 
was that of Thatcherism. The basic ingredient thereof was the adoption of a hands-off 
policy towards the manufacturing industry (Riddell, 1985, 166—69). The economic 
environment was one of a sharply appreciating currency and declining domestic demand. 
Thus textile imports could enter the UK more and more cheaply. As a result, the textile 
industry was left exposed to international competition with very little protection from the 
state. The companies therefore had to assume full responsibility for their own survival and 
strategise accordingly. This chapter examines the strategy adopted by Courtaulds Textiles. 
(b) Historical evolution of Courtaulds' strategy4 
Courtaulds' strategy in the 1960's was to try to develop a vertically integrated business 
which could act as a channel for the fibres to find their way through to the consumer as 
finished products. It accordingly acquired businesses in spinning, weaving, knitting, 
dyeing, finishing, and then clothing manufacturing. 
In the UK the strategy of big businesses at that time had been very much to invest heavily 
in the latest manufacturing technology to drive costs down to the lowest level and to adopt 
a mass market manufacturing approach. This strategy applied through the second half of 
the 1960's up to 1977. In 1978 it started to be questioned. This was because the UK had a 
Labour Government in power in the second half of the 1960's which had been quite 
protectionist. It promised protection for the clothing and textile industry, but this did not 
actually materialise and imports from the Far East started eroding the market. By 
1977—1978 it was becoming quite clear that a lot of the high volume factories, even with 
the very latest equipment, were having great difficulty in competing with the very basic 
products that were coming from the Far East. Part of the problem was that all the 
company's attention had gone on things like weaving and knitting and less investment and 
strategic resources put behind the dyeing and finishing. 
4. This section is mainly based on an interview with Peter Aubusson in London on 22 September 1992. He 
is responsible for external relations in the company. 
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A problem with the weaving and knitting processes is that they actually add relatively 
little value. In the cost breakdown of a finished fabric about 50% is the yam cost, only 
about 20% of it is actually in the weaving and 30% is in the dyeing and finishing. As a 
result Courtaulds started to close some of its larger weaving and knitting businesses in the 
late 1970's. 
To compound the problem at the same time it started to lose market shares to European 
manufacturers. The Europeans were able to produce a better quality and their design and 
product development was better in some areas. During that period the company also got 
hit by the major recession of 1979—1982. By the end of it whole sectors of the UK textile 
industry were starting to be knocked out. 
By then it had become clear to producers that the trend in UK trade policy was going to be 
towards liberalisation. The only question was how quickly it would come. What protection 
there was under the GAY!' and MFA was only going to be of fairly limited benefit. 
In the mid 1980's Courtaulds undertook a major strategic review and came up with the 
following key conclusions. Firstly, that it was operating in a very mature market with 
moderate or little growth potential because in developed economies clothing and textiles 
take an ever decreasing share of consumer spending as people get richer. Secondly it 
assumed that competition from countries with much lower wage costs was likely to 
increase quite intensively over the next ten years or so. No matter how efficiently factories 
were going to be operated, there would still be quite a lot of divisions of the company 
which would remain completely uncompetitive in an open market situation due to very 
low wage costs in other countries. Thirdly, looking ahead, it predicted that the MFA 
would still be renewed once or twice more, but by the end of the 1990's there would be no 
more protection. A fourth fundamental issue was the fact that, in textiles, there is very 
little benefit from technical leads. Technology for textiles is nearly all available off the 
shelf. Any machine Courtaulds might have bought that could do something clever could 
be bought by somebody in Hong Kong or Thailand or China. And very often in those 
countries when they purchase new technology they put it into a brand new factory in a 
green-field site and give it the perfect logistical situation, whereas in the UK it gets put 
into some old building where the layout of the factory is not ideal or the company is 
fighting against ingrained working practices. The end result is that the company cannot 
assume to gain any long term effective leads from being ahead technically. 
So what was left for the company to do? It had come to realise that quality was vitally 
important and had done a great deal on improving the quality of its products. It had also 
done a great deal to improve the design and product development, all of which was trying 
to concentrate on the differentiation aspects of the product rather than the production of 
basic commodities. But at the end of the day it could not assume that those things in 
themselves would be sufficient to give it any great long term protection on the open 
market because other countries could do those sort of things pretty much as well as 
Courtaulds could. 
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The one area where the company decided that it could get an advantage was in the 
relationship it had with its customers and the closeness to the customer. This applied on 
two fronts. One was that Courtaulds understood and gave them what they wanted better 
than other people and secondly, gave it to them faster than anybody through quick 
response. So the company concentrated — as did a lot of the UK and developed countries' 
textile industry — on shortening lead times and holding less stock in the system in order to 
make sure that it had the right product for fashion available at the right time. 
The businesses Courtaulds subsequently invested in were required to put as their top 
priorities service and closeness to the customer and quick response. When the company 
was looking at capital expenditure in the business, it was far more interested in what it 
could do to help with solving those sorts of problems than with just bringing costs down. 
It came to regard lower cost in itself as just useless. 
Another conclusion the company came to in its strategic study was that there were quite a 
lot of areas of its business which would not be defensible manufacturing solely in the UK. 
So it decided to make the business international. At the time of the strategic study 
something like 80% of its products were made in the UK and 80% of them were sold in 
the UK. The company set itself the target of getting that number down to more like 40% 
over the next ten years or so. The company realised that it would have to start 
manufacturing products wherever it made most sense in the world to manufacture them 
and where the products themselves were very differentiated in order to give itself some 
advantage over the Far East. Lace was an area which Courtaulds was not in at all at the 
time of the strategic debate. It came to realise that lace was very closely associated with 
some of the areas where the company did have the necessary skills in knitting as lace is a 
speciality version of knitting. As a result it acquired three businesses in lace: one in 
America, the other in France, and the third in the UK. It also acquired a French fashion 
design house which was a move into an area of clothing which was far more specialised 
and differentiated. In America it acquired a stretch fabric business which is also highly 
specialised. 
Courtaulds acquired four or five very key businesses outside the UK in the late 1980's that 
spread its portfolio so that about 65% of its sales are presently in the UK and 65% of its 
manufacturing as well. It still sees itself moving further in the direction of 40%. 
Another thing Courtaulds did in internationalising its business has been at the upper 
clothing end where it was quite clear that it could not compete from a developed country 
manufacturing base. That is because in clothing labour cost disadvantage is highest and 
there is presently no substitute for human skill in sewing. It was in clothing that the 
company saw the biggest risks on the labour costs disadvantage and resigned itself to start 
manufacturing it in places other than developed countries. It now has quite significant 
manufacturing of clothing in Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey, around the Mediterranean. It 
still gives the company closeness to the market with the benefit of relatively low labour 
costs, not as low as China or Thailand, but within one or two days trucking to the markets 
which it wants to supply. 
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Some years ago Courtaulds also set up an office in Hong Kong, which acts as a sourcing 
operation and buys in product from other businesses in the Far East. Consequently the 
company now has a mixture of strategies from which it can take its pick. When it gets 
some business, or sees a market opportunity, it can decide what is the most appropriate 
supply route for it. Either make it in the UK which gives the highest costs, but probably 
the greatest flexibility and control over it, or to go to its own factories in the 
Mediterranean area and get some lower costs and still relatively good logistics and service, 
or to go to the Far East and get the lowest costs, but have a long lead time as it takes six 
weeks on a boat to get it to the European market. The company is still learning how to 
orchestrate the different sourcing options and deciding which products are right for which 
routes, This is something that is happening throughout the European industry. 
In brief, Courtaulds strategy has been to make its business more international and less 
dependent on one market and one economy. It is concentrating its money and resources on 
product areas that are much more specialised and highly differentiated, either in terms of 
the product or the service that it can give the client and at the same time to make the 
portfolio change happen quicker. It actually disposed of a number of the more 
'commodity' businesses, i.e. undifferentiated basic fabrics that compete mainly on price, 
and those that did not have a long term future. 
The company's capital expenditure programme is about at the level of its depreciation 
charge, but it is very spiky and there are some businesses such as the lace businesses that 
are getting three or four times their depreciation charge in capital expenditure while others 
are getting none in order to make this switch in the portfolio. And what Courtaulds is 
doing as a group is almost what the UK textile industry as a whole is doing in a less 
organised way. The ones that are in the more undifferentiated basic commodity area are 
getting squeezed out, while those in areas that have some differentiation built in are doing 
quite well and are investing and going forward. 
(c) The restructured Courtaulds Textiles 
While some of the restructuring which Courtaulds undertook has already been outlined, it 
is instructive to highlight some other aspects of its restructuring. Firstly, there was some 
corporate restructuring. While Courtaulds was going through the exercise of rethinking its 
textile and clothing strategy, the parent company was developing a variety of other sectors 
outside of textiles and clothing. These were in packaging, paint, speciality chemicals, 
adhesives, and a range of other products. It became increasingly clear that the textile 
clothing parts were quite different from a lot of the other parts and in March 1990 the 
company demerged into two quite separate businesses, Courtaulds and Courtaulds 
Textiles, with the latter becoming an independent company listed on the London Stock 
Exchange. 
By 1992 Courtaulds Textiles had five main business areas: spinning, fabrics, home 
furnishings, own-label clothing and branded clothing. 
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In spinning the idea that a vertically integrated company could force particular products 
down a pipeline to a consumer did not work because it was a production-driven approach. 
It went out in the late 1970's. The demand for textiles has rather been found to be pulled 
by clothing fashion changes and the need to respond quickly and be close to the customer 
with the ability to buy and sell wherever it is needed. 
Another important feature of the restructuring is that Courtaulds Textiles operates through 
some 50 management teams, each operating as a profit responsible business, i.e. as a profit 
centre. Each profit centre operates fairly autonomously in the market as is evidenced by 
the fact that only about 5 percent of sales are within the group. Hence Courtaulds Textiles 
had restructured itself from a full vertically integrated company driven by production 
demands, to a company with semi-autonomous profit centres responding quickly to market 
demands. 
These trends have not been unique to Courtaulds, but also happened to other groups in the 
United Kingdom as Peter Kilduff has pointed out in writing about structural changes in the 
textile industry in the UK: 
As their competitive position deteriorated rapidly during the late 1970's, therefore, many 
groups were forced to abandon vertical integration and undertake extensive closures in 
textile processing. However, groups usually retained a vertical element but established 
business units at each of the major processing stages as clearly-defined profit centres, with 
each given a greater level of autonomy, including freedom to buy and sell in the best 
markets. Furthermore, firms have tended to place greater emphasis on smaller business 
units which are able to create strong competitive positions by specialising in meeting the 
requirements of specific markets or market segments. In this way, the large firms have 
been able to combine the flexibility of small, specialised firms in serving dynamic and 
fragmented markets with the strength of a large diversified group which has a broadly- 
based expertise in textiles and clothing and is able to respond rapidly to market changes by 
transferring corporate resources into or out of specific sectors (Kilduff, 1989, 
pp.109—1 10). 
Another key feature to note about Courtaulds Textiles is that it is not exclusively a textile 
company, but also a clothing manufacturer. The division between textile and clothing 
companies that exists in South Africa, is partially obliterated by Courtaulds which treats 
them as an integrated whole in the textile-clothing pipeline. 
The spinning part of Courtaulds contracted enormously due to competition from low cost 
countries. In less than four years its spinning mills were reduced from 28 in the UK and 
France to only 4 in the UK by 1991 with the remaining mills being geared towards making 
more complex yarns and products (Courtaulds Textiles, l991,pp.3,8). 
Courtaulds Textiles had been contracting as a whole as a result of the restructuring with 
nearly 40 factories closing and a decline of 25 percent in the number of employees 
worldwide in the two years following the demerger. In 1991 alone the group's workforce 
fell by almost 20 percent from 28 200 to 22 700, largely as a result of the closure of 23 
factories and the sale of five businesses (Courtaulds Textiles, 1991, pp.2,18). 
Even so Courtaulds Textiles was doing quite well under adverse economic circumstances 
in the UK. Its operating profit in 1991 was £53,2 million on a turnover of £922 million. 
Operationally it claimed continuing improvement in the key ratios covering added value 
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per employee, productivity and efficient use of capital. In terms of customer service it 
claimed that its lead times had been steadily reduced and that over 95 percent of orders 
were delivered on time in 1991 (Courtaulds Textiles, 1991, pp.2,13,22). A mill case study 
of a Courtaulds subsidiary cofirms the trend in the improvement of efficiency of the 
company. 
(d) Mill case study of a Courtaulds subsidiary 
At the textile mill which does weaving, dyeing and finishing, management took a major 
step to change the company culture in 1990. The first component thereof was a quality 
initiative in which American consultants were called in to undertake extensive training of 
the whole workforce. One of the consequences of the training was that the company tried 
to create a climate so that employees could be involved in trying to get continuous 
improvement. The other component was a realisation that costs had to be monitored and 
attacked constantly. The company also invested to make productivity improvements 
(Interview, Managing Director, September 1992). 
The result of the initiative were quite dramatic: 
Stock turns rose significantly between 1990 and 1992: 
1990 1992 
Stock turns per year 2 5—6 
Matching this improvement in the turnover of stock was a decline in stock on hand: 
1990 1992 
Stock: Units 12000 4 500 
Raw materials (weeks) 8—12 4 
Finished goods (weeks) 18 6 
Throughput time also improved markedly over this period: 
1990 1992 
* Throughput time (weeks) 4_12* 2,5 
The average throughput time in 1990 was 7 weeks. 
The proportion of deliveries made on time corresponded with the impressive 
improvements made in the efficiency of production: 
1990 1992 
Deliveries on time (%) 50 90 
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(e) Implications of Courtaulds for South African companies 
The performance of the Courtaulds subsidiary textile mill demonstrates amply the 
improvements that can be achieved once a company puts its mmd to it and makes a 
concerted effort to drive through the initiatives. 
Like Bozkurt Mensucat it is likely that Courtaulds Textiles also provides South African 
textile companies with a glimpse of the potential future they may face. Courtaulds adopted 
a strategy that would enable it to survive and grow in the long run. The strategy was both 
defensive and offensive at the same time. It was defensive in that the company searched 
for opportunities and relationships where it would be very hard for their major competitors 
to emulate or oust them. It was offensive in that the company expanded its operations into 
new product areas which are more specialised and where it is able to remain 
internationally competitive. 
6.4 Lessons for South Africa 
The comparative study of the textile industries in Turkey and the United Kingdom holds 
some valuable lessons for both the South African state and textile industry if South Africa 
is to build a long tenn viable and internationally competitive textile industry. 
From Turkey the lesson to be learnt for the creation of sustainable exports in textiles is 
that it has to be built on the foundation of high productivity in the textile industry itself 
and a crucial component in maintaining a competitive level of productivity is in the 
continuous modemisation of capital equipment through high levels of imvestment. To do 
so on the basis which Turkey did in the 1980's is not sustainable. The three pillars on 
which the Turkish export performance rested in the 1980's were subsidisation of the 
industry, continuous depreciation of the exchange rate, and keeping wage levels low. But 
these pillars crumbled in the face of liberalisation in order to integrate itself into the world 
economy and so gain entry to the EC market, as well as trade union strength that pushed 
up minimum wages in the industry. 
The second important lesson from Turkey and the UK is that both industries restructured 
in order to remain competitive in a rapidly changing world environment. Both industries 
(with UK far more advanced than Turkey) concentrated on their areas of profitability and 
let go of uncompetitive segments of the industry. In both countries there has been a 
movement from the commodity end of the market to the more specialised and 
differentiated end with greater responsiveness to the needs of niche markets. 
A third valuable lesson from Turkey is the creation of industry-level assistance in order to 
promote exports. Turkey did so by establishing ITKIB, the Istanbul Textile and Apparel 
Exporters Association, which performed a wide range of valuable functions for firms in 
the industry. 
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The fourth lesson to be learned from Turkey and the UK is the need for ongoing 
improvement in the production performances of mills, not only by means of investment in 
new technology, but also through the adoption of new and improved production and 
organisational techniques. This lesson can best be demonstrated by comparing the 
improvements in production performance of the Courtaulds Subsidiary in the UK and 
Texco One in South Africa (Table 6.5). 
Table 6.5 
Production Performance: Comparison of UK and SA Mills 
UK Mill South African Mill 
1990 1992 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Stock turns 2 5—6 2,3 2,0 1,9 1,7 2,0 
Weeks of Stock 
Raw Material 8—12 4 22 20 18 15 10 
Work-in-progress .. .. 3 3 4 4 4 
Finished Goods 18 6 5 6 7 9 8,5 
Throughput time 4—12 2,5 15 14 13 13 12 
(weeks) 
% Deliveries on time 50 90 50 60 65 75 88 
Table 6.5 shows that over a shorter two-year period the improvements in performance at 
the UK mill were better in every single category than the improvements achieved over a 
longer four-year period by the South African mill. For the UK mill improvements in stock 
turns and weeks of stock of finished goods improved two- to three-fold while the SA 
mill's performance in these categories actually deteriorated. It is only in the improvement 
in proportion of deliveries on time that the two mills show almost the same dgree of 
improvement, although the SA mill took two years longer to attain it. There is thus much 
that the SA mills can learn about continuous improvement of their performance, a key 
ingredient for remaining internationally competitive. 
Chapter Seven: The textile-clothing pipeline 
7.1 Introduction 
Thus far the study has concentrated almost exclusively on the textile industry, but the 
industry represents only one distinct production process in a long chain of transformations 
and services before the commodity is sold to the final consumer. It is therefore important 
to adopt a filiere approach and study the textile-clothing pipeline. 
Amongst all the advantages of adopting a filiere approach to the industry there are two 
that warrant highlighting. The first is that, in termS of developing an industrial strategy, it 
is important to bear in mind the whole filiere. For instance, for a gannent woven from a 
chemical fibre, it is important to bear in mind the whole filiere which includes the 
chemical fibre manufacturing, spinning and weaving the fibre, finishing the fabric, 
making-up the garment, and retailing it. Unless there is co-operation between all the stages 
of processing it is possible that even the most carefully devised strategy for the textile 
industry alone can go awry. 
Secondly, the major union in the industry, SACTWU, organises workers in almost all 
stages of the filiere. In particular, the union is strongly represented in the textile and 
clothing industries, and is therefore very well placed to play a key role in the development 
of an industrial strategy for the textile filiere as a whole. Before considering the role of the 
union in developing an industrial strategy in the next chapter it is therefore useful to gain 
an insight into the problems and challenges presented by the textile fillere. 
7.2 Length of the Textile-Clothing Pipeline 
The textile-clothing-retailing pipeline is one of the longest, if not the longest, pipelines 
transforming raw materials into consumer goods. Not only are there a large number of 
distinct stages in the transformation process, but the pipeline cycle, i.e. the duration from 
the time a fibre reaches the first stage of production until it is finally sold to a consumer, is 
also extremely long. Kurt Salmon Associates established in 1986 that the pipeline cycle 
for woven textile goods in the USA had a duration of 66 weeks. 
Of this total, only 11 weeks are spent as work-in-process — when something is actually 
being done to turn fibre into a finished garment ready for sale. The balance of 55 weeks — 
83 percent of the total cycle time — is -spent in inventory (Kurt Salmon Associates, 
1986:2). 
A closer examination of the flow of material through the pipeline is provided in Table 7.1. 
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Table 7.1 
Textile-clothing pipeline: Duration at different stages of production (weeks) 
Inventory WIP 
Fibre 
Raw Material 1,6 
WIP 0,9 
Finished Fibre at Fibre 4,6 
Fibre at Textile 1,0 
7,2 0,9 
Fabric 
W1P - Greige 3,9 
Greige Goods at Greige 1,2 
Greige Goods at Finish 1,4 
Finishing 1,2 
Finished Fabric at Textile 7,4 




Finished Apparel at Apparel 12,0 
Ship to Retail 2,7 
Apparel at Retail Distribution Centre 6,3 
Apparel at Store 10,0 
31,0 5,0 
Totals 55,0 11,0 
Note: WIP = Work in Process or Work in Progress 
Source: Hunter, 1990:20. 
According to Hunter the tenn 'work in process' is itself misleading in that a large 
proportion of WIP time is spent by the product between process steps. 'It has been 
estimated that less than 1% of WIP time is spent on actual conversion of a product.' 
(Hunter, 1990:21). But the obvious area in which improvements in the duration of the 
pipeline cycle can be made, is in shortening the inventory times. Substantial changes have 
already been made by major companies in the USA (Hunter, 1990:42). Before discussing 
how improvements can be made, it is necessary first to consider the South African textile- 
clothing pipeline. 
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7.3 Analysis of textile-clothing pipeline performance 
inSA 
No comparable study of the length of the textile apparel pipeline in South Africa exists, 
but it is probably longer. Instead, research has tended to focus on problems in the textile- 
clothing interface. Although complaints abound about poor service, inconsistent quality 
and lack of reliability of the textile industry, much of it probably based on bitter 
experience, comprehensive evidence that is scientifically sound is actually hard to come 
by. Some such studies do exist though and are briefly summarised below. 
Emby (1987:116) cites the case of a clothing company that kept thorough records in 1986 
of all problems related to the delivery of cloth. It calculated that, on average, supplying 
mills requested five extensions per order before the cloth was finally delivered. 
Colman (1990) has done a gap analysis of the discrepancies between textile buyers' 
expectations and textile suppliers perceptions with regards to the quality of textiles. She 
measured three discrepancies: firstly, the difference between what buyers of textiles 
expect and what they perceive of actual product and service quality; secondly, the 
difference between customers' expectations and suppliers' perceptions of those 
expectations; and thirdly the gap between the standards suppliers set and the degree to 
which they achieve those standards (Colman, 1990:1—2). Her analysis was based on 
questionnaire responses from 76 managing directors of clothing manufacturers and 
retailers and 20 questionnaire responses from managing directors of textile manufacturers. 
(Colman, 1990:18,22) As a measure of quality she took eight dimensions. They were 
performance, features, reliability, conformance, durability, serviceability, aesthetics and 
perceived quality. After using sophisticated research methods she comes to the following 
conclusions. 
The perception of the buyer of South African textile products is that the quality they 
receive does not meet their expectations, over a range of criteria or dimensions. This 
perception of quality is related to an overall dissatisfaction with the products and services. 
Although generally the textile suppliers have a good understanding of what their customers 
expect, some suppliers underestimate their customer requirements. The textile suppliers 
are overstating the extent to which they are satisfying their customers' expectations. This 
tendency to overstate brings into doubt whether they are in fact meeting standards as they 
state they are. Because the suppliers and customers' perceptions of quality are very 
different, it hinders the suppliers' ability to see that they are not in fact delivering what the 
customer wants. 
Suppliers appear to determine the level of quality standards rather than set them according 
to an external measure such as customer requirements or competitive levels. Management's 
focus appears to be on conformance to their own standards rather than continuous 
improvement through an external means of assessment. 
The costs of quality assurance are underestimated and the costs of lost business due to 
customer dissatisfaction are not taken into account by the suppliers (Colman, 1990:51—2). 
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Colman's study is at the level of subjective expectations and perceptions, but does not 
study the actual performance of textile deliveries in the pipeline. Such a study was carried 
out by the National Productivity Institute which surveyed the retail-clothing-textile 
pipeline's delivery of orders for the 1986 summer season (Fairhurst, Totten and Boer, 
1987). The study was conducted in depth, but with a small number of companies, namely 
two major retailers, ten clothing suppliers and four major textile suppliers. 
Findings of the study were: (i) that buying procedures left a lot to be desired and the 
absence of firm or assured contracts between buyers and suppliers created loopholes for 
cancellation of orders placed. (ii) Communication between the textile and clothing 
manufacturers as well as the retail trade seemed to be informal and of an unacceptably low 
standard. This led to late deliveries and arbitrary cancellations of orders between the 
parties. (ifi) Co-operation between the textile and clothing and the retail sector was poor, 
e.g. there was no feedback or reporting on how sales were progressing so that orders could 
be TIMEOUSLY placed or be amended to take account of changes in the market (BTI, 
1988:50). 
The total delivery performance for the four textile mills was analysed for August 1986. It 
was found that, out of 3 058 orders, 64,5% were on time, 89,5% were delivered within two 
weeks and 95% within four weeks of the specified delivery date. In addition the deliveries 
for summer 1986 to the clothing manufacturers who participated in the pipeline study was 
also analysed. The delivery performance was found to be weaker: out of 222 orders 
analysed 55% were on time, 73% within two weeks and 89% within four weeks of the 
specified delivery date (Fairhurst, Totten and Boer, 1987:6—8). 
The NPI study of 1986 thus demonstrated that, in the case of the four textile mills, the 
quality of service with regards to delivery left much to be desired. Deliveries actually 
reaching purchasers on time ranged from only slightly more than half (55%) to less than 
two-thirds (64,5%). 
These performances were generally much weaker than the deliveries of the competitive 
companies surveyed in this study. For instance, three of the companies surveyed claimed 
that their proportion of deliveries on time were 88%, 93% and 95% respectively. Although 
the companies' orders were not scrutinised, it does suggest that one of the factors 
contributing to their competitiveness is a higher quality delivery performance than exists 
in the textile industry on average. 
Turning from delivery performance to product quality, a survey comparing the quality of 
South African fabric with imported fabric provides useful information. Unfortunately it is 
not clear in what year the survey was carried out. The results of the survey are summarised 
in Table 2. It shows that on average the local fabric has more faults per 100 metres than 
the imported fabric: 7,6 as opposed to 6,3 faults per 100 metres. The percentage of rolls 
with more than 9 faults per 100 metres was also higher in the local than in the imported 
fabric: 31,3% as opposedto 22,1%. 
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On the other hand the South African manufacturers strung the faults more diligently than 
did the foreigners. On average there were strings on 5,8 faults per 100 metres of the local 
fabric whereas imported cloth had only 1,4 strings per 100 metres. This meant that there 
was a considerably larger proportion of unstrung damages in imported fabrics (4,8 as 
opposed to 1,8 on the local fabric). This meant that, even though South African fabric is 
inferior in quality, clothing manufacturers stood a better chance of not using damaged 
local fabric than they did with imported fabric. 
Table 7.2 
Frequency of fabric damage: Local and imported fabric 
Local Fabric Imported Fabric 
No. of Fabric Rolls 742 177 
Total Length (M) 55 209 13 187 
Average Roll Len,th (M!Roll) 74 75 
StmngDamages') 3214 190 
Unstrung Damages (1) 986 637 
Total Damages 4 200 827 
Average No. of Damages per Roll 5,6 4,7 
Average No. of Damages per lOOM 7,6 6,3 
Average No. of Strung Damages per lOOM 5,8 1,4 
Average No. of Unstrung Damages per lOOM 1,8 4,8 
% of Rolls with 0-9 Faults per lOOM 68,7 77,9 
% of Rolls with more than 9 faults per lOOM 31,3 22,1 
Notes: 
(1) The fabric manufacturer is meant to put a string as a marker by damages in the 
fabric so that the purchaser can readily find them. 
Source: Miriam Altman, 1993:207. 
7.4 Pipeline volatility and amplification 
While it is clear that there is scope in the textile industry for improving its delivery service 
to customers and the quality of its fabric, there is another, deeper problem connected with 
the textile pipeline. The problem is one of volatility in demand due to the amplification of 
changes in consumer, and hence retailers', demand for textile apparel. This is most 
dramatically illustrated in the case of SANS where a fluctuation of 10% in consumer 
spending at the retail end leads to a fluctuation of 40% in the demand for SANS products 
(Interview, J.Hofmeyr, 1992). The higher up the pipeline the higher the volatility of 
demand for the product and SANS, as a producer of continuous synthetic filament, is a 
considerable way upstream from the garment retailer. 
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Graham Hopper (1990) has studied the textile-clothing pipeline in the Western Cape and 
developed a strategic model that explains the volatility and upstream amplification in the 
pipeline. The following exposition draws directly from his useful and insightful work. The 
configuration of the pipeline and the number of participants per sector is shown in Figure 
7.1. 
Figure 7.1 
Western Cape pipeline configuration 
The reasons for the volatility of demand in the textile pipeline are due to two inherent 
characteristics of the pipeline. They are, firstly, the length of the pipeline characterised by 
a relatively large number of distinct stages in the transformation of raw materials into 
saleable goods. The stages of transformation are sufficiently distinct from each other to be 
regarded as industries in their own right. They differ vastly from each other in terms of 




Source: Hopper, 1990:9. 
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Figure 7.2 
Pipeline stock effects 
STEADY STATE 
InItial Sales = 100.0 
0/Sac % of Sales 25.0% 
New Retail Sales = 100.0 
C/S as % of Sales 25.0% 
25.0% 25.0% 25.0% 25.0% 
RAW 
00 Clothing 100 
0MERS 
SALES 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
STOCK OPENING 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 
STOCK CLOSING 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 
PURCHASES 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
OPTION 1: SALES DROP AT THE RETAIL LEVEL 
New Retail Sales = 90.0 
RAW 




SALES 80.5 84.4 81.5 90.0 
STOCK OPENING 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 
STOCK CLOSING 20.1 21.1 21.9 22.5 
PURCHASES 15.6 80.5 84.4 87.5 
OPTION 2: SALES RISE AT THE RETAIL LEVEL 
New Retail Sales = 110.0 
RAW 




SALES 119.5 115.6 112.5 110.0 
STOCK OPENING 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 
STOCK CLOSING 29.9 28.9 28.1 27.5 
PURCHASES 124.4 119,5 115.6 112.5 
Source: Hopper, 1990:18 
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Secondly, the stocks held by each of the stages of production directly cause and determine 
the extent of upstream amplification in the pipeline. Thus the mechanism which drives the 
amplitude effect is the stock holding decisions of the participants in the pipeline. 
This can best be illustrated by means of an example. Figure 7.2 demonstrates the effect on 
the pipeline of a change in demand by customers for the pipeline's goods. 
It assumes, initially, a steady state in the industry with each component sector holding, on 
average, 25% of its sales as stock. Option I illustrates the effect of a drop in sales at the 
retail level. As the 10% drop in sales from 100 to 90 works its way upstream, each sector 
dips into its current stockholdings to meet the lower closing stock requirements. For 
example, the retailers will hold 25% of their new sales, i.e. 25% of 90. This translates into 
a closing stock (CIS) of 22,5 units. Thus 2,5 units of the opening stock are consumed and 
the net amount purchased from the clothing manufacturers is 90 — 2,5 = 87,5 units. The 
clothing manufacturers thus experience a 12,5% drop in sales. The same process occurs at 
each stage upstream. By the time the initial 10% drop reaches the fibre spinning sector, the 
drop in sales has almost doubled to 19,5%. The more stages there are in the pipeline, the 
worse this gets. 
Figure 7.2 also illustrates in option 2 how an increase in retail sales has exactly the 
opposite effect. Driven this time by a desire to build up stocks in each sector, an initial 
10% rise in sales results in a 19,5% rise in sales for the upstream fibre producers. 
Thus the configuration of the pipeline magnifies initially mild changes in consumer 
demand and amplifies the effect the further upstream one goes. 
The pipeline increases the volatility of upstream demand even more if the participants 
change their stock holding policies in response to unanticipated booms or slumps. For 
instance, Figure 7.3 indicates the effect if participants reduce their stock holdings from 
25% to 20% of sales in response to an unanticipated recession. An initial fall of 10% in 
retailers' sales is amplified to a drop of no less than 35,5% for upstream fibre holders. 
Conversely, if, during a boom, participants increase their stocks as a proportion of sales, 
demand will shoot up the further upstream one goes (Hopper, 1990:17—21). 
The question arises how the volatility of the pipeline can be reduced for the upstream 
textile and fibre producers. The answer lies in improving the efficiency of all sectors of 
the pipeline by cutting stock levels. Figure 7.4 explains, by means of an example, how it 
works. 
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Figure 7.3 
Pipeline reaction to an unanticipated economic downturn 
STEADY STATE 
Initial Sales 100.0 
O/S,s%ofSal.s =25.0% 
New Retail Sales 100.0 
C/S as % of Sales 25.0% 
25.0% 25.0% 25.0% 25.0% 
RAW 
Retailers 
SALES 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
STOCK OPENING 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 
STOCK CLOSING 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 
PURCHASES 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
RETAIL SALES DROP AND STOCK LEVELS ARE CUT ACROSS THE 
PIPELINE 
New Retail Sales = 90.0 
C/S as % of Sales 20.0% 
20.0% 20.0% 20.0% 20.0% 








SALES 64.5 74.6 83.0 90.0 
STOCK OPENING 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 
STOCK CLOSING 12.9 14.9 18.6 18.0 
PURCHASES 52.4 64.5 74.6 83.0 
Source: Hopper, 1990:52 
Figure 7.4 shows the effect that the increase of efficiency in various stages of the pipeline 
has on the volatility of demand. Option 2 shows that, if the retail sector alone cuts stock 
levels from 25% of sectoral sales to 10% of sectoral sales, then a drop in final retail sales 
of 10% will lead to a drop in fibre spinners' sales of 17,2%. ibis is an improvement on the 
19,5% reduction (option 1) that would have been experienced if all participants held 25% 
of sectoral sales as stock. 
As more sectors drain the pipeline of stock, so the variability upstream falls. Once all 
sectors have drained the pipeline of excessive stock by reducing their stock levels from 
25% to 10% of sales (option 5), the effect of a 10% drop in retail sales is only a 13,3% 
drop in sales for the upstream fibre producers. 
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Figure 7.4 
Effects of pipeline efficiencies achieved by draining each stage of stock 
STEADY STATE 
Initial Sales 100.0 
0/Sas%of Sales 25.0% 
New Retail Sales = 100.0 
C/Sas%ofSales 25.0% 
25.0% 25.0% 25.0% 25.0% 
RAW 
Clothing 100 Retailers - 
I OMERS 
SALES 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
STOCK OPENING 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 
STOCK CLOSING 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 
PURCHASES 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
OPTION 1: SALES DROP BY 10% WHEN OVERALL STOCKHOLDINGS 
ARE 25% OF SECTORAL SALES 
Initial Sales — 100.0 
0/S as % of Sales = 25.0% 25.0 25.0 25.0 
New Retail Sales 90.0 
C/S % of Sales — 25.0% 26.0 25.0 25.0 
RAW 
MATERIAL 





SALES 80.5 84.4 87.5 90.0 
STOCK OPENING 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 
STOCK CLOSING 20.1 21,1 21.9 22.5 
PURCHASES 75.6 80.5 84.4 87.5 
OPTION 2: RETAIL SALES DROP 10%, BUT RETAILERS ARE 
OPERATING WITH LOWER STOCK LEVELS 
0/S as % of Sales = 25.0% 25.0 25.0 10.0 
C/S as% of Sales = 25.0% 25.0 25.0 10.0 
RAW 
MATERIAL I Fibr, I 82.6 I 18621 ClothIng go. Retailers 
Spinners Textiles 
rMutadturel I 
SALES 62.8 86.3 89.0 90.0 
STOCK OPENING 26.0 25.0 25.0 10.0 
STOCK CLOSING 20.7 21.6 22.3 9.0 
PURCHASES 78.5 82.8 86.3 89.0 
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OPTION 3: RETAIL SALES DROP 10%, BUT CLOTHING 
MANUFACTURERS GET EFFICIENT TOO 
0/S as % of Sales 25.0% 25.0% 10.0% 10.0% 
C/S as % of Sales = 25.0% 250% 10.0% 10.0% 




SALES 84.9 87.9 89.0 90.0 
STOCK OPENING 25.0 25.0 10.0 10.0 
STOCK CLOSING 21.2 22.0 8.9 9.0 
PURCHASES 81.1 84.9 87.9 89.0 
OPTION 4: RETAIL SALES DROP 10%, BUT THE TEXTILE SECTOR 
GETS EFFICIENT TOO 
0/S as % of Sales 25.0% 10.0% 10.0% 10.0% 
C/S as % of Sales = 25.0% 10.0% 10.0% 10.0% 
RAW 
MATERIAL 





SALES 86.7 87.9 89.0 90.0 
STOCK OPENING 25.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 
STOCK CLOSING 21.7 8.8 8.9 9.0 
PURCHASES 83.4 86.7 87.9 89.0 
OPTION 5: RETAIL SALES DROP 10%, BUT THE WHOLE PIPELINE IS 
EFFICIENT 
0/S as % of Sales = 10.0% 10.0% 10.0% 10.0% 
C/Sea %of Sales = 10.0% 10.0% 10.0% 10.0% 
MATERIAL 





SALES 86.7 87,9 89.0 90.0 
STOCK OPENING 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 
STOCK CLOSING 8.7 8.8 8.9 9.0 
PURCHASES 85.4 86.7 87.9 89.0 
Source: Hopper, 1990:53—54 
The example thus demonstrates the necessity for all sectors in the pipeline to improve their 
efficiency by reducing their stock levels. It also shows that it lies within the power of 
downstream participants to help improve efficiency by reducing volatility in the overall 
pipeline (Hopper, 1990:30). 
How this increased efficiency can be achieved is of great importance to the South African 
textile-clothing pipeline. The way it can be achieved is discussed next. 
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7.5 Increasing efficiency and reducing the pipeline 
cycle: Quick Response 
The exposition on the textile-clothing pipeline commenced by examining the long duration 
of 66 weeks of the pipeline cycle and the fact that for 55 weeks or 83% of the time the 
material is not being transformed during which time no value is being added to the 
material. Even worse, only a small proportion of the 17% work in progress time is spent 
on actual conversion of the production. In addtion, for 83% of the time the stock is adding 
to cost as storage cost and opportunity cost of the capital tied up in the stock holdings. The 
study of volatility in the pipeline has also demonstrated that the higher the level of stock 
is, the greater the volatility in the textile-clothing pipeline due to the amplification effect. 
It is therefore important for the survival of all the sectors in the pipeline to increase their 
organisational efficiency by reducing stock levels and work in progress time throughout 
the pipeline. Ways in which this can be achieved have been put forward by Alan Hunter 
who has drawn on five years' experience in helping the USA textile and apparel industries 
become internationally competitive (Hunter, 1990:i). The following collectivity of 
techniques which is required and known as Quick Response, is drawn directly from 
Hunter and Derek van der Riet, a South African engineering management consultant.. 
Hunter maintains that a firm commitment to change by top management is the single most 
important step to be taken by any company intent on introducing new procedures, 
operating philosophies or strategies. Then the obvious point of attack on inventories is 
duplicate stocks, i.e., finished goods held by the supplier and raw materials held by the 
customer. There are two parts to this problem: how to manufacture in a more flexible 
manner so that the supplier can get rid of inventories associated with long runs of 
individual products and how to persuade the customer not to hold safety stocks, i.e. to 
adopt a Just In Time supplier relationship (Hunter, 1990:43). 
In order to manufacture in a way that enables the supplier to reduce inventories and work 
in progress, more sophisticated principles and techniques of production management need 
to be applied. Techniques that have been developed include, for instance, Operations 
Research, Materials Requirement Planning (MRP), Kanban, and Manufacturing Resource 
Planning (MRP2) (Hunter, 1990:44). 
Hunter also considers an all-embracing change in corporate culture to be necessary. He 
regards the broader based Quality Management philosophy developed by Deming and 
marketed as a structured program by Crosby, to be the most successful, but this is 
disputed. Techniques and mechanics of the Quality process include Statistical Quality 
Control, systematic Error Cause Removal procedures, formal Problem Solving training, 
Interruption Free Processing and, .above all, a Zero Defect mentality at every level in the 
organisation (Hunter, 1990:44—45). 
Hunter regards certification as central to the operation of Quality Management. it means 
that suppliers and customers, through partnership programs, draw up agreed on product 
specifications which allow for certification of the product. Derek van der Riet regards it as 
essential for the customer to gain satisfactory answers to the following three questions 
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from the supplier: (1) Do you know my conformance requirements? (2) Can you show that 
you have the necessary process capability to meet my requirements? (3) If your process 
capability is less than one, are you getting it up to one? (a process capability of equal to 
one means getting the conformance requirement wrong only ten times in a million) (D van 
der Riet, Consultation, March 1993). 
Milliken and Company in the USA has quantified the savings to its customers of 
implementing product certification. It has calculated that, for a customer using a million 
yards of fabric per year, certification can increase profits by up to $200 000 and contribute 
to the contraction of the pipeline at the same time (Hunter, 1990:46). 
Furthermore, Quality Management is, of necessity, accompanied by a change to a more 
participative management style and an increase in employee involvement which results in 
marked improvement in employee commitment (Hunter, 1990:45). 
By employing only the techniques of Quality Management and production management 
mentioned above, Hunter demonstrates that the pipeline cycle can be brought down from 
66 to 46 weeks. To take it a step further down to 21 weeks is more difficult. It requires the 
full use of available technology, rapid and open information exchange up and down the 
pipeline, and close, trusting partnerships between suppliers and customers. Hunter also 
maintains that it needs substantial investment by the retailer and his suppliers in Electronic 
Data Interchange (ED!) and bar coding equipment as well as in point-of-sale tracking at 
the Stock Keeping Unit (SKU) level, so that buyers and their suppliers can be kept 
informed of consumer demand (Hunter, 1990:51). 
Focusing only on the textile inventories of textile mills Hunter argues that Quick Response 
techniques can reduce stocks to two-thirds of their existing level by means of production 
management techniques and Quality Management alone, and even further down to only 
one-third of the level if all the other steps are taken (see Table 7.3). Once again the biggest 
reductions in textile inventories can come from avoidance of duplicate stocks of finished 
fabric at the apparel customer's plant. The essential ingredient in reducing duplicate stock 
is information. This includes electronic order and invoicing procedures, shipping status, 
defect mapping, width and shade data, and playback of the finished apparel sales 
information. The last-mentioned is of critical importance for the correct scheduling of both 
greige manufacture and finishing operations (Hunter, 1990:48). 
According to Hunter an even greater potential for inventory reductions at the apparel 
manufacturer/retailer interface exists than is the case for the textile fabrics (see Table 7.3). 
With the use of sophisticated Unit Production Systems, modular manufacturing, optimal 
sub-assembly operations, highly engineered manufacturing flow systems with 'intelligent' 
sewing machines and computer shopfloor controls, what used to take weeks has been 
brought down to only days or hours to manufacture (Hunter, 1990:49). 
It appears that Hunter has omitted two factors from his account. The first is the importance 
of commitment to Quick Response, and the second is the value of good planning. In a 
Pilot Project carried out in South Africa it was possible to obtain a 45 percent reduction in 
the duration of the pipeline without the use of any of the additional technology outlined by 
THE TEXTILE SECTOR 119 
Hunter (van der Riet, 1989:Table 4). 
Table 73 
Quick and potential very Quick Response reductions in pipeline inventories and WIP 
Textile Fabric Inventories (Working Weeks) 
Traditional Quick Potential 
Very Quick 
WlPGreige 3,9 2,7 2,0 
GreigeatGreige 1,2 1,0 0,8 
Greige at Finishing 1,4 1,2 0,8 
WIP Finish 1,2 1,0 0,8 
Fin.Fabric at Textile 7,4 5,0 2,5 
Fin.Fabric at Apparel 6,8 3,4 0,5 
Total 21,9 14,3 7,4 
Apparel & Retail Inventories (Working Weeks) 
Post Cut WIP 5,0 2,5 1,0 
Fin.App. at Apparel 12,0 11,1 1,0 
Transport to Retail 2,7 1,4 1,0 
App. at Retail Distrib. Centre 6,3 1,1 — 
App. at Retail Store 10,0 10,0 8,0 
Total 36,0 26,1 11,1 
Source: Hunter, 1990:48,49 
The Pilot Project was carried out by a retailer, garment manufacturer and textile mill. The 
retailer was totally committed to the project. The managing director gave it his backing in 
front of about 100 senior and middle management members. A number of people 
underwent formal training in the techniques of Quick Response, and all involved were 
very enthusiastic and motivated. 
The garment manufacturer that was selected for the Pilot Project had developed short 
cycle manufacturing capability using the Just In Time philosophy and techniques. The 
textile mill selected had a reputation for high quality work and had introduced SABS Code 
0157, thereby showing evidence of process control ability. 
The products selected for the Project were a T shirt and leggings. 
In order to determine the pipeline flow rates and capacity commitments a stock model was 
developed. It was based on four weeks sales by size and colour for the T shirt and 
leggings. Indexes were calculated to allow for seasonal and promotional influences on the 
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model, and the model was then made operational.1 This involved careful timing of the 
pipeline activities and generation of a style diary. The importance of the style diary was to 
establish the latest dates for colouring up of each fabric drop (van der Riet, 1989:A3—9 to 
A3—15). 
In addition to the reduction in stock flow times, the Pilot Project also had financial 
benefits. For the retail company the increase in sales over sales the previous summer for 
the Quick Response line was 120 percent while a comparable product increased by only 
40 percent. The number of stock turns for the traditional line was 6,3, but for the Quick 
Response it went up to 11,8 thereby increasing the gross margin on return considerably 
(van der Riet, 1989, untitled mimeograph). 
7.6 Economic benefits of Quick Response 
While it is clear that the textile-clothing pipeline as a whole will benefit from Quick 
Response, what are the economic benefits for individual companies in different sectors of 
the pipeline if they adopt Quick Response techniques? 
Table 7.4 
Estimated financial improvements from Quick Response (% change) 
Seasonal Fashion 
Reduction Wholesale Price 7 15 
Reduction 1st Retail Price 9 13 
Reduction Ave. Retail Price 2 6 
Increase Pre-Tax Profit 
J Manufacturer 40 40 
J Retailer 80 80 
Reduction in Assets 
J Manufacturer 0 0 
J Retailer 18 18 
Increase % Return on Assets 
J Manufacturer 40 40 
j Retailer 120 120 
Net Cost Improvement 8 12 
(% Ave. Retail) 
Source: Hunter, 1990:89. 
1. This is a highly simplified account of a far more complex and detailed set of operations. 
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Hunter has addressed the question of economic returns of Quick Response. In his first set 
of calculations he omits the costs associated with adding specific tecimologies on the one 
hand, and the increases in business volume that stem from the adoption of Quick Response 
on the other hand. He maintains that neither of these factors is large enough to affect the 
main thrust of the findings (Hunter, 1990:78). 
After extensive calculations using weighted average benefits for the mixes of seasonalities 
involved, Hunter presents the achievable financial improvements for the manufacturer, 
retailer and consumer (Table 7.4). It is important to note that the savings that accrue from 
Quick Response need to be passed on to the consumer if the domestic industry is to 
become more competitive with imports. 
In his second round of calculations Hunter includes investment costs as well as the 
outcome of higher volume sales. It is based on Quick Response trials by Crafted With 
Pride in the USA. The trials raised a number of questions including, What is the 
investment pay-off for Basic, Seasonal and Fashion Merchandise?' To provide information 
to the industry Kurt Salmon Associates and du Pont undertook a series of costlbenefit 
studies on behalf of Crafted With Pride. Hunter presents their analysis and findings for the 
economics of a poplin fabric. 
Table 7.5 
Quick Response investment and returns at higher volumes for a vertically integrated 
textile mill 
Basic Seasonal Fashion 
QRII QRI QRII QRII 
Investments ($00(Ys) 
Systems 576 1040 1040 1620 
Inspect, pack, ship 336 423 423 486 
Greater flexibility etc. — 283 1843 6510 
Consulting 340 525 525 690 
Total 1252 2271 3831 9306 
Returns 
Increased profit ($/yard) 0,018 0,017 0,020 0,034 
Increased profit/yr ($000's) 2316 2856 3090 4539 
Payback (months) 7 10 15 25 
Source: Hunter, 1990:135 
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In the first presentation (Table 7.5) it was assumed that the greige mills could expand 
existing capacity to meet the additional demand. However, in the second presentation 
(Table 7.6) of the expansion of wet processing capacity, it was assumed that additional 
investment in equipment was required. (The numerous assumptions which the calculations 
are based are stipulated in the book and too exhaustive to present here.) 
Table 7.6 
Investment for QR and additional capacity dyeing and finishing 
Basic Seasonal Fashion 
QRII QRI QRII QRII 
Net Sales ($ millions) 123 137 141 155 
Annual Yards 72 78 78 81 
Investments ($000's) 
Additional capacity 3007 3007 5520 
QRlnvestment 1746 3306 8616 
Training, consulting etc. 525 525 690 
Total 5278 6838 14826 
Returns ($000's) 
Increased profit/year — 2544 2700 3891 
Payback (months) — 25 30 46 
Source: Hunter, 1990:137 
The significance of Tables 7.5 and 7.6 lie in the fact that they demonstrate the greatly 
enhanced financial performance and increased profit for the textile-clothing supply 
pipeline. They also demonstrate the acceptability of paybacks on investment. The payback 
periods range from as short as 7 months in Basic Merchandise up to 46 months in the very 
capital intensive dyeing and finishing section. 
7.7 Quick Response in South Africa 
The first concerted effort to apply Quick Response in South Africa took place in 1988 
when a Textile Pipeline Workshop was organised and attended by representatives of the 
textile, clothing and retail sectors. The Workshop demonstrated a willingness by the 
different sectors to cooperate with each other. No less than six potential pipeline projects 
were suggested with two of them even specifying targets they wished to achieve in 
reducing the pipeline cycle. There was also a general consensus that the success of QR in 
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the South African textile pipeline would be dependant on a retail-driven program.2 
However, not much progress has been made in the projects between the pipeline partners 
even though considerable effort has been made by individual retailers and manufacturers 
to undertake Quick Response pilot schemes such as the Pilot Project outlined above. The 
reason why Quick Response in the textile pipeline in South Africa has not succeeded to 
date has been attributed to retailers by Dr Boer of the NP! without mincing his words. 
In the USA the Quick Response programme was initiated and driven by some of the most 
highly respected textile and clothing manufacturers such as Mihiken, Levi Strauss and 
Haggar Apparel. Retailers are sophisticated and were quick to co-operate in order to gain 
the financial benefit. In South Africa, the clothing and textile industry leaders have not 
taken the challenge and clothing retail is controlled by approximately six leading retailers 
who have on the whole failed to honour the co-operative Quick Response agreements with 
their suppliers. Quick Response means a partnership and a partnership can only succeed if 
there is no duplicity. Regretfully, local retailers have not played the game, and as they hold a position of power over the other partners in the textile pipeline, Quick Response has not 
succeeded in South Africa to date (Boer, 1992b:8). 
Although there are notable exceptions amongst retailers (as pointed out above), MPCS 
consultant, Mr Joop de Voest, has pointed out other problems with garment retailing in 
South Africa. In his experience as consultant to clothing and textile companies, the retail 
chains engage in such high mark-ups that they stifle demand for the products of textile and 
garment producers. He cites as an example two clothing factories that sold certain 
garments for R120 to R180 to chain retailers which marketed them for between R700 and 
R800. Upon his recommendation the factories found alternative retail outlets where the 
garments marketed for between R300 to R400. Once the prices fell the factory demand for 
the garments rose again. He also maintains that cost savings made by textile and garment 
factories are not passed on by major retailers to the customers (de Voest, telephonic 
discussion, 2 April, 1993). 
The observations of messrs de Boer and de Voest stress the immense importance of a 
fihiere approach in developing a strategy for the textile industry as well as the immense 
significance of retailers in the filiere. The scope of this study is unfortunately limited to 
the textile industry, but there clearly is a need, when developing an actual industrial 
policy, to adopt a filiere approach that includes retailing. 
Another very important factor in adopting a Quick Response in the textile industry in 
South Africa is the need for industrial stability. An industry that is characterised by 
frequent or unpredictable strikes and work stoppages would have difficulty adopting Just 
In Time methods of production in view of the uncertainty the instability creates. It then 
makes more sense to adopt a Just In Case approach with large amounts of stock. In all this 
the roles of the union, company management, and the industrial relations system are all 
crucial. 
SACTWU, as the dominant union, has an approach to honour agreements reached with 
management and not to engage in wild-cat strikes. The industry and union's record in 
2. Recommendations made by the Work Groups at the Close of the Textile Pipeline Workshop, 
undated mimeograph. 
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industria:1 conflict reflects this approach. The union does however seek to ensure good 
wages and working conditions for its members and where these do not exist it uses its full 
bargaining strength to try and achieve them. This does mean that the union could enter 
into strikes if all attempts at resolving the conflict through negotiation and mediation fail. 
But the build up to a strike takes place over a long time period and would give employers 
ample opportunity to build up stocks that may be required during the strike. 
On management's side a commitment to sound industrial relations, good wages and 
working conditions would help to ensure stability in their companies and the industry as a 
whole. To the extent that they are achieved, Quick Response becomes a viable option 
within the textile industry and the filiere. 
However, the role of SACTWU, workers, and the industrial relations system in the 
formulation and implementation of an industrial strategy goes beyond Just In Time and 
Quick Response. The next chapter examines this wider role. 
Chapter Eight: The role of SACTWU in 
Industrial Strategy and Training 
8.1 Outline of the chapter 
The role of labour in the development as well as implementation of an industrial strategy 
in the textile industry is of crucial importance. Without the participation of labour, 
especially organised labour, it does not stand a chance of succeeding. On the other hand 
labour has an immensely important and constructive contribution to make to the whole 
process. This chapter therefore commences by focussing on the approach of organised 
labour towards the formulation and implementation of an industrial strategy in the textile- 
clothing pipeline. 
SACTWU, through a process of mergers starting in 1987, has grown into the dominant 
union in both the textile and clothing industries. As such it has a concern for the welfare of 
both the clothing and textile industries because its members' livelihoods depend on the 
continued economic viability of both industries. 
This chapter accordingly focuses exclusively on examining SACTWU's approach towards 
industrial policy formulation and implementation. From this it emerges that the union has 
placed priority on attaining the centralisation of collective bargaining in the textile 
industry although it strongly supports worker participation and democracy as well. 
The union also has a concern about the attainment of skills by its members because better 
skills enable them to earn higher wages. To this end the union appears to be adopting 
COSATU 's approach towards worker training and its linking of skills and wages. The 
approach is known as the wage-skill nexus. 
The chapter therefore moves its focus on to training in the textile industry. It commences 
by presenting the findings of efforts to assess the training needs in the industry and 
describes the competency-based training of apprentices which was introduced by the 
Textile Industry Training Board (TITB). Thereupon COSATU's approach towards the 
training and education of workers is presented and found to be very similar to that of the 
TITB in that they are both competency-based. What appears to emerge from the wage- 
skill nexus is that it does not link the workers' remuneration to their actual perfonnance in 
the workplace. 
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This observation, plus the risk that centralisation of collective bargaining can lead to the 
bureaucratisation of the union, leads to a suggestion for the union to give priority of place 
to worker participation to which it is already committed. By so doing the union would help 
empower workers to make their enterprises internationally competitive. In the process 
workers will improve their own and the companies' performance thereby laying the 
foundations for higher wages for themselves. 
Finally, in support of the argument the results of a survey amongst a sample of textile 
workers in the Western Cape is presented. The survey shows that workers are prepared to 
share responsibility for improving the economic performance of their firms provided they 
are adequately rewarded and trained for it. 
Having presented a summary of the chapter and the link between the various sections in it, 
the full details are presented next 
8.2 SACTWU's approach to Industrial Strategy 
Formulationi 
(a) Basis of SACTWU's involvement in Industrial Strategy 
SACTWU's involvement in the formulation of industrial policy has arisen primarily from 
their concern with their members' interests. For them it is a logical extension of their 
struggle to secure better wages, working conditions and job security for workers in the 
textile industry. These aims underpin their proposed strategy for the textile industry, 
namely to create a long-term growth path for the clothing and textile industries that will 
lead to job creation, improved wages, and greater skills, and which will also allow for the 
development of competitive, dynamic enterprises. For the union the key to this strategy is 
that it is both long-term and industry-wide. They argue that these perspectives have been 
absent from employers' strategies, which have tended to focus on sporadic lobbying by 
first textile manufacturers and then clothing manufacturers (or vice versa) around the issue 
of tariffs. 
As a national industrial trade union that spans both the clothing and textile industries, in 
both of which it has extremely high levels of membership, it believes that it is critical to 
intervene in order to correct the limitations of capital's vision for the future of the 
industry, and as far as possible supplant that vision with one of its own. 
1. This section is almost entirely based on an interview conducted on 8 March 1993 with Ebrahim Patel, 
Assistant General Secretary of SACTWU, by Shane Godfrey and myself. I am extremely grateful to 
Shane for all the assistance he has given me in my research and in the drafting of this section. 
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However, its mode of intervention, says Patel, is as a democratic trade union. This means 
that industrial strategy will be debated within union structures and the trade union 
representatives will be accountable to those structures when they participate in the forums 
that have been set up to devise a development programme for the industry. It also means 
that the union can revert to its membership for industrial action or industry-wide 
campaigns to support its proposals and arguments at these forums. 
For SACTWU thus, by it's very nature as a trade union, industrial relations and industrial 
strategy are inextricably bound together in the process of participation in the development 
of an industrial policy for the clothing and textile industries. 
(b) The establishment of forums to plan long-term strategy 
In September 1992 the Department of Trade and Industry established two forums, a Panel 
and a Task Group, to advise the government on long-term strategy for the textile and 
clothing industries after the recommendations of a previous forum (The Hatty Committee) 
had run aground. The smaller of the two, the Task Group, was given the responsibility of 
meeting regularly and drafting a report containing recommendations. It has to consult with 
the Panel, which has broad representation from the textile-clothing pipeline. The main task 
of the two forums was 'to formulate a strategy with achievable recommendations based on 
sound economic principles, for the restructuring required to develop clothing and textile 
industries that are viable and competitive' (NCF, 1992:29). 
SACTWU, as a key stakeholder, was represented and active in the forums. Their key task, 
according to Patel, was to concentrate on the fundamental restructuring of the industry 
rather than to focus on the tariff issue. The grounds on which the union opposed focusing 
on the tariff issue gets to the heart of the union's perception of an industrial policy. Patel 
articulated it as follows: 
The real debate in the industry is not whether to promote the clothing industry at the 
expense of the textile industry, or to protect the textile industry with a loss to the clothing 
industry. That is not the real debate and only comes about when the starting point is tariffs. 
The real debate is how to restructure both the clothing and textile industries in a manner 
that provides for strong enterprises, sustainable growth, and highly competitive industries 
with the maximum labour-absorbing capacity. So how the issue is posed defines the 
debate. 
The union is aware that restructuring will have differing implications for different parts of 
the clothing-textile pipeline. In certain parts of the textile industry it could mean a high 
tech industry with a relatively low labour-absorbing capacity, but in other parts, like the 
clothing industry and sections of the textile industry, it could mean a strategy generating 
large-scale employment. 
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(c) Levels of engagement 
Right from the start of the union's involvement in the formulation of a development plan 
for the industry it has brought shop stewards into the debate within the union. Patel 
explains what the union's thinking is on this point as follows: 
Sometimes the debate is posed that national accords are for the union leadership and that 
shopfloor restructuring is for the shop stewards. We think that is the most dangerous 
formulation that one can have because on the one hand for national accords to stick 
requires the support of workers as a whole, and hence you have got to make the worker 
leadership at the factory-level part of that and they have got to understand the issues. And 
secondly, for factory restructuring to take place on terms that will favour workers requires 
that the union's national leadership must take an active interest in plant issues, and not 
only concentrate on the macro picture and leave shop stewards who have had less 
opportunity of thinking through the challenges and the dangers of restructuring to manage 
the plant ones. 
The above quote raises the issue of the level at which the trade union engages in industrial 
strategy and improving the performance of the industry, and the effect that traditional 
industrial relations issues will have on that engagement. Patel believes that engagement 
must take place at both the national level and at plant-level. Both are seen as equally 
important, but he argues that the national level has to take precedence at this point in time: 
We have got to reach the national agreement that sets the terms and the framework for 
what is permissible and what are the parameters and what are the rewards of shopfloor 
transformation. Then the detail of what needs to be done at factory X can only be done at 
factory X. .. One wouldn't see it as two rigid stages that you first fix up the national and 
then you go to the shopfloor, but in emphasis and direction the union is seeking first to 
reach the broad accord at national level, on the understanding that if that is not going to be 
reached there is going to be no purpose or value in seeking shopfloor transformation 
because you wont have the infrastructure in place that will allow the shopfloor to feed into 
it and to draw from it. 
Patel goes on the emphasise the importance of plant-level engagement by stating the he 
thinks 'that an incredibly large measure of the productivity gain in our industry is going to 
come about through shop floor transformation, rather than only through the macro 
picture'. 
By engaging at both levels the union believes that it will be able to influence the particular 
form that the development of the industry takes, and that it will thereby achieve two 
things. Firstly, it will contribute to the growth of the industry, which will create jobs; and 
secondly, workers at plant-level will be empowered by their engagement in performance 
issues: 
We would want a growth strategy that systematically empowers and assists workers. 
Empowers them through re-defining shop floor relations — its not just about getting 
workers to be multi-skilled as an example — its about re-defining power relations on the 
shop floor. . . So the broad framework is the prerequisite for shop floor transformation, 
but shop floor transformation remains an important engine of productivity gains and 
worker empowerment. 
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(d) The process of involvement and the implications for industrial relations 
Pate! argues that the union must build on its organisational strengths when it begins with 
the process of involving workers at plant-level in industrial policy issues. He identifies 
two strengths that will form the basis of this process. The first of these strengths is 
campaigning, which the union has in the past successfully directed at distributive and 
consumption issues, e.g. the Living Wage Campaigns. Pate! believes that in future 
campaigns will have to focus crisply on specific industrial strategy issues to bring the 
mass of workers into the arena. 
The second strength identified by the union is its shop stewards who, Pate! argues, have 
high legitimacy on the shopfloor, and who have gained valuable skills over time. The 
union believes that shop stewards are going to play a critical role in shopfloor 
transformation. However, this will mean a considerably expanded role for shop stewards 
beyond their existing focus on disciplinary concerns, and it will require a concerted 
training programme to equip them with the necessary skills. To this end the union is 
introducing a two day training course on industrial policy that it envisages for all its 3000 
shop stewards. The course will focus on both macro policy issues and plant-level issues. 
In addition, the union aims to introduce industrial policy issues into its programme of 
action. This means that these issues will be put onto the agenda of regional congresses of 
the union for discussion and debate. Following on from this is the need to project the issue 
of industrial policy as a legitimate worker concern. This will involve using the union's 
newspaper to inform and educate workers. Pate! is aware of the challenge that this poses 
but argues that: 
we must not have the attitude that industrial policy issues are too complex for workers 
and in that way chase it off the pages of our newspaper. The challenge is to find a way to 
put it so simply without losing its subtleties, that people can read it and understand and be 
interested. 
The union's aim is to 'constantly raise industrial policy issues so that the broad lesson that 
the future of our industry is also the responsibility of workers starts to become part of the 
daily discourse, part of the psychology of every SACTWU member'. 
Finally, the union aims to restructure the existing collective bargaining arrangements and 
agreements. For the union this means a national centralised bargaining structure and a 
revision of certain aspects of the collective agreements. However, Pate! argues that this 
collective bargaining strategy needs to be complemented by a union-driven industrial 
strategy: 
There is a fallacy that says that through restructuring your collective bargaining you can 
get growth in your economy. That is nonsense — you can't have a growth strategy that is 
determined by collective bargaining. You need an industrial policy to get growth, but your 
collective bargaining is an element that can contribute or retard growth. So we must see all 
the time how do we enhance the economic growth elements of your collective bargaining 
agreements. 
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He cites the grading structure in a collective agreement as one factor that 'can either be 
one that promotes complacency and inertia and a lack of dynamism' or it can be one that 
rewards competence, training and skills. A particular type of job grading structure can 
therefore provide workers with an incentive to use their skills. This is one way in which 
collective bargaining can contribute to a skills-driven growth path for the industry. But to 
have skills in the industry there is also a need for training. 
8.3 Training needs in the textile industry. 
What are the training needs in the textile industry? Two surveys were conducted to 
establish what the needs are, one by the National Productivity Institute (NPI) and the other 
by the Textile Industry Training Board (TITB). The former tended to concentrate on the 
training needs of management, supervisors, artisans and technicians while the latter looked 
at the training needs across the industry as a whole. 
The TITB conducted a Training Needs Survey Questionnaire and received responses from 
31 companies representing almost 32 000 employees in the industry. The companies 
ranged in size from 216 to 2686 employees and covered a wide range of textile products. 
The Survey can therefore be regarded as fairly representative of the textile industry as a 
whole. Although the date is not specified, the survey was probably conducted in 1990. 
Table 8.1 
Formal training — highest qualification 
Training % of Total labour force 
Miscellaneous 38,5 
No formal training 24,9 
Std 8/matric 18,5 
In-service 14,7 




Source: TITB, 1991. 
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Table 8.1 represents the formal training and highest qualifications attained by employees 
in the survey. The largest section (miscellaneous, 38,5%) refers to employees for whom no 
records of their skill level were kept. It is probably not wrong to surmise that this group 
constituted largely unskilled and untrained workers. The second largest section (24,9%) 
had received no formal training. Hence 63% or almost two-thirds of the labour force were 
probably unskilled and untrained. On the other hand less than one-fifth of employees had 
std 8 or matric while 15% had received in-service training. But the proportion of 
employees who had received technical or tertiary education and training were extremely 
small. All told they added up to only 3,3% of the labour force (TITB, 1991:5). 
The education and training profile of employees in the textile industry thus reveals a 
largely untrained labour force with a very small proportion possessing specialised 
technical training or education received outside the workplace. 
The Survey also revealed that there was a shortage in the availability of trainers. Of the 31 
companies surveyed there was one personnel manager for every 1000 workers and one 
training manager for every 1800 workers. Anyone available who could offer training 
would have to cater for about 400 people and the load for available training supervisors 
was 2000 trainees per supervisor. Training provision in terms of human resources 
available inside companies was thus also found to be inadequate. Most companies also 
appeared not to evaluate the effectiveness of the training they provided (TITB, 1991:8—9). 
With the aid of the NIPR the TITB grouped the training needs from 1988 to 1994 as 
reported by the companies into an order of relative importance (TITB, 1991:13). It is 
reproduced in Table 8.2. 
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Table 8.2 
Relative importance of training needs 
Training needs Relative importance 
Operator Skills 100,00 
Various on-the-job operator skills 89,45 
Tex machine-specific skills (Picanol, Airjet, Ruti, Suizer) 5,72 
Tex task-specific skills 4,83 
Production Management Skills 3 1,97 
Process managers 9,86 
Dye chemical technologists 8,01 
Spinning technicians 4,86 
Weaving technicians 4,53 
Finishing technicians 3,13 
Cloth designers 1,58 
Supervisory skills 16,52 
Production supervisors 9,82 
Industrial relations 3,43 
Inter-personal relationships 3,01 
Cultural understanding 0,26 
Production decision skills 14,40 
Quality improvement 6,13 
Productivity understanding 3,69 
Production planning 3,55 
Performance appraisal 0,89 
Costing and estimating. 0,14 
Management decision skills 8,98 
Financial control system analysis 3,39 
Strategic planning 2,95 
Marketing programs 2,33 
Sales promotion 0,31 
Engineering Skills 7,40 
Electronic technologist 5,13 
Artisan fitters 1,07 
Mechanical technologists 0,80 
Artisan electricians 0,40 
Source: TITB, 1991. 
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It thus appears that the overwhelming training need as observed by management in the 
industry was for short courses providing various on-the-job operator skills. 
The National Productivity Institute (NPI) was commissioned to undertake a study of 
human resources in the textile industry on issues affecting the industry's ability to be 
globally competitive. Its terms of reference included the identification of key skills within 
the industry, the current and future areas of skill shortages, and an evaluation of different 
options available to satisfy the industry's demand for appropriate human resources. While 
the NPI's subsequent report (Riley and Cillié, 1990) did not fulfill its terms of reference, it 
does contain useful and insightful information about the human resources in the textile 
industry. Once again the date of the data was unspecified, but it was probably 1989. 
Table 8.3 
Racial composition of labour force 




















Male workers 49% 
Female workers 51% 
Total number of companies in sample 17 
Total employees 13876 
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Table 8.4 
Formal training and course attendance: 
Percentage with: Manage- Super- Arti- Tech- 
ment visors sans nicians 
Degree 22% 2% 0% 1% 
Technikon Diploma 17% 6% 18% 1% 
Higher National Diploma 15% 6% 20% 1% 
City and Guilds Certificate 12% 2% 2% 2% 
Institute Membership, e.g. AT!, LTI 20% 2% 0% 2% 
Other recognised qualification 11% 16% 21% 18% 
Percentage having attended: 
Machine maker's courses 14% 6% 11% 41% 
NP! 6% 0% 0% 0% 
PM! 7% 1% 0% 0% 
CSIR(SAWTRI) 1% 1% 0% 7% 
SAI3S 7% 2% 0% 0% 
Consultants 15% 1% 0% 0% 
NOSA 30% 27% 8% 26% 
Others 19% 13% 1% 28% 
!n-house certified courses 21% 36% 11% 56% 
Companies in sample 13 13 13 13 
Average years in job 5 7 8 9 
Average years in company 10 13 7 15 
Average number of subordinates 37 19 2 5 
Source: NP!, 1990 
Tables 8.3 and 8.4, taken from the report, present the characteristics of the human 
resources in the textile industry. Table 8.3 presents the racial composition of the labour 
force by occupational level. It shows that the textile industry has a racial composition 
typical of South African manufacturing industry as a whole: Whites dominate the 
managerial, artisanal and technical posts while Blacks dominate the unskilled occupations 
in the industry. Table 8.4 shows that no less than 97% of management had some formal 
training, but it is unclear what proportion of it constituted specific training in textile 
management and textile manufacturing processes. It also shows that while 61% of artisans 
had undergone formal training only 34% of supervisors and 25% of technicians had one or 
other recognised qualification (Riley and Cillié, (1990:34—39). 
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In pulling together its findings the NP! Survey found shopfloor and supervisory staff to 
have relatively low educational attainments. It also gained the impression that top 
management of companies in the textile industry consisted mainly of immigrants with 
high technical and managerial skill. They were however retiring over the next 5 to 10 
years and the companies did not appear to have personnel with the appropriate skills to 
replace these top managers when they were due to retire. 
The NP! Survey concluded that the primary and basic needs in human resource training 
were: 
• to improve substantially the number of technologists and technicians; 
• to improve the basic literacy and numeracy of the work-force; 
• to improve the effectiveness of supervisors and managers to enable productivity 
improvements to be sustained; 
• to upgrade the effectiveness and skills of middle managers to enable them to fill the 
posts of top managers who were due to retire in 5 to 10 years; 
• to shift managerial thinking beyond the requirements of the South African market to 
those of both a South African and global market (Riley and Cillié, 1990:3). 
8.4 The provision of training in the textile industry 
There are a variety of ways and institutions through which training is provided for 
employees in the textile industry in South Africa. The forms it takes include: 
• in-house training by companies; 
• apprenticeship training by companies accredited by the TITB; 
• textile design training by several Technikons; 
• training of textile technicians by Natal Technikon; 
• a course provided by the South Mrican Dyers and Finishers' Association (SADFA) at 
the Natal Technikon; 
• a course provided by SAFTO; 
• courses provided by the Division of Textile Technology (Textek) of the Council for 
Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) in Port Elizabeth; 
In addition there are informative monthly meetings held by SADFA and the Textile 
Institute (TI) in various regions in the country. 
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In spite of the variety of forms, education and training provision in the textile industry is in 
fact very thin on the ground. The most ambitious and latest training to be introduced is the 
apprentice training scheme of the Textile Industry Training Board (TITB). It is also the 
first ever artisan training provided for textile workers in South Africa. The scheme is 
examined next. 
(a) The TITB's competency-based apprentice training scheme 
The TITB is the governing body of the Textile Industry Training Scheme and is 
constituted in terms of the Manpower Training Act. The Training Scheme was officially 
published in the Government Gazette in December 1989 (Nagel, 1990:18,21). It is based 
on competency-based modular training (CMBT). The characteristics of its principle 
components are as follows: 
• Competencies which are descriptions of job tasks that produce results that can be 
observed in the form of a product, service or change in the working environment. 
• The job tasks are one that employers are prepared to pay. 
• Each competency has a number of clearly definable procedural steps which require 
knowledge and skills to perform. 
• The focus of the system is on the mastery of competencies against pre-set 
performance standards (Nagel, 1990:1). 
Tests are primarily performance based. Theoretical tests are only designed to assess 
knowledge that is difficult to incorporate in the performance test An important feature of 
the CBMT system is that an apprentice is not permitted to proceed until he or she has 
mastered the module on which he/she is currently being trained (Nagel, 1990:2). 
Minimum age and educational qualifications have been laid down for commencing an 
apprenticeship. The minimum age is 16 and education is a Standard 8 with passes in 
mathematics and science or a National Technical Certificate, Part II (N2). 
The Training Scheme is still developing trades. By August 1992 it had succeeded in 
having six trades declared designated trades in the textile industry; four of them were for 
weaving machine mechanicians (on shuttle, rapier, projectile, and airjet looms), one for 
long staple spinning machine and another for weft knitting machine mechanicians (TITB, 
1992) Accredited companies could formally apply to the Training Board to indenture 
apprentices in these trades. Companies become accredited once they meet the required 
standards as evaluated by the accreditation committee appointed by the Training Board. 
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In August 1992 the accredited companies and the designated trades in which they could 
train apprentices were the following: 
Gelvenor Textiles weaving 
David Whiteheads weaving 
Industex weaving 
SA Fine Worsted weaving and long staple spinning 
Frame Textile Corp. weaving 
Mooi River Textiles weaving 
Da Gama Textiles weaving 
(TITB, 1992) 
8.5 COSATU's approach to training and skills formation: 
the Skills-Wage Nexus 
Since SACTWU's approach to training is taking place within the broad policy framework 
laid down by COSATU, it is relevant to discuss and clarify COSATU's approach to 
worker training. There are many ways in which COSATU's approach to training coincides 
with that adopted by the TITB, but there are also some significant differences. 
The area in which there is remarkable overlap between COSATU and the TITB is in 
competency-based training. COSATU's approach has been well expressed in a summary 
written for SACTWU. 
Training should be competency based in the sense that the training must focus on 
outcomes (the ability to do the job effectively) rather than traditional methods of training 
which focus on inputs. 
A competency based training system comprises two components: 
instruction which is characterised by the precise definition of skills to be achieved 
both on and off the job to specific standards and under specified conditions which 
becomes the performance objectives for the skill formation process; and assessment 
and certification of competency, related to both on and off the job components of 
skill formation with performance as the basic criterion (Machin, 1993:3). 
The above quote makes it clear that there is a remarkably high degree of overlap between 
the TITB and COSATU's approaches towards skills training. They both support 
competency based training which requires certain skills to perform certain tasks to 
previously specified standards, and the competencies are to be certified by an accredited 
body. 
There are however also some important differences between COSATU's approach and the 
TITB's policy. The most important differences are the following: 
(1) the TITB training is specifically industrial training for apprentices in order to qualify 
as artisans, whereas COSATU advocates a broad based training, from language and 
communication skills to scientific/technological understanding, in order to 'enable 
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individuals to develop skills which are required for all types of work' (Machin, 
1993:4—5). In short, COSATU wants the Industrial Training Boards to provide 
education as well, especially Adult Basic Education, and that they should become 
known as Industrial and Education Training Boards (COSATU, 1992:para.1.3). 
(2) The TITB system of accreditation of companies means that only employees from 
those companies and with the necessary education qualify for artisanal training, 
whereas COSATU wants the training to be available to all workers. 
(3) Whereas the end-goal for the TITB is qualification as an artisan, COSATU proposes 
that the competencies be linked to a new skills-based occupational grading system 
which promotes career path advancement for employees. 
There are also differences between COSATU and the TITB over the question of 
representation on the Training Board. COSATU's approach is for the union(s) in the 
industry to have equal representation with management on the Training Board. The TITB 
however only offered the unions in the textile industry one representative on the Board 
(Interview, R Alexander and W van der Rheede, SACTWU, 6 April 1993). 
The close link that COSATU draws between training and occupational grading has wider 
ramifications in that it also links skills to wages. The way this is to be done is, firstly, to 
develop a skills competency grading system. A wage level is then determined for each of 
the new grading levels. Each employee is then placed in one of the grading levels to which 
a specific wage is attached. Hence there is a direct link between the skill of the employee 
and his or her wage level. This system of tying wages to skills is called the skills-wage 
nexus. 
The aim of the skill-wage nexus is to help workers improve their standard of living: 
The objective then is to improve the skills of workers so that they can get increased wages 
and improve their standard of living.... 
It is possible then not only for workers to get an across the board wage increase annually 
which is negotiated by their union, but they can also have access to a second wage increase 
by being regraded on the basis of their higher skills (Machin, 1993:2—3). 
COSATU's skills-wage nexus ties the level of wages exclusively to skill competency: 
Provided you can demonstrate that you can competently perform the job to the required 
standard within specified conditions you will be regraded at a higher level (Machin, 
1993:2). 
A limitation of COSATU's wage-skills nexus approach is that it does not directly address 
the relationship between wages and skills on the one hand and productivity and economic 
performance on the other hand. It is true that the wage-skill nexus links the wage to a skill 
level which is based on attaining specific levels of performance. But the assessment takes 
place by an accredited body outside the workplace. Thereafter this approach appears to 
leave the responsibility for achieving the same level of performance from the employee 
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entirely up to management. At the very least, the COSATU documents are completely 
silent about the performance of employees in the workplace. 
There is a danger that the wage-skills nexus approach can become a very formalistic and 
static approach. Skills, and hence wages, will become dominated by certification as the 
attainment of a certificate showing that the employee has reached the next level of skill 
will immediately bring about a rise in the employee's wage regardless of whether that 
employee's contribution in adding value to the enterprise has changed or not. Such an 
approach is bound to work to the detriment of the economic performance of the enterprise 
and undermine efforts to survive not to mention becoming internationally competitive. 
There is another reason why it is important for COSATU to be concerned about the 
productivity of labour. Greater productivity is often seen by labour as only enhancing 
company profits, which it does do. However greater labour productivity also increases 
workers' wages. In fact, it is only highly productive enterprises that can sustain the 
payment of high wages to their workers. Enterprises with low levels of productivity can 
only afford to pay workers low wages over the long run. It is therefore in the interest of 
both management and labour to ensure that enterprises have high levels of productivity. 
It is therefore necessary for COSATU to takes its approach to wages, skills and training a 
step further to include the economic performance of the enterprise as well. The next 
section argues that the best way this can be achieved is to incorporate worker participation 
into the approach. 
8.6 The case for worker participation 
The starting point of my argument is the study done by Blinder and others in which they 
tried to determine the form of wage payment (the 'compensation scheme') that would 
contribute most to enhancing productivity, and hence to economic performance of 
enterprises. Their finding is so important that it is worth quoting: 
A major finding of all the papers in the book — one that was not expected when the book 
was initially planned — is that whatever compensation scheme is used, meaningful worker 
participation, beyond labour representation in boards of directors, enhances productivity 
(Blinder, 1990:vii). 
Blinder is not alone in coming to this conclusion. In fact there is a vast body of literature 
that comes to the same conclusion, namely that meaningful worker participation in the 
workplace and beyond enhances productivity and the economic performance of the 
enterprise. It also reduces worker alienation which generally has a beneficial effect on 
workplace performance. Numerous examples and references — too many to go into here — 
are cited in the book by Hodgson (1984:135—46). He demonstrates however that: 
There is overwhelming evidence that increased worker participation reduces work 
alienation and raises productivity (Hodgson, 1984:135). 
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On the macro-economic level worker participation has also proven itself. The Federal 
Republic of Germany's system of co-determination is effectively a system of co- 
management by labour. Since the early 1950's the German economy has become one of 
the world's strongest economies, an achievement it has sustained for four decades (See 
Maree, 1992). 
Closer to home, a company operating in Atlantis in the Western Cape, Cape Cabinets, 
which produces wooden TV and music centre cabinets, started being threatened in 1983 
by imported plastic components. In response it switched from autocratic management to a 
participative management style. The result was an increase in labour productivity of 26 
percent while its annual stock turnover increased from 4,2 to 7,8 over the period 
1985—1987. As a result it won a National Productivity Award in 1988 (Cape Cabinets, 
1988:2—7; Jones and Maree, 1989: 10—14). 
The implications of these findings are that all the stakeholders in the textile industry stand 
to gain from the introduction of worker participation systems in textile companies. 
Workers could find themselves more fulfilled, working conditions could improve, 
productivity and the quality of the products could increase, heightened productivity could 
potentially lead to higher profits, higher wages and lower prices. 
In order to introduce meaningful worker participation both management and SACTWU 
would have to support it as either of them has the power to block its development on the 
shopfloor and much more would be achieved if they both gave it their strong support. 
In view of the importance of achieving international competitiveness as soon as possible, 
the introduction of worker participation schemes in the textile industry should commence 
sooner rather than later. It is my contention that the union should commit itself to worker 
participation in the industry at the enterprise level as soon as possible. It should then 
provide organisers and shop stewards with comprehensive training on all aspects of 
worker participation including its potential and pitfalls. Management of textile companies 
should also familiarise themselves with the principles and techniques of worker 
participation and enter into consultation and negotiation with SACTWU about the 
introduction of worker participation schemes in their enterprises. Although there are 
bound to be hitches in the process of introducing worker participation systems, the 
outcome would most likely be to the benefit of all the parties in the textile pipeline. 
8.7 Survey of Western Cape textile worker attitudes 
A survey conducted among textile workers in the Western Cape provides an indication of 
worker attitudes towards participation in the workplace. It was conducted in the last 
quarter of 1992 from a random stratified sample of fourteen companies in four districts in 
the Western Cape: Cape Town, Bellville, Atlantis and Paarl. The companies range from 
small (less than 200 employees) to large (more than 400 employees) and were engaged in 
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spinning, weaving, knitting, dyeing and finishing of apparel, household and industrial 
products.2 
One hundred employees were interviewed. Of these 93 percent were Coloured and 7 
percent African; 59 percent male and 41 percent female; 60 percent were workers, 29 
percent shop stewards, and the remaining 11 percent supervisors. Fifty one percent of all 
interviewees were operators. The educational level of the respondents was quite high in 
that 82 percent had received at least a high school education. Ninety percent of the 
employees interviewed belonged to a union. The overwhelming majority (87 out of 90) 
belonged to SACTWU. Hence 87 percent of employees interviewed were SACTWU 
members. 
In response to the statement, 'to be able to export and remain competitive with other 
manufacturers many textile manufacturers think that overall efficiency in the textile 
industry needs to improve', all the employees interviewed (100 percent) said they would 
support improving the economic performance of their firms. Sixty one percent said their 
support would be very strong while a further 37 percent would give strong support. Only 2 
percent indicated a weak support. Furthermore, 91 percent were prepared to assume 
responsibility for their firm's economic performance. This includes sharing responsibility 
for reaching production targets and implementing quality production. What workers 
expected in return for their commitment to improving quality and productivity were, in 
order of importance, more money, training and a better relationship with management 
based on consultation and communication. 
Sixty nine percent of employees interviewed considered the level of quality of their 
company's products to range from high to very high. The six factors (in descending order 
of frequency) which they considered to account for the high level of quality were: (1) 
workers' performance has improved; (2) high yarn quality; (3) reliability of machines; (4) 
workers are quality conscious; (5) high co-operation between workers and management; 
and (6) new machines. The five most frequently mentioned areas where they thought the 
greatest improvement could be made to the level of quality were: (1) training of workers; 
(2) improving raw material quality; (3) management's attitude to workers; (4) quality 
control and checking; and (5) machine reliability and maintenance. 
Of the employees interviewed 81 percent had their wages and working conditions 
bargained at the plant or firm level and 17 percent on an industrial council. On the issue of 
where productivity issues should be bargained, 66 percent preferred the plant, 15 percent 
industrial councils, and 18 percent did not know. The main reasons advanced for 
preferring plant level were that conditions were different at each company and that 
workers and management know what is happening at the plant. 
2. The survey was conducted by Nalin Nair, research trainee of the Industrial Relations Project in the 
Department of Sociology. It was designed to supplement the research work on textiles for the Industrial 
Strategy Project. 
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Little consultation of employees on investment in new technology takes place. Out of 33 
respondents, 22 were not consulted about the purchase of new machines, only 1 was 
consulted about its implications for the production process, while no-one was told what 
the implications were for existing or new jobs. 
In response to the question whether the union has discussed issues of participation and 
responsibility before, 28 out of 38 respondents said 'no', while 22 out of 28 thought that 
workers and union officials should begin such discussions. 
In conclusion, although the survey is focused on SACTWU members in the Western Cape, 
the findings nevertheless suggest that the union's members are prepared to take up worker 
participation in the workplace in order to improve the economic efficiency and 
performance of the companies they work in. The experience of SACTWU in running the 
Zenzeleni Clothing co-operative has most probably also given the union experience in 
running an enterprise that can be put to good use in training and preparing its members to 
participate in production issues in companies. It is therefore recommended that SACTWU 
should strive to introduce worker participation in production issues on the shopfloor 
without delay. 
Chapter Nine: Conclusions: Striving towards 
international competitiveness 
The aim of this chapter is to summarise the paper's major recommendations and to discuss 
the implications of the restructuring proposals in terms of their job-loss and job-creation 
potential. It is important to note that the recommendations focus on the spinning, weaving 
and finishing subsectors of the textile industry, but could also have relevance for other 
subsectors. 
91 Recommendations directed mainly at companies 
(a) Restructure by moving into higher value-added products 
The major finding of the study, based on an examination of seven successful South 
African textile companies, is that their advantage is based on the production of 
differentiated, higher value-added goods. Their products are either: 
specialised (such as fabric decoration), or 
fill a particular market niche, or 
excel in quality. 
The study has also shown that the South African textile industry is not competitive in 
basic commodities because the local cost of production far exceeds that in South and East 
Asian countries. 
South African textile companies will therefore have to restructure over the next decade in 
order to move away from basic commodities production, into higher value-added and 
differentiated products for niche markets. But that alone will not suffice to ensure 
international competitiveness or retain current markets. South African textile producers 
must also become customer-focused, striving to meet exact specifications and develop 
good relations with customers. The strategy adopted by Courtaulds UK (outlined in 
Chapter Five) and by South African Nylon Spinners (SANS), should be emulated by 
South African textile companies. 
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(b) Become internationally competitive by attaining organisational efficiency 
and investing in new technology. 
There are two ways in which textile companies can strive to become internationally 
competitive: 
improving their organisational efficiency 
investing in new technology 
Improving Organisational Efficiency 
This requires the implementation of organisational management techniques appropriate to 
each company. These include, amongst others, Total Quality Management with kaizen 
(continuous improvement), Computer Aided Production Management, and the Just In 
Time approach.1 These techniques enhance important aspects of production such as 
flexibility and the reduction of lead times in order to respond rapidly to market demand. 
Such techniques also save costs by reducing stock and work in progress. Such reductions 
have become crucial in the face of competition from the Far East where these techniques 
are well applied. 
Investment in New Technology 
Research by the Textile Federation has demonstrated that spinning and weaving 
machinery in South Africa is very old in comparison with other countries. In South Africa, 
67 percent of spindles and 66 percent of shuttleless looms are more than ten years old. 
These figures compare adversely with international standards: in Austria only 32 percent 
of shuttleless looms were more than ten years old in 1988, and in Australia, the 
comparable figure was 40 percent. Because new technology results in productivity and 
quality improvements, it is extremely important for South African textile companies to 
move closer to state-of-the-art technology through new investments. Significantly, the 
successful internationally-competitive companies examined in this paper had a 
considerably higher proportion of new technology than the South African average. 
Updated technology is necessary not only to achieve international competitiveness, but to 
sustain exports. The chapter on Turkey's textile industry demonstrated that companies 
capable of sustaining exports must invest in new technology so that the industry remains 
near the technological frontier. Without such investment, the state has to adopt 
unsustainable measures to assist companies to export. Such measures led to a collapse in 
the rapid growth of textile exports in Turkey in the late 19 80's. 
1. See Bessant, 1991, for a good discussion on the application of these techniques. 
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(c) The textile industry must prepare to become fully integrated into GATT 
The pending integration into GAiT could represents a potential threat for which the textile 
industry should be prepared. 
The integration into GATT will result in the reduction of all forms of protection, 
especially the high tariff protection on specific textile items. An export incentive such as 
GElS is also likely to be phased out because it is not in keeping with GATT requirements 
and because of its high cost. South African textile producers, like the Turkish and British, 
will then start sensing that they are 'on their own' and should use the opportunities of the 
intervening period to resiructure their enterprises in order to make them internationally 
competitive in the long term. 
One such opportunity is the fact that South Africa is not a party to Multi-Fibre 
Arrangement, and therefore not subject to the quotas applied to the developing countries 
that belong to the MFA. As the MFA is to be phased out over ten years from the date of 
commencement of the Uruguay Round, South African textile companies have a once-off 
opportunity for a decade to penetrate or expand their exports into markets from which 
many developing countries are barred due to their MFA quotas. 
(d) There is a clear need to adopt a textile filiere (pipeline) approach in 
developing an industrial strategy 
The textile industry should adopt a filiere approach in the development of an industrial 
strategy for the industry. As the chapter on the textile-clothing pipeline showed, the length 
of the pipeline and the large levels of stock held within it, lead to significant volatility in 
demand for textiles. In order to resolve this problem there must be a high level of co- 
operation between companies in different stages of the production process, that is, 
between fibre producers, textile mills, clothing companies and retailers. Such co-operation 
is essential if Quick Response techniques are to be applied along the whole pipeline. 
Quick Response has the potential of reducing stocks held in the pipeline and, at the same 
time, introducing large cost savings and improving profits of companies in the pipeline. 
In the South African experience the retailing sector (with some notable exceptions) 
appears to present problems in the pipeline on two grounds: 
It seems that retail chains have not been making an effort to co-operate in efforts 
to implement Quick Response in the pipeline. 
Retailers, particularly retail chains, appear to engage in high mark-ups and do not 
pass cost savings made by textile and clothing firms on to the customers. 
Without the active commitment of the retailing sector to Quick Response techniques in the 
textile-clothing pipeline, even the most carefully crafted industrial strategy for the textile 
industry faces the risk of running aground on the rock of unresponsive retailing chains. 
Apart from finding alternative retailing outlets, producers in the textile and clothing 
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industries should strive to gain the commitment of major retailers in the development of an 
industrial strategy for the textile filiere. 
9.2 Recommendations directed mainly at the state and 
labour 
The role of the state and labour (including organised labour) are no less important than the 
role of textile companies in achieving international competitiveness. 
(a) Tripartism should become a permanent feature of the textile-clothing 
fihiere 
The establishment of two long-term planning forums, the Panel and the Task Force, which 
include all the major stakeholders in the textile filiere, is a welcome development. These 
forums include the state, all industries in the textile pipeline, and organised labour. The 
forums have an opportunity of developing long-term policy that does not seek to favour 
one sectional interest above another, but tries to ensure the long-term survival and growth 
of the whole filiere. This approach is also the best way of maximising potential 
employment creation on a sustainable basis across the whole fihiere. 
In addition, there is a need for stability in the govermnent's trade policy towards the fihiere 
and for the adaptability of the policy in relation to changing circumstances and 
developments. In order to prevent a return to the conflicts and instability generated by the 
promotion of sectional interests, a permanent tripartite body should be established to 
regulate state policy in relation to all the industries in the textile fihiere. Such a structure 
would be in the best position to ensure that the interests of the filiere as a whole are always 
kept in mind. 
(b) The state should remove the anti-export bias in the textile industry 
Research by Pedro Belli and others of the World Bank has demonstrated conclusively that 
there is an anti-export bias in the trade regime applicable to the textile industry. In order to 
promote international competitiveness that includes a strong export component, it is 
important that the anti-export bias be eradicated as soon as possible. 
One method commonly applied in many other countries is to ensure that exporters have 
easy access to duty-free imports. The challenge is to develop a policy that will ensure the 
easy access without leading to extensive corruption of the policy. The state must also 
identify other methods that are within GAiTs constitutional framework to assist textile 
producers to invest in new technology and facilitate the export of textiles. 
One potential model that should be explored is the Istanbul Textile and Clothing 
Exporters' Association, ITKIB, in Turkey. ITKIB conducts research into international 
market trends and conditions with a view to promoting Turkish textile and clothing 
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exports. In addition to disseminating its research findings, it runs courses for management 
on modern production techniques aimed at enhancing the economic performance of their 
companies. In South Africa the role of the Textile Federation could be extended, or a new 
parastatal body could be established with similar objectives and functions to that of 
ITKIB. 
(c) SACTWU should extend the wage-skill nexus approach to incorporate an 
ongoing concern with productivity 
SACTWU, as part of COSATU, is in the process of adopting a wage-skill nexus approach 
as the basis on which workers should be rewarded for their skills. While there is much to 
recommend this approach, which corresponds quite closely to the Textile Industry 
Training Board's competence-based training, the wage-nexus approach risks placing the 
responsibility for achieving higher productivity entirely on management's shoulders. 
SACTWU should modify the wage-nexus approach in order to link workers' level of 
payment to their own production performance as well. Through negotiations they should 
ensure that the economic gains of greater productivity and efficiency are fairly distributed 
between the company and its employees. In the long term, high wages can only be 
sustained by high productivity and hence it is important for the union to become involved 
in the economic performance of the enterprise as well. 
(d) SACTWU should adopt a policy of worker participation in production 
issues 
According to Blinder (1990) extensive research indicates that meaningful worker 
participation enhances productivity regardless of the compensation scheme used. Such a 
finding constitutes strong economic grounds for SACTWU to place a priority on preparing 
workers for participation in production-related issues in the workplace. The union, which 
was built on a tradition of worker participation, would thereby continue and expand its 
democratic tradition. 
SACTWU should also advocate worker participation schemes in the workplace. Such 
schemes need equally strong support and commitment from management in order to 
succeed, and it is necessary for the union and management to co-operate in such ventures. 
These will not emerge without conflict, but problems should be resolvable through 
negotiation. 
The introduction and support of worker participation schemes by SACTWU and 
management constitutes an important component in the strategy to achieve international 
competitiveness. 
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9.3 Implications of industrial restructuring for 
employment 
A major objective of the industrial strategy is to achieve labour-absorbing economic 
growth in the textile industry. The restructuring strategy suggested in this study does 
however entail the destruction of jobs as well. It is important to grasp this unpleasant 
aspect of industrial restructuring and deal with it. 
In order to take cognisance of this crucial factor, an industrial restructuring policy in the 
textile industry should: 
commence with developing the textile industry's capacity to expand in the 
production of higher value-added goods. If there is overall growth in the industry 
it will be easier to re-employ workers who could lose their jobs due to the shut- 
down of basic commodity plants. 
strive to minimise the number of retrenched workers by developing an adjustment 
policy that provides for the retraining of workers for placement in alternative 
jobs. 
During a period of recession and high unemployment, existing jobs should not be 
destroyed unless there is no alternative. There should thus not be a rush to liberalise the 
South African trade regime as this could have a devastating effect on employment in the 
textile industry. However, as South Africa re-enters the international arena, its policy- 
makers may have no other option but to start abolishing protection. In Turkey the state 
also started losing control over policy regulation in order to try to ensure that the European 
markets remained open to it in the long run. The South African state may also have very 
little room to manoeuvre in the years ahead. It is therefore important to implement a 
strategy aimed at becoming internationally competitive as soon as possible. 
It is important to try and estimate the impact of such restructuring on the number of jobs 
that will be lost and created. Doing so reliably is extremely difficult. It is clear, however, 
that in order to undertake such an exercise properly, the employment effect along the 
whole textile filiere must be assessed. An intervention at any point in the filiere could have 
an impact throughout. For instance, the closure of spinning and weaving mills would 
impact on the cotton growing industry, amongst others. The provision of cheaper and 
better fabric to the clothing industry could, on the other hand, lead to an increase in 
employment in clothing manufacturing. 
It seems likely that more jobs will be created in the clothing industry than will be 
destroyed in the textile industry as a result of restructuring. This is because of the 
inherently more labour intensive nature of clothing production. 
The industrial restructuring proposed in this paper does entail the eventual demise of the 
more labour-intensive spinning and weaving mills and the expansion of more capital- 
intensive dyeing, printing and finishing processes. It is thus likely that more jobs will be 
lost than created in the short-term in the textile industry. It is however most likely that 
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more jobs will be created in the clothing industry than will be lost in the textile industry. 
There are however imponderables such as the effects on employment in the cotton 
growing industry. The answer to this depends on whether it is possible to grow cotton at 
internationally competitive prices in South Africa. 
In conclusion it is worth bearing in mind the observation of the general manager of the 
Turkish textile firm, Bozkurt Mensucat, that in Turkey 'the engine of the textile industry 
has been and still is the garment industry'. It is a salutary reminder that the fate of at least 
the apparel textile industry is inextricably bound up with the fate of the clothing industry 
in South Africa. Far from being in competition with each other, the two industries are 
symbiotically dependent on each other. It is therefore in the interest of each to ensure the 
survival and growth of the other. 
The restructuring proposed for the textile industry in this study therefore also impacts on 
the clothing industry. To the extent that it succeeds in lowering the cost and improving the 
quality of textile products, it will not only ensure the survival and growth of the textile 
industry, but the clothing industry as well. Together, the two industries have a potential for 
creating more jobs than will be lost in the textile industry alone due to the proposed 
restructuring. 
Bibliography 
Altman, M. 1992. Submission to BTT regarding Proposed Nov92 Tariff Schedule, 
September, mimeograph. 
Altman, M. 1993. Tinker, Tailor, Tailor's Son... Developing the South African Clothing 
Industry, Report submitted to the Industry Strategy Project (Economics Department, 
University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg). 
Ansal, H. 1991. The Turkish Textile and Clothing Industry: Technological Change, 
International Competitiveness and Employment, World Employment Programme 
Research, Working Paper (ILO, Geneva) 
Anson, R. and P Simpson, 1991. 'World Textile Trade and Production Trends,' Textile 
Outlook International, July: 8—37. 
Arsian, I. and M Celasun, 1992. Sustainability of Industrial Exporting in a Liberalizing 
Economy: the Turkish Experience, paper presented at the UNU/WIDER Conference on 
'Trade and Industrialization Reconsidered (Phase II),' OECD Centre, Paris, November. 
Balassa, B. 1982. Turkey: Industrialization and Trade Strategy (The World Bank, 
Washington). 
Barker, H A F. 1963. 'A Comment on Textile Development in South Africa,' South 
African Journal of Economics, 31:285—303. 
Barthold, A. 1991. 'Arbeitskosten in der Textilindustrie,' Textilveredlung, 26, 2, 46—8. 
Belli, P. M Finger and A Ballivian, 1993. South Africa: Review of Trade Policy Issues, 
World Bank, Southern Africa Department, Informal Discussion Papers on Aspects of the 
Economy of South Africa, Paper No.4. 
Bessant, J. 1991. Managing Advanced Manufacturing Technology (Hutchinson, London) 
Best, Michael 1990. The New Competition: Institutions of Industrial Restructuring 
(Harvard University Press, Cambridge) 
Black, A. 1991. 'Current Trends in South African Industrial Policy: Selective intervention, 
Trade Orientation and Concessionary Industrial Finance,' paper, biannual meeting, 
Economic Trends Research Group, University of Cape Town. 
Blinder, A. ed., 1990. Paying for Productivity. A Look at the Evidence (The Brookings 
Institution, Washington) 
THE TEXTILE SECTOR 151 
Bodgener, J. and L Duruiz, 1991. 'The Turkish Textile and aothing Industry,' Textile 
Outlook International, July:50—66. 
Boer, J. 1992a. 'A Pipeline Approach for South African Textiles,' Textile Topics, 4,4:2—3. 
Boer, J. 1992b. 'The Quick Response Approach in a Textile Pipeline,' Textile Topics, 
4,4:8—9. 
Bridgman, D. 1993. Industrial Targeting Project: Results and Conclusions, WESGRO, 
Cape Town. 
BTI (Board of Trade and Industry), 1950. The Textile Manufacturing Industry, Report 
No.323. 
BTI, 1988. The Development and Structural Adjustment Programme of the Apparel 
Textile and Clothing Industries, Report No.2646 (Pretoria) 
BTI, 1991. Guide: 'Incentives in Terms of the Development and Structural Adjustment 
Programme of the Apparel Textile and Clothing Industries' (BTI Report No.2646) 
Business Day, 15 January 1988. 
Cape Cabinets, 1988. 'National Productivity Award 1988' (Zebra Production, Cape Town) 
Colman, P. 1990. 'A Gap Analysis of Quality: a Study of the Discrepancies between the 
Suppliers and Purchasers of Textiles in South Africa', Technical Report, Graduate School 
of Business, University of Cape Town. 
COSATU PRP (Participatory Research Project), 1992, Training/Grading Report 19—30 
October 1992 (COSATU, mimeograph) 
Courtaulds Textiles, 1991. Reports andAccounts 1991. 
CSS (Central Statistical Service), 1985. Census of Manufacturing. Statistics according to 
Major Groups and Subgroups: South Africa, Report No.30—01-01 (Pretoria, Government 
Printer) 
CSS, 1992. 'Utilisation of Production Capacity, Manufacturing,' Statistical News Release 
P.3043, September. 
CSS, 1993. 'Labour Statistics: Employment and Salaries and Wages: Mining and 
Quarrying, Manufacturing, Construction and Electricity, October 1992,' Statistical News 
Release P0242.1, February. 
Dertouzos, M. R Lester and R Solow, 1989. Made in America: Regaining the Productive 
Edge (The MIT Press, Cambridge). 
152 INDUSTRIAL STRATEGY PROJECT 
du Toit, B. 1978. Ukubamba Amadolo. Workers' Struggles in the South African Textile 
Industry (London, Onyx Press). 
Ellsworth, P. and J Leith, 1975. The International Economy, fifth edition (Macmillan, New 
York) 
Emby, P. 1987. Problems in the Textile Industry and in its Interface with the Clothing 
Industry, Technical Report, Graduate School of Business, University of Cape Town. 
Fairhurst, H. E Totten and J Boer, Final Report to the Board of Trade and Industry on the 
Retail-Clothing-Textile Pipeline (Pretoria, National Productivity Institute) 
Financial Times Survey, 1991. World Textiles, 3 October. 
Friedman, S. 1987. Building Tomorrow Today (Johannesburg, Ravan Press). 
GAIT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), 1990a, International Trade 89—90, 
Vol.1 (Geneva, GAiT). 
GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), 1990b, International Trade 89—90, 
Vol.11 (Geneva, GATT). 
GAiT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), 1991, Multilateral Trade Negotiations: 
The Uruguay Round (GATF Secretariat, mimeograph) 
Godfrey, S. 1992. Industrial Council Digest (Cape Town, Industrial Relations Project). 
Greenaway, D. ed., 1988. Economic Development and International Trade (St Martin 
Press, New York). 
Grimwade, N. 1989. International Trade. New Patterns of Trade, Production and 
Investment (Routledge, London) 
GSB (Graduate School of Business), undated. University of Cape Town, Study of 
industrial relations in the South African textile industry, (mimeograph). 
Hardill, I. and P Wynarczyk, 1991. 'A Research Note: Information Technology and 
Company Performance in the Textile Industry,' New Technology, Work and Employment, 
6,1:65—70. 
Hatty, Paul 1992. Proposals of the Clothing & Textile Industry, First Proposal, January. 
Hirsch, A. 1978. Ducking and Weaving: Problems of Worker Organisation in the Textile 
Industry of Durban-Pinetown-Maritzburg (BA Honours Dissertation, Political Studies 
Department, University of the Witwatersrand). 
THE TEXTILE SECTOR 153 
Hirsch, A. 1979. 'An Introduction to Textile Worker Organisation in Natal,' South African 
Labour Bulletin, 4, 8:3—42. 
Holden, M. 1992. 'The Structure and Incidence of Protection in South Africa,' ch.14 in P 
Black and B Dollery, eds, Leading Issues in South African Microeconomics (Southern 
Book Publishers, Halfway House), 183—92. 
Hopper, G. 1990. Industry Pipeline Analysis: a Strategic Model, Technical Report, 
Graduate School of Business, University of Cape Town. 
Hunter, A. 1990. Quick Response in Apparel Manufacturing (Textile Institute, 
Manchester) 
ICAC (International Cotton Advisory Committee), 1992. 'Background Information for 
ICAC Discussion of the Impact of Internal Policies in Pakistan on International Cotton 
Prices and the Spinning Industries of Cotton Importing Countries,' Standing Committee, 
Washington, DC. 
IDC (Industrial Development Corporation), 1990, Ondersoek na die 
TarieJbeskermingsbeleid: Ontleding van die Tariefstruktuur (Bylae C) (IDC, Sandton) 
IDC, 1992a. Sectoral Data Series Manufacturing (IDC, Sandton) 
IDC, 1992b. Trade Data for Clothing and Textile Industry Vol 2: (Per HS-Code) (IDC, 
Sandton) 
ITMA (International Textile Manufacturers' Association), 1991a. International 
Production Cost Comparison Spinning/Weaving (ITMA) 
ITMA, 1991b. International Textile Shipments Statistics, vol.14, International Textile 
Manufacturers' Association, Zurich. 
Jones, G. and J Maree, 1989. 'Worker Participation and Industrial Democracy: Two South 
African Case Studies,' Industrial Relations Journal of South Africa, 9,2:1—16. 
Kell, G. and S Marchese, 199?. 'Developing Countries' Exports of Textiles and Metals: 
the Question of Sustainability of Recent Growth,' Unctad Review, No.3:15—25 (United 
Nations, Geneva) 
Keller, E. 1992. 'South Africa, GATI & the MFA,' Textile Topics, 4,2:12. 
Kilduff, P D F. 1989. Corporate Responses to Recessionary Conditions in the United 
Kingdom Textile Industry (D.PhiL, Department of Textile Industries, University of Leeds) 
Kurt Salmon Associates, 1986. New Technology for Quick Response (mimeograph). 
154 INDUSTRIAL STRATEGY PROJECT 
Machin, A. 1993. 'Summary of Training/Skills/Grading /Adult Basic Education Issues' 
(mimeograph) 
Maree, J. 1986. An Analysis of the Independent Trade Unions in South Africa in the 1970s 
(PhD Thesis, Faculty of Social Science and Humanities, University of Cape Town). 
Mare; J. 1992. 'The Economic Case for Worker Participation: Co-determination,' ch. 13 
in R Schrire, 1992:237—259. 
McGregor, R. 1993. McGregor's Who Owns Whom, 13th edition, Juta & Co, Cape Town. 
Mody, A. and D Wheeler, 1990. Automation and World Competition (Macmillan Press, 
London) 
MPCS (Marketing and Planning Consulting Services), 1991, The South African 
Woolboard Study 1991 Volume III Reputation Audit. 
Munkholt, P. 1991. 'Internationalism: the Future of Textiles,' Textile Month, 
February :33—35. 
Nagel, A. 1990. Textile Industry Training Board Competency-Based Modular Aprrentice 
Training Seminar (Kwazulu Training Trust, Amanzintoti) 
NCF (National Clothing Federation), 1992. The South African Clothing Industry, Annual 
Report (Bedfordview, NCF). 
NCF, 1993. The South African Clothing Industry, 1993 Executive Handbook/Diary 
(Bedfordview, NCF). 
NPI (National Productivity Institute), 1991. Productivity Statistics 1991 (Pretoria, NPI). 
NUTW (National Union of Textile Workers), 1982. 'Industrial Councils — New 
Dimensions to the Struggle in the Textile Industry,' South African Labour Bulletin, 7, 
4&5:94—101. 
Page, S. and C Stephens, 1992. Trading with South Africa: the Policy Options for the 
Economic Community, ODI Special Report (Overseas Development Institute, London) 
Plant Location International, 1993. Industrial Targeting Study for Regions A and E of 
South Africa. Executive Summary (Plant Location International and Price Waterhouse) 
Porter, Michael, 1990. The Competitive Advantage of Nations (Macmillan Press, 
London). 
Riddell, 1985. The Thatcher Government (Basil Blackwell, Oxford). 
THE TEXTILE SECTOR 155 
Riley, A. and F Cillie, 1990. Manpower Skills and International Competitiveness in the 
Textile Industiy 1990 (NPI, Pretoria) 
Schrire, R. ed., 1992. Wealth or Poverty? Critical Choices for South Africa (Oxford 
University Press, Cape Town) 
Steenkamp Committee, 1983. The Policy of Protection in regard to Textiles and Clothing, 
Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Textile and Clothing Industries (Republic of 
South Africa, Pretoria) 
Strolz, H. 1991. 'Global Excesses in Primary Textiles,' Textile Month, January:33—39. 
Textile Industries Dyegest southern africa, 'Highest Labour Cost Increases for South 
Africa,' May 1991; 
Textile Month, 'Swiss back at top of labour cost league,' February 1991; 
TITB (Textile Industry Training Board), 1991. Textile Industry Training Needs Survey 
(TITB, Ellis Park) 
TITB, 1992. Progress Report (mimeograph, 24 August) 
Toyne, B., J Arpan, A Barnett, D Ricks, T Shimp and others, 1984. The Global Textile 
Industry (George Allen & Unwin, London) 
Trade Monitor, 1993. No.1, February (Trade Monitoring Project, University of Cape 
Town) 
Tussie, D. 1987. The Less Developed Countries and the World Trading System. A 
Challenge to the GATT (St.Martin's Press, New York) 
UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development), 1990, Handbook on 
International Trade and Development Statistics 1989 (New York, United Nations). 
UNIDO, 1990. Industry and Development. Global Report 1990/91, United Nations 
Industrial Development Organization, Vienna. 
UNIDO, 1992. The Textiles and Clothing Sector. Expert Group Meeting on the 
Implications of the Single European Market for Industrialization in Developing Countries. 
Van Coller, J. 1992. 'Short Term Outlook for Textiles,' Textile Topics, 4, 4:4—5. 
van der Riet, D. 1989. 'Quick Response,' Conference Proceedings, South African 
Production & Inventory Control Society, Durban, A3—1 to A3—17. 
Watkins, K. 1992. Fixing the Rules: North-South Issues in International Trade and the 
GAIT Uruguay Round (Catholic Institute for International Relations, London) 
156 INDUSTRIAL STRATEGY PROJECT 
Weekly Mail, 6—12 September, 1991. 
Werner International, 1992. Spinning and Weaving Labour Cost Comparisons 
Summer/Autumn 1991 (Werner, Brussels). 
World Bank, 1976. 'Measuring Comparative Advantage — Local Cost of Foreign 
Exchange,' Economic Development Institute Course Notes (mimeograph). 
Yasar, E. 1992. Personal communication to author from Istanbul. 
Other Industrial Strategy Titles 
An Industrial Strategy for the Pulp and Paper Sector 
An Industrial Strategy for the Clothing Sector 
An Industrial Strategy for the Building Material Supplies Sector 
An Industrial Strategy for the Household Electrical Durables Sector 
An Industrial Strategy for the Commodity Plastics Sector 
An Industrial Strategy for the Mineral Beneficiation and Mineral Based Fabrication 
Sectors 
An Industrial Strategy for the Electrical Distribution Equipment and the Professional 
Electronics Sectors 
An Industrial Strategy for the Food Processing and Beverages Sector 
An Industrial Strategy for the Footwear Sector 
An Industrial Strategy for the Engineering Sector 
An Industrial Strategy for the Microenterprise Sector 
A Trade Policy for Industrial Growth 
A Policy for Regional Industrial Development 
There is widespread agreement that if post-apartheid 
South Africa is to succeed economically, there will have to 
be a sustained improvement in industrial performance. 
Thus far, there have been no major policy oriented studies 
of South Africa's principal industrial sectors. This series of 
reports, published under the umbrella of the 
"Contemporary Policy Issues" series, seeks to fill this gap. 
Although the South African textile industry forms a vital link in the local 
textile—clothing pipeline, it has been in decline since the early 1980s. 
Current production and employment levels are well below 1981 levels. In 
addition, the industry will face increased international competition over the 
next decade as tariffs start declining due to the successful conclusion of the 
Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 
What can the textile industry do to enhance its international competitiveness? 
Can it compete successfully against imports, and establish export markets? In 
which markets should it compete? Should it let go of certain types of products 
and concentrate on others? 
Johann Maree answers these questions through a comprehensive analysis of 
the industry. By means of in-depth case studies of successful companies in the 
spinning, weaving and finishing sectors, he formulates a strategy for the 
industry: in essence to concentrate production on differentiated, higher 
value-added products in niche markets. 
The study also examines the human resource needs of the industry, and the 
vital role that the South African Clothing and Textile Workers' Union can play 
in improving productivity. 
ISBN 0—7992—1580—5 
UC T 
9 780799 215809 _________ 
